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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM

(

November 12, 1982 Conference
List 2, Sheet 4
No. 82-5466-CSX
WELSH

v.

Cert to Wisconsin S.Ct.
(Callow, for the Ct)
(Abrahamson & Heffernan, diss.)

WISCONSIN

State/Criminal

1.

SUMMARY:

Timely

Petr contends that his Fourth Amendment rights

were violated when police arrested him in his home, without a
warrant, on account of a l
2.

vil traffic offense.

FACTS and PROCEEDINGS BELOW:

At about 8:30 one evening,

a witness saw petr driving a car which was weaving from side to
side.

The car then drove into a field and stopped.

spoke

to petr,

and

intoxicated or sick.
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formed

the

The witness

impression that he was either

Petr left the scene, abandoning the car in
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the

field.

The

police

:l -

arrived

approximately twenty minutes

later, and the witness described the foregoing events.
A police license check revealed that petr was the registered
owner of the car, lived near by, and had been arrested several
weeks

earlier

disturbance."

in

connection

Armed

with

this

with

"an

information,

alcohol-related
but

without

warrant, two police officers proceeded to petr's house.
knocked on the door

and ~

a

They

admitted by petr's stepdaughter, who

told them petr had just "stumbled in" and beckoned them toward
the

stairs.

encountered

As
petr' s

the

officers

wife who

were

going

asked what was

upstairs,
going on.

they
The

officers told her there had been an accident, that petr might be
involved,

and

that

they

thought

petr

might

be

intoxicated.

' - Petr's wife told the officers that petr had just got into bed,
said that "something has to be done," and motioned them toward
the bedroom.
Petr was lying on the bed, and appeared very intoxicated.
The officers informed him that he was under arrest for driving
while under the influence of intoxicants, a civil violation under
Wisconsin law.

Although neither the petn nor the Wis.S.Ct.'s

opinion describes the subsequent events, it appears that petr was
taken down to the police station where he refused to submit to a
breathalyzer test.

Pursuant to Wis.Stat. §343.305(2) (a), petr's

driver's license was revoked for sixty days for failure to take
the test.
Petr challenged the license revocation, contending that the
officers' entry into his home and warrantless arrest violated his

/

r

rights under the Fourth Amendment and the Wisconsin Constitution.
The Wis.Ct.App. agreed that the warrantless entry into the home
was unreasonable, but remanded for a finding regarding consent to
the

The

entry.

Wis.S.Ct.

reversed

decision revoking petr's license.
U.S. 573

and

reinstated

the

TC's

Citing Payton v. New York, 445

(1980) , and Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.s. 200

(1979) ,

the majority held that a warrantless arrest in a person's home
could be justified by probable cause and exigent circumstances.
The majority ruled that at the time the officers entered petr's
house, they had probable cause to believe petr had been driving
under the influence of intoxicants.

The lack of a warrant for

the arrest was justified by exigent circumstances: the officers
needed

to

perform

the

breathalyzer

intoxication had time to wear off.

test

before

petr' s

This might not have been

possible if the officers had taken time to get a warrant first.
The ct found

it unnecessary to reach the question whether the

entry was consensual.
Two

justices

They

dissented.

asserted

that

neither

Wisconsin law nor the Constitution permits warrantless arrests
for

civil

traffic

offenses

committed

outside

an

officer's

presence: that exigent circumstances cannot justify a warrantless
entry into a person's home to arrest for a civil traffic offense:
that the officers did not have probable cause at the time they
entered

petr's

home:

and

that

there

were

no

exigent

circumstances.
3.
the

CONTENTIONS:

Fourth

Amendment

In a very brief petn, petr contends that
does

not

permit

a

warrantless,

non-

(

consensual
offense.

entry

into

the home

to arrest

for

a

non-jailable

Petr also contends that the decision of the Wis.S.Ct.

conflicts with Payton v. New York, because there was no showing
that the officers could not have obtained a warrant.
not challenge the finding of probable cause.

Petr does

He asserts that the

issue whether the entry was consensual is not before the Court.
4.

DISCUSSION:

If

the entry

into petr' s

home was

non-

consensual, this case appears to raise two issues left open by
Payton v. New York: whether exigent circumstances can justify a
warrantless entry into a home to effect an arrest and, if so,
whether

the entry can be

jailable
exigent
(

entry,

civil

violation.

circumstances
445

justified if

u.s.,

In

Payton,

"arguably"

might

the offense is a nonthe Court
justify a

stated that
warrantless

at 583, but the issue was left open.

Payton

involved a felony arrest, so the civil-violation issue did not
arise.
Although these are issues the Court may eventually wish to
address,

this

does

not

appear

to

be

an . appropriate

case.

Although the courts below did not reach the issue, it seems clear
that the entry into petr 's home was consensual.

The officers

knocked on petr's door and were admitted by petr's stepdaughter,
and

both

officers

the

stepdaughter

going

and

up to petr' s

petr' s

bedroom.

wife

acquiesced

Moreover,

in

the

if

the

even

warrantless arrest had violated petr's Fourth Amendment rights,
it

is

not

clear

that

the

Fourth

subsequent revocation of petr' s
breathalyzer

test.

License

Amendment

license for

revocation

is

would

bar

the

failure to take a
apparently

a

ci vi 1

(

penalty under Wisconsin law.

To my knowledge, this Court has

never held that the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule applies
to subsequent civil proceedings.

Neither petr nor the Wis.s . ct.

has addressed this issue.
5.

RECOMMENDATION:

There is no conflict, and the posture

of this case makes it a poor one in which to review petr's Fourth
Amendment claims.

A response might be helpful to clarify the

issues but I doubt whether one is necessary.
recommend denial.

There is no response.
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1st DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
EDWARD G. WELSH v. WISCONSIN
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME
COURT OF WISCONSIN
No. 82-5466.

Decided January-, 1983

The petition for writ of certiorari is denied.
JUSTICE MARSHALL, dissenting from the denial of
certiorari.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld a warrantless,
nighttime entry into petitioner's home to arrest him for a suspected violation of the state motor vehicle code. The court
concluded that exigent circumstances justified the entry. In
my view, this decision is inconsistent with the Fourth
Amendment. It is also at odds with decisions from several
other jurisdictions. I would grant certiorari to consider
what circumstances are sufficiently exigent to justify a warrantless entry to arrest, a question we explicitly left open in
Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573, 583 (1980).
I
On the rainy night of April27, 1978, a lone witness, Randy
J ablonic, saw a car swerve and leave the road, eventually
coming to a stop in an open field. J ablonic stopped his truck
and asked a passerby to call the police. Prior to the arrival
of the police, the driver of the car emerged from it and approached Jablonic's truck. The driver asked Jablonic for a
ride home but J ablonic told him that they should wait for assistance in removing or repairing the car rather than leave it
in the field. The driver nevertheless left the scene. Jablonic remained behind. A few minutes later, the police arrived. J ablonic told one officer what he had seen and that he
thought the driver was either very inebriated or very sick.
The officer checked the motor vehicle registration of the
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abandoned vehicle and learned that it was registered to
petitioner.
Without securing a warrant, the police proceeded to petitioner's home and arrived at about 9:00p.m. When petitioner's step-daughter answered the door, the police successfully
sought entry into the house. 1 They proceeded upstairs to
petitioner's bedroom where they found him lying naked in
bed. The police then placed petitioner under arrest for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicants, in violation of Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1). Petitioner was
taken to the police station where he refused to undergo a
breathalyzer test required by § 343.305(2)(b).
On September 5, 1980, a hearing was held to determine the
reasonableness of petitioner's refusal to submit to the breathalyzer test. The primary issue at the hearing was whether
petitioner was under a valid arrest at the time he was requested to submit to the test. See § 343.305(2)(b)(1) and
(7)(c). After receiving evidence, the trial court concluded
that exigent circumstances made the warrantless arrest
valid, and that the petitioner's refusal to take the test was
therefore improper. 2 Accordingly, the court issued an order
suspending petitioner's operating license for 60 days. The
Wisconsin Court of Appeals vacated the suspension order. 3
The appellate court concluded that the warrantless arrest of
petitioner in his home violated the Fourth Amendment because the State had not established the existence of exigent
circumstances. The Wisconsin Supreme Court in turn re1
The state trial court never decided whether there was consent to the
entry, because it deemed decision of that issue unnecessary in light of its
finding that exigent circumstances were present. The Wisconsin Court of
Appeals had remanded for consideration of this issue, but was reversed by
the Wisconsin Supreme Court.
2
Prior to the hearing on the refusal to take the breathalyzer test, an
evidentiary hearing was held on petitioner's motion attacking the circuit
court's jurisdiction on the ground that the arrest was invalid. The court's
ruling on this issue formed the basis for its ruling at the refusal hearing.
8
The court remanded the case for further findings as to whether the
police had entered petitioner's home with permission. See note 2, supra.
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versed the court of appeals. In doing so, the majority relied
upon three putative exigent circumstances: the need for "hot
pursuit" of a suspect, the need to prevent physical harm to
the offender and the public, and the need to prevent destruction of the evidence of intoxication. 108 Wis. 2d 319,
336--338 (1982).
II
Absent exigent circumstances, the police may not enter a
person's home to make a felony arrest without a warrant.
Payton v. New York, 445 U. S., at 590. "[P]hysical entry of
the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the
Fourth Amendment is directed," United States v. United
States District Court, 407 U. S. 297, 313 (1972), and this
Court has repeatedly declared that "the Fourth Amendment
accords special protection to the home." United States v.
Johnson,-- U.S.,--,--, n. 13 (1982). 4 The Court
has thus refused to excuse the absence of a warrant "without
a showing by those who seek exemption from the constitutional mandate that the exigencies of the situation made that
cause imperative." McDonald v. United States, 335 U. S.
451, 456 (1948).
In my view, the nature of the offense in this case precludes
any claim of exigency. When the police entered petitioner's
home, they suspected only that he had violated Wis. Stat.
§ 346.63(1), which prohibits driving while under the influence
of an intoxicant. Under state law, a first offense of
§ 346.63(1) is not a crime but rather is merely a civil "traffic
regulation" requiring forfeiture of one's license. § 346.65(2);
State v. Albrecht, 98 Wis. 2d 663, 673, 298 N. W. 2d 196 (Ct.
App. 1980). A second or subsequent offense within a fiveyear period converts the violation into a misdemeanor, but
the record does not show that petitioner has any prior
•see, e. g., Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 211 (1981); United
States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U. S. 543, 561 (1976); Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,474-475 (1971); McDonald v. United States, 335
U. S. 451, 456 (1948); Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10, 13-15 (1948);
Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 630 (1886).
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record. 5 Nonetheless, the State argues that the existence of
exigent circumstances does not "depend on the seriousness of
the crime the suspect is believed to have committed." 6 I
disagree. While a serious crime by itself does not create any
exigency, a minor offense severely undercuts application of
the exigent circumstance exception to the warrant requirement. In particular, the kind of offense for which petitioner
was arrested simply cannot justify the egregious intrusion
into petitioner's privacy that resulted from the warrantless
entry. 7 See Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10, 14-15
(1948) (finding of exceptional circumstances depends on balancing of need for law enforcement with right to privacy).
The Wisconsin Supreme Court erroneously invoked a variety of exigencies traditionally discussed in the context of felony arrests in order to justify the intrusion here. First, the
court below referred to the "hot pursuit" doctrine, but this
Court has applied that doctrine only when the police were "in
hot pursuit of a fleeing felon." Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U. S.
30, 35 (1970) (citing prior cases) (emphasis added). More5
See State v. Welsh, 108 Wis. 2d 319, 343 n. 1 (1982) (Abramson, J.,
dissenting); Reply Br. of State of Wisconsin in Wis. Sup. Ct., at 2.
6
Br. in Wise. Sup. Ct., at 14. Thus, it contended that the "same exigent circumstances can justify the warrantless, nonconsensual entry to arrest for a misdemeanor as to arrest for a felony." !d. , at 14-15.
7
Respondent asserts that petitioner never raised this particular issue in
the courts below. The record suggests otherwise. For example, in his
brief before the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, petitioner's primary argument was that the warrantless arrest was unconstitutional absent exigent
circumstances. At page 5 of his Brief, Petitioner stated that:
In the present case, the entry of the defendant's dwelling without consent was to effect a warrantless arrest in a civil-type of special proceeding.
It is highly doubtful whether the seriousness of this offense under any
circumstance could justify such an intrusion into one's home by the
State .. . ."
Similarly, in arguing for affirmance of the Court of Appeals' decision before
the State Supreme Court, petitioner noted that a first violation of§ 346.63
was not a crime and also relied upon the Court of Appeals' analysis as to
the absence of exigent circumstances due in part to the relatively minor
nature of the offense. Brief at 4, &-7.
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over, this case did not involve circumstances even resembling
"hot pursuit." The lower court also thought that an imminent threat to safety existed, but this case is far removed
from those involving entries to arrest armed felons. See
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294, 29S-299 (1967). There
was simply no evidence that petitioner was "armed, violent
or dangerous to himself or others," Ct. App. at 5, particularly
since his car lay abandoned in a field. See 108 Wis. 2d, at
356-357 (Abramson, J., dissenting). Finally, the lower
court relied upon the possibility that evidence of the traffic
offense would be lost over time because alcohol metabolizes
relatively quickly in the blood. However, the threatened destruction of evidence of the violation of a civil traffic regulation can not justify a warrantless entry into a home.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court compounded its error by
adopting a "presumption favoring warrantless arrests which
are a result 'of an ongoing investigation in the field.'" 108
Wis. 2d 319, 338 (quoting W. LaFave, Search and Seizure
§ 6.1, at 391 (1978 ed.)). Any such "presumption" eviscerates the constitutional mandate that the decision whether to
invade an individual's privacy should "as a rule, ... be decided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman or government
enforcement agent." Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S.,
at 14. If warrantless arrests inside a home were "presumed" to be valid, the special protection afforded the home
in our past Fourth Amendment decisions would have little
meaning. Indeed, as the Court declared in Payton v. New
York, a case involving afelony arrest, it is a "'basic principle
of Fourth Amendment law'" that warrantless arrests inside a
home are "presumptively unreasonable." 445 U. S., at 586
(emphasis added).
The State Supreme Court's decision in this case is plainly
inconsistent with numerous lower court decisions holding
that the gravity of an offense is an important consideration in
determining the presence of exigent circumstances. The
most frequently cited case in this area, 8 Dorman v. United
8

Donnino & Girese, Exigent Circumstances for a Warrantless Home
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States, 435 F. 2d 385 (CADC 1970), describes the gravity of
an offense as a principal factor bearing upon the existence of
exigent circumstances. I d., at 392. Both federal and state
courts have repeatedly relied upon the seriousness of an offense in evaluating a claim of exigency. See, e. g., United
States v. Campbell, 581 F. 2d 22 (CA2 1978) (armed robbery); Virgin Islands v. Gereau, 502 F. 2d 914 (CA3 1974)
(murder); United States v. Shye, 492 F. 2d 886 (CA6 1974)
(bank robbery); State v. Allison, 298 N.C. 135, 257 S. E. 2d
417 (1979) (murder); Commonwealth v. Williams, 483 Pa.
293, 396 A. 2d 640, cert. denied, 446 U. S. 912 (1979) (murder); Cook v. State, 35 Md. App. 430, 371 A. 2d 433 (1977)
(armed robbery); People v. Fitzpatrick, 32 N. Y. 2d 499, 346
N.Y.S. 2d 793, 300 N. E. 2d 139 (1973) (murder). Cf. People
v. Sanders, 59 Ill. App. 3d 6, 16 Ill. Dec. 437, 374 N. E. 2d
1315 (1978) (burglary without weapons not a crime of violence
for this purpose); State v. Bennett, 295 N. W. 2d 5 (S.D.
1980) (distribution of controlled substances not a grave offense). By contrast, the Wisconsin Supreme Court andrespondent have not cited a single case finding exigent circumstances when a minor offense was involved.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court decision permits a warrantless entry into a home to arrest someone suspected of committing at most a misdemeanor. Because this decision has
serious implications for the special protection afforded the
home under the Fourth Amendment, and because it conflicts
with prevailing case law, I would grant certiorari.

Arrest, 45 Alb. L. Rev. 90, 99 (1980).
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
EDWARD G. WELSH v. WISCONSIN
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME
COURT OF WISCONSIN
No. 82-5466.

Decided January-, 1983

Opinion of JusTICE O'CONNOR respecting the denial of the
petition for a writ of certiorari.
In my view, there are at least two compelling reasons to
deny a writ of certiorari in this case, and the dissent from denial neglects both reasons.
First, the facts of the case, as reported in the decision
below, show clearly that when the police officer proceeded to
petitioner's residence, both petitioner's wife and his stepdaughter consented to the officer's entry into the residence.
When the 'stepdaughter answered thedoor, she stated to the
police officer that petitioner had "'just stumbled in . . . . ' 'He
is upstairs, and motioned the way-towards the stairs, allowing us to pass."' State v. Welsh, 108 Wis. 2d 319, 325 (1982).
When the officer began to ascend the stairs, he encountered
petitioner's wife, who, according to the officer, "gave her
consent for us to go up, because she said, 'Yes, he is in bed.
He just got into bed. And something has to be done,'
.... and motioned us to the bedroom." Id., at 325--326.
The dissent from denial states that "[t]he state trial court
never decided whether there was consent to the entry, because it deemed decision of that issue unnecessary in light of
its finding that exigent circumstances were present." Ante,
at 2, n. 1. Nevertheless, where the facts of the case, as
adopted by the Wisconsin Supreme Court, show that resolution of the issue presented for review may prove unnecessary
since the judgment below was clearly correct on another
ground, it would be inappropriate to grant certiorari. See
The Monrosa v. Carbon Black Export, Inc., 359 U. S. 180
(1959).
Second, in the court below, petitioner only questioned

2
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whether the police had probable cause to believe that a misdemeanor had been committed because "the police had no
·. ·idea that the defendant had ever been charged much less convicted of a prior violation of operating a motor vehicle while
intoxicated." Brief for Defendant-Appellant in Wisconsin
Supreme Court 6. * The petitioner did not argue below that
that the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibited a
warrantless arrest for non-jailable offenses. Therefore, the
petitioner may not raise this argument for the first tim~ in
this Court. See Cardinale v. Louisiana, 394 U. S. 437
(1969).
Irrespective of any possible conflict between the decision
below and prevailing case-law, the factual and procedural
posture of this particular case makes it a poor vehicle for
resolution of any constitutional issues presented.

*In the response to the petition, the respondent states that "[u]ntil he
filed his responding brief in Wisconsin Supreme Court, the petitioner always treated the case as one involving a misdemeanor and only contended
that the issues were whether the police possessed probable cause and
whether exigent circumstances existed to justify the warrantless arrest."
Response to Petn. 6

/
·

Justice White
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Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
EDWARD G. WELSH v. WISCONSIN
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME
COURT OF WISCONSIN
No. 82-5466. Decided February-, 1983

The petition for writ of certiorari is denied.
JUSTICE MARSHALL, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN joins,
dissenting from the denial of certiorari.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld a warrantless,
nighttime entry into petitioner's home to arrest him for a suspected violation of the state motor vehicle code. The court
concluded that exigent circumstances justified the entry. In
my view, this decision is inconsistent with the Fourth
Amendment. It is also at odds with decisions from several
other jurisdictions. I would gr3nt !!.ertiorari to~~der
what circumstances are sufficiently~nt to justify a warrant ess en ry to arrest, a question we explicitly left open in
Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573, 583 (1980).
I

On the rainy night of April27, 1978, a lone witness, Randy
Jablonic, saw a car swerve and leave the road, eventually
coming to a stop in an open field. J ablonic stopped his truck
and asked a passerby to call the police. Prior to the arrival
of the police, the driver of the car emerged from it and approached Jablonic's truck. The driver asked Jablonic for a
ride home but J ablonic told him that they should wait for assistance in removing or repairing the car rather than leave it
in the field. The driver nevertheless left the scene. Jablonic remained behind. A few minutes later, the police arrived. J ablonic told one officer what he had seen and that he
thought the driver was either very inebriated or very sick.
The officer checked the motor vehicle registration of the

>IJJ~. ~
1M~. il t)rl
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abandoned vehicle and learned that it was registered to
petitioner.
Without securing a warrant, the police proceeded to petitioner's home and arrived at about 9:00p.m. When petitioner's step-daughter answered the door, the police successfully
sought entry into the house. 1 They proceeded upstairs to
petitioner's bedroom where they found him lying naked in
bed. The police then placed petitioner under arrest for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxi' The state trial court never decided whether there was consent to the
entry, because it deemed decision of that issue unnecessary in light of its
finding that exigent circumstances were present. The Wisconsin Court of
Appeals had remanded for consideration of this issue, but was reversed by
the Wisconsin Supreme Court.
JUSTICE O'CONNOR asserts that "the facts of the case" demonstrate consent to the warrantless entry so that the "judgment below was clearly correct on another ground." Ante, at 1. However, the "facts" on which JusTICE O'CONNOR relies consist primarily of verbatim quotations from the
testimony of one of the arresting officers. This version of the facts was
highly disputed at the trial court. For instance, petitioner's wife denied
having consented to the entry into the house and her testimony contradicted that of the arresting officer in several other ways. Moreover, even
under the officer's version, consent to a warrantless entry cannot be
readily inferred. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10, 13 (1948)
("Entry to defendant's living quarters . . . was granted in submission to
authority rather than as an understanding and intentional waiver of a constitutional right.").
The trial court never addressed the conflict in the testimony, never made
factual findings pertinent to the issue of consent, and never ruled on the
issue. That is precisely why the Wisconsin Court of Apeals remanded the
case for findings as to consent. Decision of Wis. Ct. App. at 7 ("Because
consent is an undecided issue, the trial court's findings are inadequate.").
Similarly, the issue of consent was neither bried nor argued before the
Wisconsin Supreme Court, nor did that court even purport to analyze the
matter, let alone resolve factual disputes in the record.
A dubious decision should not stand simply because, after a remand, a
trial court might make factual findings that would lead to reinstatement of
the original judgment on an entirely different ground. The Monrosa v.
Carbon Black Export, Inc., 359 U. S. 180 (1959), is in my view inapposite.
This is hardly a case where the issue raised by petitioner is posed "abstractly," id., at 184, or where the Court would not be deciding a case "in
the context of meaningful litigation," ibid.
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cants, in violation of Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1). Petitioner was
taken to the police station where he refused to undergo a
breathalyzer test required by § 343.305(2)(b).
On September 5, 1980, a hearing was held to determine the
reasonableness of petitioner's refusal to submit to the breathalyzer test. The primary issue at the hearing was whether
petitioner was under a valid arrest at the time he was requested to submit to the test. See ~43.305(2)(b)(l) and
(7)(c). After receiving evidence, the trial court concluded
that ~igent circumstances made the warrantless arrest
valid, and that the petitioner's refusal to take the test was
therefore improper. 2 Accordingly, the court issued an order
suspending petitioner's operating license for 60 days. The
Wisconsin Court of Appeals vacated the suspension order. 3
The appellate court concluded that the warrantless arrest of
petitioner in his home violated the Fourth Amendment because the State had not established the existence of exigent
circumstances. The Wisconsin Supreme Court in turn reversed the court of appeals. In doing so, the majority relied
upon three putative exigent circumstances: the need for "hot
pursuit" of a suspect, the need to prevent physical harm to
the offender and the public, and the need to prevent destruction of the evidence of intoxication. 108 Wis. 2d 319,
336--338 (1982).
II
Absent exigent circumstances, the police may not enter a
person's home to make a felony arrest without a warrant.
Payton v. New York, 445 U. S., at 590. "[P]hysical entry of
the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the
Fourth Amendment is directed," United States v. United
States District Court, 407 U. S. 297, 313 (1972), and this
Prior to the hearing on the refusal to take the breathalyzer test, an
evidentiary hearing was held on petitioner's motion attacking the circuit
court's jurisdiction on the ground that the arrest was invalid. The court's
ruling on this issue formed the basis for its ruling at the refusal hearing.
3
The court remanded the case for further findings as to whether the
police had entered petitioner's home with permission. See note 2, supra.
2

4
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Court has repeatedly declared that "the Fourth Amendment
accords special protection to the home." United States v.
Johnson,-- U.S.,--,--, n. 13 (1982). 4 The Court
has thus refused to excuse the absence of a warrant "without
a showing by those who seek exemption from the constitutional mandate that the exigencies of the situation made that
cause imperative." McDonald v. United States, 335 U. S.
451, 456 (1948).
In my view, th nature of the offense in tl}is case pr~des
an:Lclaim of exigency.
e
e po 1ce entered petitioner's
home, they suspected only that he had violated Wis. Stat.
§ 346.63(1), which prohibits driving while under the influence
of an intoxicant. Under state law, a first offense of
§ 346.63(1) is not a crime but rather is merely a civil "traffic
re~ion" requiriniforfeiture of one's license. § 346.65(2);
State v. Albrecht, 98 Wis. 2d 663, 673, 298 N. W. 2d 196 (Ct.
App. 1980). A second or subsequent offense within a fiveyear period converts the violation into a misdemeanor, but
the record does not show that petitioner has any prior
record. 5 Nonetheless, the State argues that the existence of
exigent circumstances does not "depend on the seriousness of
the crime the suspect is believed to have committed." 6 I
disagree. While a serious crime by itself does not create any
exigency, a minor offense severely undercuts application of
the exigent circumstance exception to the warrant requirement. In particular, the kind of offense for which petitioner
was arrested simply cannot justify the egregious intrusion
into petitioner's privacy that resulted from the warrantless
'See, e. g., Steagald v. United States, 451 U. S. 204, 211 (1981); United
States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U. S. 543, 561 (1976); Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 474-475 (1971); McDonald v. United States, 335
U. S. 451, 456 (1948); Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10, 13-15 (1948);
Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 630 (1886).
5
See State v. Welsh, 108 Wis. 2d 319, 343 n. 1 (1982) (Abramson, J.,
dissenting); Reply Br. of State of Wisconsin in Wis. Sup. Ct., at 2.
6
Br. in Wise. Sup. Ct., at 14. Thus, it contended that the "same exigent circumstances can justify the warrantless, nonconsensual entry to arrest for a misdemeanor as to arrest for a felony." Id., at 14-15.
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entry. 7 See Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10, 14-15
(1948) (finding of exceptional circumstances depends on balancing of need for law enforcement with right to privacy).
The Wisconsin Supreme Court erroneously invoked a variety of exigencies traditionally discussed in the context of felony arrests in order to justify the intrusion here. First, the
court below referred to the "hot pursuit" doctrine, but this
Court has applied that doctrine only when the police were "in
hot pursuit of a fleeing felon." Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U. S.
30, 35 (1970) (citing prior cases) (emphasis added). Moreover, this case did not involve circumstances even resembling
"hot pursuit." The lower court also thought that an imminent threat to safety existed, but this case is far removed
from those involving entries to arrest armed felons. See
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294, 29~299 (1967). There
was simply no evidence that petitioner was "armed, violent
or dangerous to himself or others," Ct. App. at 5, particularly
Respondent asserts that petitioner never raised this particular issue in
the courts below, and JUSTICE O'CONNOR contends that petitioner is at- {
tempting to raise an argument "for the first time in this Court." Ante, at
2. The record suggests otherwise. For example, in his brief before the
Wisconsin Court of Appeals, petitioner's primary argument was that the
warrantless arrest was unconstitutional absent exigent circumstances. At
page 5 of his Brief, Petitioner stated that:
"In the present case, the entry of the defendant's dwelling without consent was to effect a warrantless arrest in a civil-type of special proceeding.
It is highly doubtful whether the seriousness of this offense under any
circumstance could justify such an intrusion into one's home by the
State .... "
Thus, the issue addressed in the petition was raised in haec verba by petitioner in the Court of Appeals. That court agreed with petitioner and
ruled that the offense was not sufficiently grave to justify the severe intrusion into petitioner's home. It therefore reversed the trial court's ruling
as to exigent circumstances. The State then brought an appeal to the Wisconsin Supreme Court and argued in part that the existence of exigent circumstances does not "depend on the seriousness of the crime the suspect is
believed to have committed." Br. in Wise. Sup. Ct. at 14. As appellee in
the state supreme court, petitioner chose to rely primarily on the decision
of the Court of Appeals, arguing that it was "correct and founded upon
good law." Br. at 7.
7
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since his car lay abandoned in a field. See 108 Wis. 2d, at
356-357 (Abramson, J., dissenting). Finally, the lower
court relied upon the possibility that evidence of the traffic
offense would be lost over time because alcohol metabolizes
relatively quickly in the blood. However, the threatened de':) /
struction of evidence of the violation of a civil traffic regulation can not justify a warrantless entry into a home.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court compounded its error by
adopting a "presumption favoring warrantless arrests which
are a result 'of an ongoing investigation in the field."' 108
Wis. 2d 319, 338 (quoting W. LaFave, Search and Seizure
§ 6.1, at 391 (1978 ed.)). Any such "presumption" eviscerates the constitutional mandate that the decision whether to
invade an individual's privacy should "as a rule, ... be decided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman or government
enforcement agent." Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S.,
at 14. If warrantless arrests inside a home were "presumed" to be valid, the special protection afforded the home
in our past Fourth Amendment decisions would have little
meaning. Indeed, as the Court declared in Payton v. New
York, a case involving afelony arrest, it is a "'basic principle
of Fourth Amendment law'" that warrantless arrests inside a
home are "presumptively unreasonable." 445 U. S., at 586
(emphasis added).
The State Supreme Court's decision in this case is plainly
inconsistent with numerous lower court decisions holding
that the gravity of an offense is an important consideration in
determining the presence of exigent circumstances. The
most frequently cited case in this area, 8 Dorman v. United
States, 435 F. 2d 385 (CADC 1970), describes the gravity of
an offense as a principal factor bearing upon the existence of
exigent circumstances. I d., at 392. Both federal and state
courts have repeatedly relied upon the seriousness of an offense in evaluating a claim of exigency. See, e. g., United
States v. Campbell, 581 F. 2d 22 (CA2 1978) (armed rob-

J

/

8

Donnino & Girese, Exigent Circumstances for a Warrantless Home
Arrest, 45 Alb. L. Rev. 90, 99 (1980).

/
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bery); Virgin Islands v. Gereau, 502 F. 2d 914 (CA3 1974)
(murder); United States v. Shye, 492 F. 2d 886 (CA6 1974)
(bank robbery); State v. Allison, 298 N.C. 135, 257 S. E. 2d
417 (1979) (murder); Commonwealth v. Williams, 483 Pa.
293, 396 A. 2d 640, cert. denied, 446 U. S. 912 (1979) (murder); Cook v. State, 35 Md. App. 430, 371 A. 2d 433 (1977)
(armed robbery); People v. Fitzpatrick, 32 N. Y. 2d 499, 346
N. Y.S. 2d 793, 300 N. E. 2d 139 (1973) (murder). Cf. People
v. Sanders, 59 Ill. App. 3d 6, 16 Ill. Dec. 437, 374 N. E. 2d
1315 (1978) (burglary without weapons not a crime of violence
for this purpose); State v. Bennett, 295 N. W. 2d 5 (S.D.
1980) (distribution of controlled substances not a grave offense). By contrast, the Wisconsin Supreme Court andrespondent have not cited a single case finding exigent circumstances when a minor offense was involved.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court decision permits a warrantless entry into a home to arrest someone suspected of committing at most a misdemeanor. Because this decision has
serious implications for the special protection afforded the
home under the Fourth Amendment, and because it conflicts
with prevailing case law, I would grant certiorari.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

In April 1978, police entered petitioner's home at night
to make a warrantless arrest for drunk driving.

After making the

arrest, the police took petitioner "downtown" for a blood-alcohol
test.

-

Under state law, petitioner could refuse to take the test,

but because he was under arrest a refusal would result in a 60
day forfeiture of driving privileges.
refused to take the test.

Nevertheless, petitioner

When later notified of the impending

forfeiture, petitioner requested a hearing at which he argued
that the arrest was unconstitutional under the fourth amendment
and thus that his refusal to submit to the test was not grounds
for forfeiture under state law.
~

The state court held that the

nonconsensual entry and warrantless arrest were lawful under the
fourth amendment and ordered forfeiture.

Petitioner contests the

constitutional ruling made in that civil proceeding.

II. -ACKGROUND: STATE STATUTES

In Wisconsin it is unlawful to drive "under the

requiring forfeiture of "not more than $200." 346.65(2) Wise
1975

eond ~

within 5 years of the first

~ ~

misdemeanor, carrying a penalty of imprisonment for not less

,....----...

5 days nor more than a year and a potential fine of not more
$500. 346.65(2) Wise. Stat. 1975

The state authorizes police to make warrantless arrests
for any traffic violation, including drunk driving, "if the

---

officer has reasonable grounds to believe that the person is
violating or has violated a traffic regulation." 345.22 Wise.
Stat. 1975

Wisconsin also provides that any person who drives on

the state's public roads "shall be deemed to have given consent

~to
~~f

a chemical test

~is

breath, blood or urine, for the purpose

determining the alcoholic content of his blood if arrested and

issued a citation for driving •••• while under the influence of
an intoxicant." 343 -305(1) Wise. Stat. 1975

If, after arrest and

citation, a person refuses to take a chemical test for alcohol,
"no test shall be given."

However, if the refusal is

unreasonable, the state shall suspend the suspect's driving
privilege for 60 days. 343.305(2) Wise. Stat. 1975

III. FACTS & DECISIONS BELOW

On the evening of April 24, 1978, petitioner ran his car
off the road into a field.

No one was hurt in the accident.

A

eyewitness called the police, but petitioner walked away from the
scene before the police arrived.

The eyewitness told the police

that petitioner seemed drunk and had staggered off in a
northwesterly direction.

The police checked the license on the

abandonned car and determined that it belonged to petitioner.
They drove directly to petitioner's house, arriving there within
30 minutes of the accident.

The time was approximately 9:00p.m.

Petitioner's two 16 year old stepdaughters answered the
---,

officers' knock and informed them that petitioner was upstairs in
bed.

It is unclear what else was said at the door or whether the

stepdaughters invited the officers in.

In any event, the

officers entered the house and proceeded up the stairs to
petitioner's bedroom.
petitioner's wife.

Somewhere along the way, they encountered

It is unclear whether

~nsented

to the

entry.
The officers found petitioner lying naked on his bed.
They ordered him to get up and dress, which he did.

As soon as

he was dressed, the police arrested him and took him downtown for
a blood-alcohol test.

Petitioner was told that because he was

under arrest refusal to take the test would result in a 60 day
~~-

.

~

forfeiture of driving privileges.l

Nevertheless, petitioner

refused to take the test and the test was not administered.

On

April 26, 1978, petitioner was notified that his driving
privileges would be suspended.

On May 4, he requested a hearing

on the reasonableness of the refusal to take the test.
Meanwhile, the state learned that petitioner had
I~

1\

received a prior drunk driving citation within the past five

-----...,.. -years. Because a second

f~

~

~k~

offense of drunk driving is a

~

misdemeanor, the state vacated the citation and filed a criminal 2.. ~
complaint against petitioner charging him with the misdemeanor
1 under state law, a person who is not under arrest for drunk
driving may refuse to submit to a blood-alcohol test without
penalty. 343.305 Wise. Stat. 1975 {A-3)

~
~d..->

·~

offense.

For some reason, this complaint was not filed until

February 1980.

In March 1980, petitioner filed a motion to

dismiss the criminal complaint on the ground that his arrest was
illegal and thus that the court had no in personam jurisdiction.
After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found that the
warrantless entry and arrest were lawful and dismissed the
motion.

~ ~ 0,

~ ~~( 1978
~~·

~

Petitioner has not appealed that decision.

the

~easonableness hearin~( that

was held.

In September

petitioner had requested in

Petitioner's driving privileges had not been

forfeited up to that point, and there is no explanation for the
more than two-year delay in granting petitioner's hearing
request.
It

\1

At the reasonableness hearing, the trial court held that
the arrest was lawful under the fourth amendment and thus that
petitioner's refusal to submit to the blood-alcohol test
warranted forfeiture.

._ . . J-

The trial court based its decision on a

1

"'

CD

find ~ of ewo exigent circumstances -hot pursuit and

pres~ tion of evidence.

&t~·

~~

Because the trial court found that the

entry and warrantless arrest were justified by the exigent
circumstances, it did not resolve the question whether the entry
was consensual.
The state court of appeals held that the exigent
found by the trial court did not justify as a
matter of law the entry and warrantless arrest in this case.
court reversed and remanded on the issue of consent.

~~erne

court reversed the appellate

'\..

trial court's order.

cou· r·~

The

The state

and re-enstated the

The supreme court held that three exigent

circumstances justified the entry and arrest - imminent threat to
safety, hot pursuit, and preservation of evidence.
Meanwhile, petitioner's misdemeanor trial was held in
the trial court. A footnote in petitioner's brief informs the
--·--·- ·---·----......,.
Court that testimony concerning petitioner's intoxication was
obtained by the allegedly unlawful entry and arrest and was used

- ~tioner

in that trial.

was convicted on the misdemeanor

charge and appealed to the Wisconsin Court of Appeals.
appeal is stayed pending decision in this case.
'

That

No appeal of

- ---

that criminal proceeding is before this Court.

-------------------------------------IV. JURISDICTION & PROCEDURAL POSTURE

This is a civil forfeiture case.

In the cert memos and

in Mark's notes to you there was some concern that the order
appealed from asked this Court to apply the exclusionary rule in
a civil proceeding - something this Court has never done.
However, petitioner. does not rely on the exclusionary rule to
vindicate his fourth amendment rights.
I\

~~brS

Instead, he claims that

\\

under state law his refusal to submit to the blood-alcohol

~ should

not result in forfeiture of his driving privileges.

Petitioner argues that under state law) refusal is grounds for
forfeiture only if made while he is under lawful a ir est
-:;::::::::__

his arrest was unlawful under the fourth amendment.
Although it is not clear that state law required a
lawful arrest before refusal became grounds for forfeiture, 2 the

Footnote(s) 2 will appear on following pages •

.

·;

bench memo: Welsh --
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state court reached the fourth amendment question and held that
the arrest was lawful.

An adequate and independent state ground

would deprive this Court of jurisdiction to review the forfeiture
decision.

Unfortunately, there does not seem to be one.

The

/)..(...f)

supreme court stated: "To prevail in this case, the state must
prove the co-existence of probable cause and exigent

~

It is clear that the state court
I)

~

~

analyzed these two factors under the fourth amendment.

Petitioner does not contest the state court's determination of
probable cause.
before the Court.

-~

/2--/-7Ch

circumstances, justifying the officer's conduct at the
defendant's residence."

~

Moreover, the issue of consent is not

~ cf

~i-D

curr~

Although there is convincing evidence that the

--~~
officers made a consensual entry, the state court expressly ~
refused to resolve this issue.

If this Court finds that the

exigent circumstances did not justify the nonconsensual entry, it

----

must remand for resolution of the consent issue. Because there
---------~,~---is ~me conflicting t~stimony on this issue, ~ two crucial
~
witnesses have never testified, 3 I disagree with Justice

~Alf
~wv/Ai._

2After the reasonableness hearing, the state amended 343.305 so SO~
that refusal to submit to a blood-alcohol test was grounds for
forfeiture only if the suspect were under lawful arrest at the
time. The trial court at one point hinted that forfeiture was
appropriate as long as petitioner had been told that he was under
arrest when he refused the test, whether or not the arrest was
lawful. Unfortunately the supreme court did not bear this out.
Footnote(s} 3 will appear on following pages.

·.
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state court reached the fourth amendment question and held that
the arrest was lawful.

An adequate and independent state ground

would deprive this Court of jurisdiction to review the
decision.

forfeiture ~~

Unfortunately, there does not seem to be one.

The

supreme court stated: "To prevail in this case, the state must
prove the co-existence of probable cause and exigent

~
-~

~
_____-/

It is clear that the state court
I)

~

/2-;;tJ...i

circumstances, justifying the officer's conduct at the
defendant's residence."

~

~

analyzed these two factors under the fourth amendment •

.

Petitioner does not cont;: t the state court's determination of
probable cause.
before the Court.

Moreover, the issue of consent is not

dYt-

~ Lf
iD

curr~

Although there is convincing evidence tliat the

officers made a consensual entry, the state court expre
refused to resolve this issue.

~-

.

If this Court finds tha

--

~

exigent circumstances did not justify the nonconsensual

must remand
for resolution of the consent--=:--.........issue. Becau
..
,
is some conflicting testimony on this issue, ~ two cr ... ~--~
witnesses have never testified, 3 I disagree with Justice

~Alr

~~

2After the reasonableness hearing, the state amended 343.305 so SD ~
that refusal to submit to a blood-alcohol test was grounds for
forfeiture only if the suspect were under lawful arrest at the
time. The trial court at one point hinted that forfeiture was
appropriate as long as petitioner had been told that he was under
arrest when he refused the test, whether or not the arrest was
lawful. Unfortunately the supreme court did not bear this out.
Footnote(s) 3 will appear on following pages.

O'Connor's suggestion that this Court may affirm on the ground of
consent.
It seems that cert. should never have been granted in
c::;.__..

----

this case.

The issue of consent and the testimony of the two
- - --·
--stepdaughters is crucial to the determination of whether there

-

was a constitutional violation in this case.

A decision by this

Court on what exigent circumstances may justify a nonconsensual
nighttime entry into the horne to make a warrantless arrest will
be a major decision in the a,_r_ea of fourth amendment law.

~ ~tle

This

casJ>) hardly seems the vehicle for such a decision,

~ specially since the case probably could be resolved on far
simpler grounds.

If it is possible to DIG this case, I believe

that would be the wisest course.

VI. DISCUSSION

In Payton v. New York, 445

u.s.

573, 576 (1979), this

Court held that the fourth amendment "prohibits the police from
making a warrantless and nonconsensual entry into a suspect's
horne in order to make a routine felony arrest."

In that case,

the Court had "no occasion to consider the sort of emergency or
dangerous situation ••• that would justify a warrantless entry
into a horne for the purposes of ••• arrest." 445 U.S. at 583
3The two stepdaughters were unavailable at the hearing and the
trial court found it unnecessary to call them to testify in light
of its holding on exigent circumstances •

. i.t

'

"

Other cases have relied on exigent circumstances to uphold
nonconsensual entry into a suspect's horne to make a warrantless
felony arrest.
(1976)

See, e.g., United States v. Santana, 427

38

(hot pursuit justifies nonconsensual entry to make

warrantless felony arrest); Warden v. Hayden, 387
(same)

u.s.

u.s.

294 (1967)

This case presents two issues as yet unresolved by this

Court. ~ may exigent circumstances ever justify
nonconsensual entry to make a warrantless arrest for a non-felony

---

off~ ? ~ if so do the exigent circumstances found by the
state court in this case justify as a matter of law the
nonconsensual entry to make a warrantless arrest for the noncriminal offense of drunk driving?
If the Court holds that the exigent circumstances found
here do not justify the warrantless entry and arrest, it need not
address the broader question whether exigent circumstances ever
may justify nonconsensual entry into the horne to make a
warrantless arrest for a non-felony offense.
categorical "no" would be unwise.

I believe that a

As petitoner's brief points

out, battery is a misdemeanor in Wisconsin.

It seems

inconceivable that a call from a wife that her husband has just
beaten her and is

~t

horne threatening to beat her again would not

justify a nonconsensual entry to make a warrantless arrest.
There may be rna~ other misdemeanors that will justify
nonconsensual entries and warrantless arrests.

The

reasonableness of a nonconsensual entry to make a warrantless
arrest depends on whether the state's interest in making the
entry and arrest in the manner chosen outweighs the privacy

interests compromised by the intrusion.

This "balancing act"
___.>-

requires a case-by-case analysis.

The nature of the offense is

but one of the factors that should weigh in the balance.
Applying the exigency exception to this case, the state
'-l'-

:7 (~

#

t.- y.

) ~hree exi ent circumstances justified

supreme
the nonco

sual entry and warrantless arrest

/-;S;)

~to safet¥r1fot pursuit,

an~servation

1 imminent

of evidence.

threat

However, I

believe that for the most part the first two exigencies collapse
l o..

into the third, making preservation of evidence the only exigency
offered to justify the entry and

arrest ~

A. Imminent Threat to Public Safety

Applying the "imminent threat to safety doctrine," the

state court reasoned that if arrest were not made promptly, the
blood-alcohol test would be ineffective, prosecution and
conviction unlikely, and the safety of the state's roads
jeopardized.

While this may be true, inability to convict

because of loss of evidence does not pose an imminent threat to
safety.

The only imminency here was the destruction of evidence.

B. Hot Pursuit

The exigency of "hot pursuit" is more applicable, but
standing alone it does not justify the warrantless entry and
·~

arrest.

This Court twice has relied on the exigency of hot

pursuit to justify nonconsensual entry into a home to make a

·.,.-.

.

_..... ___ -··--···-. ··- ---· .. - ... --- -··-- -··

warrantless arrest.

--·-.

-- - .

...,

...,

United States v. Santana, 427

{1976); warden v. Hayden, 387

u.s.

294 {1966)

u.s.

38

In both cases, the

Court was careful not to use the doctrine of hot pursuit as a
talisman to open the doors of suspects' homes automatically.
Instead, the Court carefully evaluated the totality of the
circumstances before finding that a warrantless entry and arrest
were justified.
In Hayden, the police, acting on the information of two
eyewitnesses, pursued an armed robber to his residence, arriving
minutes after he did.

The officers entered the house without

consent in order to search for and arrest the suspect.

Because

they were in "hot pursuit" of an armed felon, the Court found
that the police had acted reasonably when they made a
nonconsensual entry into the suspect's home.
In Santana, the police were informed that defendant had
just been given some marked money in a heroin transaction.

When

they drove the two blocks to defendant's residence, they saw her
standing in the doorway of her home holding a brown paper bag.
When they approached her shouting "police," she retreated into
the vestibule of her house.

The officers followed her through

the open door and caught her in the vestibule.

The Court held

that the warrantless entry and arrest were justified by the "hot
pursuit" for several reasons.

First, the arrest began when the

police shouted their identity and while defendant was in a public
place.
'-.

She could not defeat the arrest by retreating into a

private place.

Second, once the defendant saw the police, there

was a realistic expectation that she immediately would destroy

the incriminating evidence - in this case the heroin and marked
money that she held in her hand.

The~t

pursuit in this case does not raise the same

concerns as either Hayden or Santana.

Unlike Hayden, petitioner

was unarmed and not suspected of any crime.
~------------

Unlike Santana,

------------------~

petitioner was not standing in his open doorway but was upstairs
in bed when the police made their arrest.

Moreover, it would

have been impossible for petitioner immediately to dispose of the
incriminating evidence of intoxication.

In this case, the state

court found that obtaining an arrest warrant would have created
an undue delay because the "inherent nature of the offense
demanded the suspect's immediate apprehension to accomodate the
dictates of the blood-alcohol test statute."

Thus, the hot

pursuit exigency collapses into the need to preserve evidence
from imminent destruction.

Although the fact that the police

were in "hot pursuit" is a factor that should be considered in
applying the exigency exception, standing alone it adds little to
the analysis.

c.

Imminent Destruction of Evidence

~~

The state court found that because blood metabolizes
alcohol rapidly, an immediate arrest was necessary so that a
blood-alcohol test could be performed.

It found further that

"this situation did not afford the officer ample time in which to
obtain a warrant."

The court thus held that the exigencies made

.1.--;J-

--

nonconsensual entry and a warrantless arrest reasonable under the
fourth amendment.

I disagree for several reasons.

First, the exigency exception, although flexible and
highly fact specific, should be construed as a narrow exception
to the warrant requirement.

Q

The government has the burden of

proving that its actions fit within that narrow exception.

I do

not believe that the government has met its burden in this case.
Application of the exigency exception is essentially a balancing
process.

The government must show that its interest in making

the arrest in the manner that it did outweighs the privacy
interests compromised by the intrusion.

In this case, the police

believed that immediate seizure of petitioner was necessary to
secure probative evidence.

However, assuming that this was so,

the record does not establish that the police proceeded in the

J?~

least intrusiv~nner possible: it is not clear that they ~!:'~
attempted to avoid the intrusion by giving petitioner the
opportunity to surrender at his doorstep.

~~~~

The record shows that ~

~Jv.

the police knocked on the door, identified themselves, and asked ~
if petitioner was at home.

When they received an affirmative

reply, they entered the house and started up the stairs to
petitioner's bedroom.

~

~

The state court expressly failed to ~~~

resolve what if any other conversation occurred at the door.
Thus, it is unclear whether the police obtained consent to enter
or requested that petitioner come to the door.

In cases such as

this where it would pose no danger to the police or to the
preservation of evidence, nor increase the chances of escape, I
believe that the police should give the suspect the opportunity

''

.

'

~

1:"-::J-

/

--

~~

to surrender himself and thus to avoid the invasion of privacy
involved in entry into the horne.

If the suspect willingly would

surrender at the door, the intrusion would be unnecessary.

If

the intrusion is unnecessary to protect a substantial government
interest, it is unreasonable under the fourth amendment.
Second, assuming that the warrantless entry and arrest
were necessary to preserve probative evidence, I am not certain
that in this case the government has shown that its need to
obtain the evidence outweighed the privacy interests compromised
by the intrusion.

At the time of the arrest, the police had

probable cause _:~believ~~~ ~hat pet i tioner had committed a

--

~lvil offense subject to a maximum forfeiture of $200.
Conviction for that offense would not have deprived petitioner of
his driving privileges nor subjected him to any criminal
sanctions.

Drunk driving is a serious problem, and states have a

significant interest in prosecuting and convicting offenders.
However, the state in this case has provided some measure of its
interest in deterring and penalizing the conduct by
characterizing it as a civil rather than a criminal offense and
by the penalty it has prescribed.

I am not sure that the state's

expressed interest warrants the intrusion here.

Furthermore,

under state law petitioner's arrest does not guarantee
preservation of the evidence sought.
A drunk driving suspect may defeat the state's interest
in obtaining probative evidence of intoxication even after a
valid arrest.

Under state law, a person arrested for drunk

driving may refuse to submit to any sort of chemical analysis,

-~

- ------

-

~~::;,.;
-.;...
-

- -

--- ---------- ----

--

----

and the state will respect that refusal. 343.305 Wise. Stat. 1975
The state seeks to deter such a refusal by requiring that a
suspect who exercises his right to refuse the test forfeit his
driving privileges for 60 days.

In this case, that deterrent did

not stop petitioner from exercising his right to refuse the test.
Thus, by virtue of its own law, the state never obtained the
evidence it claims justified its warrantless entry and arrest.

The~te

u.s.

argues that in

~hmerber

v. California, 384

757 (1965), this Court manifested its belief that the

state's interest in obtaining meaningful blood-alcohol tests may
justify warrantless and nonconsensual intrusions of a
significance similar to the one at issue here.
troubling but ultimately distinguishable.

J?' ~~-

~ermerber

is

'"chermerber, the

drunk driving suspect had been involved in an accident in which
others were injured.

He was placed under arrest for a

misdemeanor offense and taken to the hospital for treatment of
his own injuries.

Over defendant's objection and without

obtaining a warrant, the police ordered a blood-alcohol test.
The Court held that the intrusion was significant but was
justified by the exigencies.

The only exigencies that the Court

mentioned were that the body metabolizes alcohol quickly and that
no search warrant could be obtained in time to perform a
successful blood-alcohol test.

The state court found that the

same exigencies existed in this case.
It would be hard to argue that intrusion into the home
requires a more substantial state interest and more compelling
exigencies than intrusion into the body.

However, Schmerber is

~

__ ......._ ....... u'-"''-•

... _....._._. .....

v

•

-,-,.~"-'"-'"&----c;;a..&&

.a; ..

v.

distinguishable on other grounds.

u~
~ ~""ZUO

In Schmerber, the intrusion

was not only necessary but sufficient to obtain the desired
evidence.

In this case the warrantless entry and arrest may have

been necessary to obtain the probative evidence, but they were
not sufficient.

As discussed above, state law allowed petitioner

to prevent the state from acquiring the evidence merely by

-------blood test. Although Schmerber makes

re t~U~S~
l=
n=
g~t~o~s~u~b=m~l~
.t~~
t=
o~t~
he

the conclusion troubling, I do not believe that the state's
interest in acquiring the evidence justified the warrantless
entry and arrest in this case.

VI. CONCLUSION

/I strongly
r believe that

This is an unfortunate case.

the police would not have entered petitioner's home and his
second floor bedroom absent some sort of consent.

~

wUv

Unfortunately,

the state court refused to resolve the consent issue.

Assuming, ~

as this Court must, that there was no consent, I find

~

unpersuasive the state court's conclusion that exigent

~

~ circumstances

justified the warrantless entry and arrest.

Absent

~~ consent, the entry and arrest were graphically intrusive and the

f:~ offense was a
~~~st~icat~on

~~

non-violent civil offense.

The only legitimate

offered for the intrusion is the preservation of

· In my view, the state did not meet its burden of

proving that the intrusion was necessary to obtain that evidence.
First, it did not show that petitioner was given an opportunity
to surrender at his doorstep rather than suffer arrest as he lay

--••-••

•••-•••-•

,._,.......,,..

naked on his bed.
fault.

v•

.......

...,......,-....,.a..., .... &.&

.. ,......,.

'-'"""'

J~VV

However, this is hardly the government's

The government could have met that burden only if the two

stepdaughters had been called as witnesses.
great pains to avoid having to do that.

The trial court took

If the court was willing

to uphold the arrest without requiring the government to bring on
two crucial witnesses, we can hardly fault the government for not
bring them forth.
Second, assuming that the government has shown that the
intrusion was necessary to make a prompt arrest, I am not
completely satsified that it has shown that a prompt arrest was
sufficient to preserve the evidence that justified the intrusion.
State law allowed petitioner to defeat the state's interest in
obtaining the evidence simply by refusing to submit to the bloodalcohol test.

However, I am uncomfortable suggesting that this

Court rush into an analysis of the state's interest in obtaining
certain kinds of evidence or in prosecuting various offenses.
Although this is necessary in balancing the need to intrude
against privacy rights, it seems somewhat offensive for this
Court to be second guessing the state's interest.

Furthermore,

it would lead to innumerable petitions requesting the Court to
re-evaluate a state's interest in any warrantless intrusion.
Unless five members of the Court can be persuaded to DIG
this case, the best way to deal with it may be to hold that a

-

-

arrest for a non-criminal traffic offense is per se unreasonable
~

under the fourth amendment.

Although generally such categorical

statements are unwise, it may be the narrowest holding possible

in this case.

A decision affirming or reversing on any other

ground would constitute a major decision in the area of fourth
amendment law.
little case.

Such a decison is unwarranted in this messy
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE

w,. , J .

BRENNAN, JR.

October 11, 1983

Re:

Welsh v. Wisconsin, No. 82-5466

Dear Chief:
You suggested in the assignment sheet that a more
complete explanation of the Conference decision in the above
case would appear in a Per Curiam if a dissent was to be
written. This prompts me to advise you that I do intend to
circulate a dissent fran ·the dec is ion to DIG the case. I
would, of course, prefer to frame a dissent addressed to the
grounds upon which the Per Curiam rests.

Siw
WJB, Jr.

~~~
Chief Justice Burger
Copies to the Conference

tr:L~~

7)16--~~

~~

,,

.

~u:prtntt <!fttnrl of f:lrt ,-m±tb ~hdt$
:.as!pngto:tt. ~· Q}. 2llp'!-~
CHAMBERS OF'

JUSTICE

w.. . J .

BRENNAN, JR.

October 17, 1983

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE

No. 82-5466

Welsh v. Wisconsin

Supplementing my memorandum of
October 11, 1983 in the above, I have
decided that I shall write in dissent.
Sincerely,

-.
,
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I

- -·

-

,~

.-

<!f"lttt "f tift ~tb ,»tatts
-ulfington. Jl. ~· 211~~~

~lt.Fnnt

CHAMBERS OF'

.JUSTICE WILLIAM H . RE.HNQUIST

October 19, 1983
Re:

No. 82-5466

Welsh v. Wisconsin

Dear Chief:
Please join me in your Per Curiam.
Sincerely~

The Chief Justice
cc:

The Conference

OctohPr lD,

1~83

A2-5466 Welsh v . Wisconsin

Dear

~hjef:

I

aar~e

with vour Per, Curiam.
Si.ncet'Ply,

~he

Chjef

Justic~

lfp/ss

cc:

The Conference

To: Justice Brennan
Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackm~
Justice Powell
Justice Rehnquist
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor
From:

The Chief Justice .,

Circulated: _ _ _ _ _ _ __ __

2nd DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF ffiE UNITED STATES
No. 82--5466

EDWARD G. WELSH, PETITIONER v. WISCONSIN
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT
OF WISCONSIN

[October -

, 1983]

PER CURIAM.

After hearing oral argument and fully exammmg the
record, we conclude that the totality of the circumstances did
not warrant bringing the case here. Accordingly, the writ of
certiorari is dismissed as improvidently granted.

.in.prtmt Qiottd ltf tqt )tnitth .itzdt,&'
JI'IU'lfingtltn, ~.

ar.

2ll&t~~

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

October 19, 1983

No. 82-5466

Welsh v. Wisconsin

Dear Chief,
I agree with the per curiam.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference
.'

.....

~ttprtmt

C!Jltlttt nf tlft ~tb .jbdt.e'

~~·~·~ 20~~~
October 20, 1983

CHAMBERS Or

..JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE

Re:

82-5466 - Welsh v. Wisconsin

Dear Chief,
I

agree.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference
cprn

.,.,

'"I

1'1<

'-'J:\l

28,

v.

Dear
i

-~··

~

~

··;,:,It~;· · I '

appreciate your gi.ving me th~ opportuni.ty to
think further about this case. I believe, however., that i.t
is best for me to stay with my DIG vote. ,,

~~

•·

··r consistently voted to "~eny" when the. cert pet.ition was under consideration. As Thurgood said at Conference, there is "no purpose in our deciding this case as no
other state has laws like wtsconRi~"·
'
, . '• After·· the case was grante~ am arqued, T was in- ., ·~
to vote to reverse, thouqh I continued to think we ~•
had made a mistake in addressing a unique and a very foolish ,
statute •' Nhen it came my turn to ''cte at Conference, the
Chief had voted to affirm or DIG, Byron agreed wi.th the
Chief, "and 'T'hurqood and Rar:ry also vote~ to DIG. I was then
content• to_ qo along with a DIG. .. " .
·
·'
clin~d

1

~

'

, __

r

-

:tu

You ate right in implying that perhaps I did not
recall Justice Harlan's view with respect to when it is appropriate to DIG. ' My sense of what we have done in the past
is that few of us have heeded cons is tent ly his quite, loq leal. ·~,;;,
argument.
_,-·"¥

In sum, Bill, at this late datfl',' and havi. ng adheren t o my DIG vote after Aeeinq the dissents by you and
Harry, ! ju~t do not think it appropriate to change a circulated vot~ that reflects the view I always have had ·of this
~

case. !'

~Hncerely,

l!i

r

.lustice Brennan

"

ilnprtntt Clfltltrl of tlrt ~b i\lattg

._aslfinghtn. ~.

<fl.

20~'!~

/

CHAMBERS 01'"

THE CHIEF .JUSTICE

January 6, 1984

Re:

82-5466 - Welsh v. Wisconsin

Dear Bill:
Will you take on a draft opinion in this case1 -

Justice Rehnquist
Copies to the Conference

ilupunu Qf4turl qf tlf.t ~in jltaU•
JluJrin:ghm. ~. <!f. 2Ll.;i'l'
CHAMI!IERS Of'

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

January 6, 1984

Re:

82-5466 - Welsh v. Wisconsin

Dear Bill:
In order to forestall any possible
misunderstanding, I would like to reserve the right to
take a somewhat different approach to the Rule of Four
issue discussed in part III of your circulating
dissent. I have not yet written anything on this
subject because, as I suggested at conference today, I
find it hard to believe that the majority will actually
dismiss the case as improvidently granted after it has
been argued and over the dissent of the four members of
the Court who voted to grant. As I think we all agreed
at conference today, that has never happened while any
present member of the Court has been on the Court. At
least, that's my impression of the discussion.
As you know, I think reasonable judges can differ
concerning the wisdom of the Rule of Four, but if it is
to continue as a part of our routine procedures, I
surely think that it should be administered in a
uniform fashion.

Justice Brennan
Copies to the Conference

~ltpfmtt (ij~nrl ~f

tlft ~tb .lltatt•

._u!finghm. ~. <!f. 2llp'!~
CHAMBERS Of'

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

January 9, 1984
Re:

No. 82-5466

Welsh v. Wisconsin

Dear Chief:
I will try to draft a Per Curiam to support the
order for a DIG.

r

Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
cc:

The Conference

•

.hprtntt Clf!turl!tf firt ~b .Jbt±t.s
'JfuJringhm. ~. <!}. 2ll~~~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE

w ...

J . BRENNAN, JR.

December 27, 198 3

Re: Welsh v. Wisconsin, No. 82-5466

Dear Lewis:

At our Conference after oral argument on this case, the
Court agreed to dismiss the writ of certiorari as
improvidently granted. If I recall our Conference
correctly, while noting that you would not dissent from a
~
DIG, you also agreed that the judgment below should be ____.
reversed. Thurgood and Harry, who originally proposed the
DIG, now agree that a DIG is inappropriate. Given their
change in position, we are now faced with a situation in
which the four who originally voted to grant the writ of
certiorari are dissenting from the DIG.
Although there are obviously no set rules that control
the propriety of a DIG, the Court has previously
acknowledged that the five Justices who originally voted to
deny the writ will DIG a case only in the most narrow of
circumstances. As Justice Harlan explained in the leading
case in this area:
"I think the Court should not have heard any of
these four cases. Nevertheless, the cases having been
taken, I have conceived it to be my duty to consider
them on their merits, because I cannot reconcile voting
to dismiss the writs as "improvidently granted" with
the Court' s "rule of four." In my opinion due
adherence to that rule requires that once certiorari
has been granted a case should be disposed of on the
premise that it is properly here, in the absence of
considerations appearing which were not manifest or
fully apprehended at the time certiorari was granted."
Ferguson v. Moore-MCCormack Lines, Inc., 352 u.s. 521,
559 (1957) (separate op1n1on).
See The Monrosa v. Carbon Black Export, Inc., 359 u.s. 180 (1959)
(DIG appropriate when "[e]xam1nation of a case on the merits, on
oral argument, ••• bring[s] into 'proper focus' a consideration
which, though present in the record at the time of granting the

writ, only later indicates that the grant was improvident"}.
Compare Triangle Improvement Council v. Ritchie, 402 u.s. 497,
502 (1971} (Harlan, J., concurring} (DIG appropriate "in light of
••. changed posture of the case} with id., at 508 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) (so as not to impair the "rule of four", it is "the
duty of the five opposing certiorari to persuade others at
Conference, but, failing that, to vote on the merits of the
case"). See also Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 u.s. 637, 648
(Stewart, J., concurring} ("If as many as four Justices remain so
minded after oral argument, due adherence to that rule requires
me to address the merits of a case, however strongly I may feel
that it does not belong in this Court."}.
In this case, there has been no intervening change in
circumstances since the writ was granted. Nor did consideration
of the case on the merits after oral argument focus the Court on
any factors that were not known at the time the case was granted.
Indeed, if anything, I believe the posture of the case has been
clarified since last February, when the original vote to grant
was taken. Therefore, because the case does not fall within any
of our established criteria to justify a DIG, don't you think
that it is our responsibility to decide the case on its merits?
If so, I would be hap~ to turn the narrow conclusion of Part IIB of my draft dissent into an opinion for the Court.
Sincerely,

,.
WJB,

Justice Powell

.(

Jr.

.Sn;rrtmt QJ.LtUrt .ttf tqt 'Jttittb .Stalt,g11Juftingt.ott, ~. QJ. 2ll.;t.l!~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE SANDRA DAY o'CONNOR

January 27, 1984

No. 82-5466

Welsh v. Wisconsin

Dear Bill,
I agree with your Per Curiam.
Sincerely,

Justice Rhenquist

Copies to the Conference

.iu.prnnt <!fourt of tlrt ~a .itatt•
'Jfufringhtn. J. Of. 2llp,.,
CHAMIS£RS 01'

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

January 30, 1984

RE:

82-5466 - Welsh v. Wisconsin

Dear Bill:
I join your January 26th per curiam.

Regards,

Justice Rehnquist
Copies to the Conference

.Su:prtlltl' Clfltud ttf tlrt ~b .Statts

'ma.etrin-ghtn. ~. <!f.

2ll.;i'!~

CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

January 30, 1984

Re:

No. 82-5466-Welsh v. Wisconsin

Dear Bill:
I agree with the first paragraph and the
judgment in this case.
Sincerely,

ftvt- ·
T.M.

Justice Rehnquist
cc:

The Conference

jlu.prnn~

OfDlUi .of tlr~ ~a i'tatts

Jfaslfhtghtn. ~. ~· 20.?,.~
CHAMI!IERS 01'"

THE CHIEF .JUSTICE

January 31, 1984

Re:

82-5466 - Welsh v. Wisconsin

Dear Bill:
I join your January 31 Per Curiam.
Regards,

Justice Rehnquist
copies to the Conference

f

l

I

<!Jll1trl ci t4t ~mu~ .§mtta
~a:alfin.gton. 10. <!J. 2Ll,?J!~

~u.prtmt

CHAMBERS Of'

JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

February 2, 1984

Re: No. 82-5466 - Welsh v. Wisconsin
Dear Bill:
I am still with you as I was before, that is, I join
all except part IIA of your dissenting opinion.
Sincerely,

~~

Justice Brennan
cc: The Conference

.

·'

j;upunu <!Jnmt llf tlyt ~b jita±ts
'maslyinghtn. ~. <!J. 2ll.;t~~
CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

February 2, 1984

Re:

No. 82-5466-Welsh v. Wisconsin

Dear Bill:
I hope I am no longer confused in this case.
As of now, I would like to be permitted to withdraw
my note joining in parts of your opinion.
Sincerely,

cj11A .
•

T.M.

Justice Rehnquist
cc:

The Conference

tl
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I

.iiupr.tntt' (!Jcnrt of t!r.t ~b ~tnt.ts

'llaslfingi:cn. ~.(!f.
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

February 2, 1984

Re:

/

No. 82-5466-Welsh v. Wisconsin

Dear Bill:
I hope I am no longer confused in this case.
As of now, I would like to be permitted to withdraw
my note joining in parts of your opinion.
Sincerely,

~•

T.M.

Justice Rehnquist
cc:

The Conference

·.

Clf.mri .ctf tJt.t ,-nit~ .Blatt•
••.lfinfhtu. ~. elf. 2Ll~,.~

• •lUll

CH4M8EAS OF"

.JUSTICE .JOHN PAUL STEVENS

February 8, 1984

Re:

82-5466 - Welsh v. Wisconsin

Dear Bill:
Please join me.
Respectfully,

I

,../

Justice Brennan
Copies to the Conference

J;tqtrnttt

<!fcuri ttf Urt ~tb' j;tatts-

..a5-lfingbm, ~.

QI. 2ll&J'-!~
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CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, .JR .

February 22, 1984

82-5466 Welsh v. Wisconsin

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:
I circulate herewith a brief opinion concurring in
a DIG.
As stated therein, my view of this case has not
changed. I voted consistently to deny certiorari. But
after the case was granted and argued, I went to the Conference prepared to reverse on the merits because of the illegality of the arrest. When it came my turn to vote, the CJ,
BRW, TM and HAB had voted to DIG. I therefore was glad to
make a fifth vote to dispose of this unhappy case, but also
stated - as my notes indicate - that I would vote to reverse
on the merits if we reached them.
Earlier drafts of op1n1ons in this case have debated the applicability of the Rule of Four, and I am now
persuaded that the Rule has not been as consistently applied
as perhaps it should have been. In this connection, we may
have a similar situation 82-1724 New York v. Uplinger. In
any event, believing still that we made a mistake to take
this case of little or no precedential value, and being further persuaded by the wide divergence of the views expressed
here, I reaffirm my vote to DIG.

L.F.P., Jr.
ss

February 22, 1984

82-5466

~-7eleh

v. Wisconsin

MEMORANDUM TO T'fiE CONFERENCE:
I
4!11

circulate here\>Iith a brief opinion concurrinq in

DIG.

~s stated therein, my view of this case has not
chanaed. I vote~ consistently to deny c~rttorari. ?ut
aft~r the case was gr~nted and argued, I went to the ~onfer
ence oreoared to reverse on the meritq becausP of the ill~
qalitv of the arrest. Nhen it came my turn to vot~, the r.J,
BRl-7, ""M and Hl\B had voted to DIG.
r therefore was glan to
make a fifth vote to dispose of this unhappy ca~e, but also
stat~d - as mv notes indi. cate - that I would vote to reverse
on the merits if we reached them.

Earlier drafts of opinions in this case have debated the applicability of the Rule o€ Four, an~ r am now
pet:suaded that the Rule has not been as consic:stently applied
as oerhaps it should have been. In this connection, we •~Y
have a c;imilar si.tuation 82-1724 New York v. UPlinger. In
any event, believinq still that we maAe a mistake to take
this case of little or no precedential value, and being further persuaded by the wide divergence of the views expressed
here, I reaffirm my vote to DIG.

t..F.P., Jr.
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TO: Justice Powell
FROM: Cammie

I

still believe

that

this case deserves

have some problems with this P.C.

a

DIG,

but

I

First, Justice Rehnquist plays

a little loose with the facts surrounding the entry (p.l).

These

are ~--------------------hotly disg~ed a~ th~~Court must assume that the entry/ was
'-

n~consensuJl:

the tone of the P.C. is otherwise.

Second, I dis7)-

agree with the assertion that the connection between the federal
.
\,\.... d th ~ 1 .
'
"" '
1
(
4) '-..__T_h_ t ----..:.
1ssue an
e
1cense suspension 1s unc ear p.
.
a
connec_..---

tion is,

I

think, perfectly clear.

fied at p.S, n.S:

it is unclear whether, under the state law ap-

pl icable to this case,
blood-alcohol
arrest.

The J eal proble3 is identi-

an "unreasonable" refusal to submit to a

test has anything

to do with

the legality of

the

If it does not, there is no reason to reach the federal

question and

the license suspension would be upheld on adequate

and independent state grounds.
to have generated so many problems.

This is a
I think it is a pr
has

much

to

commend

Marshall & Blackmun,

for a DIG, but the rule of four
it.

At

switched

votes

Just ices

both of whom had voted to grant, voted to

DIG and everything was fine.
they

the original conference,

late

in

The problem, of course,
the

game.

(I

note

came when

that

Just ice

2

Blackmun has been the model .of inconsistency on this one.
he voted

to deny the petit ion.

fourth vote for a grant.

First

Then he switched to become the

After oral argument, he voted to DIG.

Now he votes to address the merits!)

I do not believe that the

Conference generally should let 5 votes prevail for
the 4 original votes to grant.

a DIG over

However, I confess I am at a loss

as to what to recommend at this late date.

I'll stick with the

DIG only because the federal issue is so inadequately presented.

I
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To: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Powell
Justice Rehnquist
Justice O'Connor
From:

Justice Stevens
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 82-5466

EDWARD G. WELSH, PETITIONER v. WISCONSIN
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT
OF WISCONSIN
[February-, 1984]

JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting.
The analysis in Part II-A of JUSTICE BRENNAN's dissenting opinion is certainly persuasive; moreover, I am inclined to
believe that JusTICE BRENNAN is correct in concluding that
"the Fourth Amendment imposes an absolute ban on warrantless home arrests for certain minor offenses." Ante, at
10. Nevertheless, in my view it is unnecessary to decide
that question in this case. The reasoning in the remainder of
the opinion, to which I subscribe, provides a sufficient basis
for vacating the judgment of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin. The summary in Part III of his opinion is surely correct. Accordingly, I join in all but Part II-A of JUSTICE
BRENNAN's opinion, and I respectfully dissent from the
Court's disposition of this case.

.iu:prtntt <l}ourl Df tlrt ~b .itait.s
~!p:ttgbnt. ~. <!}. 21lbi~~
CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE

w ...

J . BRENNAN, JR.

February 27, 1984

No. 82-5466
Welsh v. Wisconsin

Dear Chief,
In view of Lewis'
Bill

Rehnquist's

circulation and

note,

am

I

assign the opinion for the Court?
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference

not

to

~upunu

QJ!turl 4lf Hrt ~tb •tattg

._asfri:ngbm, ~- <!J. 20~'!~
CHAMB E R S OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

February 27, 1984

Re:

No. 82-5466

Welsh v. Wisconsin

Dear Chief,
In view of the fact that the Per Curiam opinion which I
drafted has not commanded majority support, I think the
opinion should be reassigned to someone who believes the
merits should be reached and the judgment of the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin reversed.
Sincerely,

~

The Chief Justice
cc:

The Conference

I.

i'uprmu <q.mrt Df tift ~a .itatt•
._u4inght~ ~.

<!f.

20~,.~

February 27, 1984

CMAMIIERS 01'"

THE CHIEF" .JUSTICE

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE
Re:

82-5466 - Welsh v. Wisconsin

You have Bill Rehnquist's memo of February 27, 1984
"withdrawing" because too many have withdrawn.
I vote to DIG.
Regards,

~

tlrt 'Jnifta .iWtll'
~fritt.ghtn. !J. (1}. 2 0~){.~

,jtqtrtm~ "Jttltrl o-f

CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

February 14, 1984

Re:

82-5466 - Welsh v. Wisconsin

Dear Bill,
Please join me.
Sincerely,

Justice Rehnquist
Copies to the Conference
cpm

~~mu~aurlaf~t~b~mug
~a,g~ ~. <q. 2ll&f'l-~
CHAMISERS OF

.JUSTICE

w ...

.J. BRENNAN, .JR.

February 28, 1984

\

\

No. 82-5466
Welsh v. Wisconsin

Dear Chief,
I'll try my hand at an opinion for
the Court in the above.
Sincerely, ,

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference

March 1, 1984

82-5466

We1Rh v. Wf.sconsin

near Chief:
This refPrs to your note statinq th~t vou vote to ntG
because "too manv h8VP withnrawn". r han not come to rest
finally unti 1 my ~ circnlati.on of Febru."!try 27th.
I votPd not to take this case for the reasons mentioned
in my opinion. At Conference, there were four votes to DIG
when the discussion reached me. T stated that r could join
a OIG, but would reverse if the merits were reached.

The reasons advanced in Bill Rehnquist's opinion for
not addressing the merits are not the ones that caused me to
think we should not take the case. The case was granted and
opinions have been circulated. Accordingly, I now think we
should decide the merits.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference
LFP/vde

·~----------'-~-~---··-·

I
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,,..........

.Aluprmtt CIJ&nttt #f tJtr J{nitt~ .Altatt#

.__.Jtinghnt. ~. CIJ.

2D~~'

CH ...... BI!:A!I Or

..JUSTICE ..JOHN PAUL STEVENS

March 6, 1984

Re:

82-5466 - Welsh v. Wisconsin

Dear Bill:
Please join me.
Respectfully,

(/t

/Yl.
Justice Brennan
Copies to the Conference

<!ftmrl o-f t4t ~ttit.tb ~fa.tts
~~sJrbtgtott. ~. <!f. 20.?~~

.®lt}trttttt

/

CHAMBERS 01'"

JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

March 6, 1984

Re: No. 82-5466 - Welsh v. Wisconsin
Dear Bill:
Please join me in your proposed opinion for the Court.
I shall probably retain my separate writing with the
necessary revisions.

Justice Brennan
cc: The Conference

.iltJlrnm <!fonrt cf tltt ~b j;Udtg
'llM4ittghtn. ~. af. 2ll.;i'l~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

March 7, 1984

Re:

No.

82-5466~Welsh

v. Wisconsin

Dear Bill:
Please join me in your circulation of
March 5.
Sincerely,

-f,lf/.
T.M.

Justice Brennan
cc:

The Conference

March 8, 1984

82-5466 Welsh v. Wisconsin

Dear Bill:
I am certainly with you on the judgment, and agree
with most of your opinion. I do have some reservations.
As this case involves only a traffic offense, not
even classified as a misdemeanor, tt is unnecessary to articulate qeneral rules with respect to the determination of
exigent circumstances. The Court declined to undertake this
in Payton, and it is unnecessary in this case, involving
only a traffic offense, to enunciate view~ that mav apply in
all casps involving exigent circumstances. The exigent circumstances exception to the Warrant Clause always has been
applied ln light of the facts and circumstances of each
case.

r would prefer, therefore, not to announce a broad
general rule. If we undertake this, there are some portions
of your opini.on, T cannot join. r certainly agree, as the
plurality stated in Payton, that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are "presumptively unreasonable". I also agree with Justice Jackson's McDonald statement that whether "urgent circumstances" iustify a warrantless entry "depend somewhat upon the gravity of the offense
thought to be in process • • • "
I would not hold that "the government is required
to demonstrate a compelling need that overcomes the presumption of unreasonableness that attaches to all warrantless
home entries." P. 9, your opinion. In everv case involving
alleged exigent circumstances, defense counsel would be encouraged to demand a shrn·ling of "compelling neen", our highest burden of proof. A.lso, I am troubled by the portion of
your "holding" paragraph (p. 12) that states:
"[Tlhe application of the exigent circumstances exception in the context of. a home
entry should rarely be sanctioned where there
is probable cause to believe that only a
minor offense has been committed".

~-~~.··'

2.

The term "minor offense" usually distinguishes misdemeanors
from felonies, and the laws of the several states are far
from consistent in their classification of cri.minal conduct
into these categories. Some offenses classified as "misdemeanors" may be quite serious, whereas offenses classified
as felonies may be quite minor. See, for example, South
Dakota's classification of offenses in my opinion last Term
in Solem v. Helm.
Although J would prefer not to enunciate rules of
general application with respect to exigent circumstances in
a case that involves only a traffic offense, t believe I
could join all of your opinion if you modified the sentence
on page 9 that would require the showing of a "compelling
need". It should be sufficient, in light of the remainder
of your opinion, merely to say the "burden is on the government to overcome the presumption • • • " In addition, perhaps you would be willing to omit entirely the final sentence on page 12.
If you prefer to keep the opinion in its present
form, I will join all of Part I, and if you would create
subdivisions for Part II I could join pages 7-9 and 13-14,
including Part III. I would also write briefly, makinq the
points mentioned abo,,e.
This case has presented a good deal of di-fficulty
for the Court. I think we are on the right path now. I
would like to be able to join a11 of your opinion.
Sincerely,

Justice Brennan
lfp/ss

:--~-----
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE

w...

J. BRENNAN, JR.

Re:

March 12, 1984
Welsh v. Wisconsin, No. 82-5466

Dear Lewis:
Thank you for your letter of March 8. Mary and I just
returned from a brief visit to Berkeley, California, so I
have just had a chance to review your suggestions for the
proposed opinion.
I appreciate your concern that we not articulate
general rules that will cover all determinations of exigent
circumstances. To that extent, the proposed opinion is only
intended to suggest an approach for cases involving
warrantless home arrests in which the underlying offense is
extremely minor. Indeed, those lower courts that have been
faced with such cases have floundered in their attempts to
articulate any meaningful guidelines, and the years that
have passed since Payton suggest that it is time for the
Court to address at least this narrow area.
As for your specific suggestions, you are quite correct
in focusing on the "compelling need" language on page 9. In
line with your suggestion, I propose to change tnat sentence
to read as follows: "Before agents of the government may
invade the sanctity of the home, the burden is on the
government to demonstrate exigent c1rcumstances that
overcome the presumption of unreasonableness that attaches
to all warrantless home entries." As for the language on
page 12, I would prefer not to eliminate this clause in its
entirety. At the same time, the term "minor offense" is not
intended to cover all nonfelony crimes. Although, as my
prior draft dissent in this case indicated, I believe there
is a strong argument in support of an absolute ban on
warrantless home arrests for certain offenses, the opinion
i nten ti onally leaves that issue unresolved. To eliminate
any inference that "minor offense" will be interpreted to
mean all nonfelonies, I propose that the following clause be
added: "application of the exigent-circumstances exception
in the context of a home entry should rarely be sanctioned
when there is probable cause to believe that only a minor
offense, such as the kind at issue in this case, has been
committed."
Would these revisions eliminate the problem?
Sincerely,
)

Justice Powell

'

(.~Q_

.i1q1rtntt ClfDurt 1tf l4t 'Pnittb .italt.s'
'JlMlfi:n:gton, ~. <fl. 21lbf'l'
CHAMBERS OF"

.JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

March 12, 1984

1
No. 82-5466

\'Elsh v. Wisconsin

Dear Bill,
Please join rre.
Sincerely,

Justice Brennan

Cq;>ies to the Ccnference

March 13 , 1984

82-5466

N~lsh

v . Wisconsin

Dear 'A\ 11 :

Please join me .
Sincer.elv ,

,Just ice Brennan

lfp/ss
cc:

The Conference

----·--.--~l''.
------·-

-~' J

.Su.p:rtmt Qf01ttf qf Hrt ~tb .Statts
-u!pnghm, ~.<!f. 2llp~~
CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

May 4, 1984
Re:

No. 82-5466

Welsh v. Wisconsin

Dear Byron:
Please join me in your dissent.
Sincerely(~

Justice White
cc:

r~:

The Conference

t,

•

.§JqJrmu

<flottrl Df tltt~b .1\bdts
<If. 2llp'!>~

Jtasqinghtn. ~.
CHAMbERS 01'"

May 9, 1984

THE CHIEF .JUSTICE

,ti

Re:

82-5466 - Welsh v. Wisconsin

Dear Bill:
Please show me
"The Chief Justice would dismiss
the writ as having been improvidently granted and defer resolution of the question presented
to a more appropriate case."

\
Justice Brennan
Copies to the Conference

&82-5466 Welsh v. Wisconsin (Cammie)
WJB for the Court
1st draft 3/5/84
2nd draft 3/13/84
3rd draft 5/10/84
Joined by JPS 3/6/84
Joined by HAB 3/6/84 (will maintain separate writing)
Joined by TM 3/7/84
Joined by SOC 3/12/84
LFP 3/13/84
HAB concurring
1st draft 3/7/84
BRW dissenting
1st draft 4/30/84
2nd draft 5/7/84
Joined by WHR 5/4/84
CJ would DIG 5/9/84

82-5466 Welch v. Wisconsin (Cammie)
WJB for the Court 2/28/84
PC 10/7/83
1st draft 10/18/83
2nd draft 10/19/83
Joined by SOC 10/19/83
WHR 10/19/83
LFP 10/19/83
CJ 10/20/83
WJB dissent 12/14/83
2nd draft 12/23/83
3rd draft 12/29/83
4th draft 1/6/84 ·
5th draft 2/2/84
Joined by TM 12/14/83
JPS joins all but Part II-A
HAB still with WJB in. joining all except Part IIA
2/2/84
JPS joins 2/8/84
JPS dissent
Typed draft 12/14/83
1st printed draft 12/20/83
3rd draft 2/14/84
HAB dissent ·
1st draft 12/23/83
Reassigned to Justice Rehnquist 1/6/84
Will draft PC 1/9/84
1st draft 1/26/84
2nd draft 1/31/84
3rd draft 2/4/84
Joined by SOC 1/27/84
Joined by CJ 1/31/84
Joined by BRW 2/14/84
TM withdraws join in parts of opinion 2/2/84
JPS dissent
1st draft 2/10/84
WHR requesting opinion be reassigned 2/27/84
LFP letter to CJ case should be decided on merits 3/1/84
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Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
..----Justice Powell
Justice Rehnquist
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor
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Justice Brennan
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1st DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 82-5466
EDWARD G. WELSH, PETITIONER v. WISCONSIN
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF
WISCONSIN
[December - , 1983]

JUSTICE BRENNAN, dissenting.
In Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573 (1980), the Court
concluded that, absent probable cause and exigent circumstances, warrantless arrests in the home are prohibited by
the Fourth Amendment. At the same time, we explicitly refused "to consider the sort of emergency or dangerous situation, described in our cases as 'exigent circumstances,' that
would justify a warrantless entry into a home for the purpose
of either arrest or search." I d., at 583. Certiorari was
originally granted in this case to decide at least one aspect of
the unresolved question: whether, and if so under what circumstances, the Fourth Amendment prohibits the police
from making a warrantless night entry of a person's home in
order to arrest him for violation of a nonjailable traffic offense. Because, in my view, this case presents a record that
compels us to decide that question, I cannot agree that the
Court should dismiss the writ of certiorari as improvidently
granted. I therefore reach the merits of the question presented and would reverse the judgment of the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin.
I
A

Shortly before 9:00 p. m. on the rainy night of April 24,
1978, a lone witness, Randy Jablonic, observed a car that was
being driven erratically. Mter changing speeds and veering
from side to side, the car eventually swerved off the road and
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came to a stop in an open field. No damage to any person or
property occurred. Apparently worrying about the driver
and fearing that the car would get back on the highway,
J ablonic drove his truck up behind the car so as to block it
from returning to the road. Another passerby also stopped
at the scene, and Jablonic asked her to call the police. Before the police arrived, however, the driver of the car
emerged from his vehicle, approached Jablonic's truck, and
asked J ablonic for a ride home. J ablonic instead suggested
that they wait for assistance in removing or repairing the car.
Ignoring J ablonic's suggestion, the driver walked away from
the scene.
A few minutes later, the police arrived and questioned
J ablonic. He told one officer what he had seen, specifically
noting that the driver was either very inebriated or very
sick. The officer checked the motor vehicle registration of
the abandoned car and learned that it was registered to the
petitioner, Edward G. Welsh. In addition, the officer noted
that the petitioner's residence was a short distance from the
scene, and therefore easily within walking distance.
Without securing any type of warrant, the police proceeded to the petitioner's home, arriving about 9:00 p. m.
When the petitioner's stepdaughter answered the door, the
police successfully sought entry into the house. 1 They proceeded upstairs to the petitioner's bedroom, where they
found him lying naked in bed. At this point, the petitioner
was placed under arrest for driving or operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant, in violation of
' The state trial court never decided whether there was consent to the
entry because it deemed decision of that issue unnecessary in light of its
finding that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless arrest. After
reversing the lower court's finding of exigent circumstances, the Wisconsin
Court of Appeals remanded for full consideration of the consent issue. See
State v. Welsh, No. 80-1686, App. 114-125. That remand never occurred,
however, because the Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed its court of appeals and reinstated the trial court's judgment. See State v. Welsh , 108
Wis. 2d 319, 321 N. W. 2d 245 (1982).
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Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1) (1977). 2 The petitioner was taken to
the police station, where he refused to submit to a breathalyzer test.
B
As a result of these events, the petitioner was subjected to
two separate but related proceedings: one concerning his refusal to submit to a breath test and the other involving the
alleged code violation for driving while intoxicated. Under
the Wisconsin vehicle code as it appeared in April1978, anyone arrested for driving while intoxicated under § 346. 63(1)
could be requested by a law enforcement officer to provide
breath, blood, or urine samples for the purpose of determining the presence or quantity of alcohol. Wis. Stat.
§ 343.305(1) (1975). If such a request was made, the arrestee
was required to submit to the appropriate testing or risk a
revocation of operating privileges. Cf. South Dakota v.
Neville,-- U. S. - - (1983) (admission into evidence of a
defendant's refusal to submit to a blood-alcohol test does not
offend constitutional right against self-incrimination). The
arrestee could challenge the officer's request, however, by
refusing to undergo testing and then asking for a hearing to
determine whether the refusal was justified. If, after the
hearing, it was determined that the refusal was not justified,
the arrestee's operating privileges would be revoked for 60
days. 3
2
Since the time of the petitioner's arrest, § 346.63 has been amended to
provide for a code violation if someone drives or operates a motor vehicle
while under the influence of an intoxicant or while evidencing certain
blood- or breath-alcohol levels. See Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(a)-(b)
(1981-1982). This amendment, however, has no bearing on the issues
raised by the present case.
3
Since the time of the petitioner's arrest, this statute also has been
amended, with the current version found at Wis. Stat. § 343.305
(1981-1982). Although the procedures to be followed by the law enforcement officer and the arrestee have remained essentially unchanged,
§ 343.305(3), (8), the potential length of any revocation of operating privileges has been increased, depending on the arrestee's prior driving record,
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The statute also set forth specific criteria to be applied by a
court when determining whether an arrestee's refusal to take
a breath test was justified. Included among these criteria
was a requirement that, before revoking the arrestee's operating privileges, the court determine that "the refusal ...
to submit to a test was unreasonable." § 343.305(2)(b)(5)
(1975). It is not disputed that an arrestee's refusal to take a
breath test would be reasonable, and therefore operating
privileges could not be revoked, if the underlying arrest was
not lawful. Indeed, state law has consistently provided that
a valid arrest is a necessary prerequisite to the imposition of
a breath test. See Scales v. State, 64 Wis. 2d 485, 494, 219
N. W. 2d 286, 292 (1974). Although the statute in effect in
April 1978 referred to reasonableness, the current version of
§ 343.305 explicitly recognizes that one of the issues that an
arrestee may raise at a refusal hearing is "whether [he] was
lawfully placed under arrest for violation of s.346.63(1)."
§ 343.305(3)(b)(5)(a), (8)(b) (1981-82). See also 67 Op. Wis.
Atty. Gen. 93-78 (Dec. 27, 1978) ("statutory scheme ... contemplates that a lawful arrest be made prior to a request for
submission to a test"). 4
Separate statutory provisions control the penalty that
might be imposed for the substantive offense of driving while
intoxicated. At the time in question, the vehicle code provided that a first offense for driving while intoxicated was a
noncriminal violation subject to a civil forfeiture proceeding
for a maximum fine of $200; a second or subsequent offense in
the previous five years was a potential misdemeanor that
could be punished by imprisonment for up to one year and a
§ 343.305(9)(a)-(b). An arrestee who improperly refuses to submit to arequired test may also be required to comply with an assessment order and a
driver safety plan. § 343.305(9)(c}-(e). These amendments, however,
also have no direct bearing on the issues raised by the present case.
• Because state law provides that evidence of the petitioner's refusal to
submit to a breath test is inadmissible if the underlying arrest was unlawful, this case does not implicate the exclusionary rule under the Federal
Constitution.
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maximum fine of $500. Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2) (1975). Since
that time, the state has made only minor amendments to
these penalty provisions. Indeed, the statute continues to
categorize a first offense as a civil violation that allows for
only a monetary forfeiture of no more than $300.
§ 346.65(2)(a) (1981-82). See State v. Albright, 98 Wis. 2d
663, 672-673, 298 N. W. 2d 196, 202 (App. 1980).

c
As noted, in this case the petitioner refused to submit to a
breath test; he subsequently filed a timely request for a refusal hearing. Before that hearing was held, however, the
state filed a criminal complaint against the petitioner for
driving while intoxicated. 5 The petitioner responded by filing a motion to dismiss the complaint, relying on his contention that the underlying arrest was invalid. After receiving
evidence at a hearing on this motion in July 1980, the trial
court concluded that the criminal complaint would not be dismissed because the existence of both probable cause and exigent circumstances justified the warrantless arrest. The decision at the refusal hearing, which was not held until
September 1980, was therefore preordained. In fact, the
primary issue at the refusal hearing-whether the petitioner
acted reasonably in refusing to submit to a breath test because he was unlawfully placed under arrest, see supra, at
---h
. ad now been determined two months earlier by the
same trial court.
·
5

The petitioner was charged with a criminal misdemeanor because this
was his second such citation in the previous five years. See § 346. 65(2)
(1975). Although the petitioner was subject to a criminal charge, the police conducting the warrantless entry of his home did not know that the
petitioner had ever been charged with, or much less convicted of, a prior
violation for driving while intoxicated. It must be assumed , therefore,
that at the time of the arrest the police were acting as if they were investigating and eventually arresting for a civil violation only. See Beck v.
Ohi o, 379 U. S. 89, 91, 96 (1964).
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As expected, after the refusal hearing, the trial court concluded that the arrest of the petitioner was lawful and that
the petitioner's refusal to take the breath test was therefore
unreasonable. 6 Accordingly, the court issued an order suspending the petitioner's operating license for 60 days. On
appeal, the suspension order was vacated by the Wisconsin
Court of Appeals. See State v. Welsh, No. 80-1686, App.
114-125. Contrary to the trial court, the appellate court
concluded that the warrantless arrest of the petitioner in his
home violated the Fourth Amendment because the State, although demonstrating probable cause to arrest, had not established the existence of exigent circumstances. The petitioner's refusal to submit to a breath test was therefore
reasonable. 7 The Wisconsin Supreme Court in turn reversed the court of appeals, relying on the existence of three
factors that it believed constituted exigent circumstances:
the need for "hot pursuit" of a suspect, the need to prevent
physical harm to the offender and the public, and the need to
prevent destruction of evidence. See State v. Welsh, 108
Wis. 2d 319, 336--338, 321 N. W. 2d 245, 254-255 (1982). Because of the important Fourth Amendment implications of
the decision below, we granted certiorari. - - U. S. - (1983). 8
• When ruling from the bench after the refusal hearing, the trial judge
specifically indicated:
"[T]he Court is bound by its ealier ruling that that was a valid arrest.
And, I think [counsel for the petitioner] certainly will have the right to
challenge that on appeal if he appeals this matter, as well as the previous
ruling should there be a conviction on the underlying charge." App. 111.
See also App. 112-113.
7
The court remanded the case for further findings as to whether the
police had entered the petitioner's home with consent. See note 1, supra.
8
Although the state courts differed in their respective conclusions concerning exigent circumstances, they each found that the facts known to the
police at the time of the warrantless home entry were sufficient to establish
probable cause to arrest. The petitioner has not challenged that finding
before this Court.
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II
It is axiomatic that "the physical entry of the home is the
chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed." United States v. United States District
Court, 407 U. S. 297, 313 (1972). And a principal protection
against unnecessary intrusions into private dwellings is the
warrant requirement imposed by the Fourth Amendment on
agents of the government who seek to enter the home for
purposes of search or arrest. See Johnson v. United States,
333 U. S. 10, 13-14 (1948). 9 It is not surprising, therefore,
that the Court has recognized, as "a 'basic principle of Fourth
Amendment law[,]' that searches and seizures inside a home
without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable." Payton v. New York, 445 U. S., at 586. See Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 474-475 (1971) ("a search or seizure carried out on a suspect's premises without a warrant is
per se unreasonable, unless the police can show ... the presence of 'exigent circumstances'"). See also Steagald v.
The parallel criminal proceedings against the petitioner, see supra, at
- -, resulted in a misdemeanor conviction for driving while intoxicated.
During the jury trial, held in early 1982, the state introduced evidence of
the petitioner's refusal to submit to a breath test. His appeal from that
conviction, now before the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, has been stayed
pending our decision in this case. See Brief for Petitioner 17, n. 5.
9
In Johnson, Justice Jackson eloquently explained the warrant requirement in the context of a home search:
"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by
zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the
usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and
detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the
often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime. . . . The right of officers to thrust themselves into a home is ... a grave concern, not only to
the individual but to a society which chooses to dwell in reasonable security
and freedom from surveillance. When the right of privacy must reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial
officer, not by a policeman or government enforcement agent." Id., at
13-14 (footnote omitted).
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United States, 451 U. S. 204, 211-212 (1981); McDonald v.
United States, 335 U. S. 451, 456 (1948); Johnson v. United
States, supra, at 1:>--15; Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616,
630 (1886).

Consistent with these long-recognized principles, the
Court decided in Payton v. New York, supra, that warrantless arrests in the home are prohibited by the Fourth Amendment, absent probable cause and exigent circumstances.
Id., at 58:>--590. Although one might infer from the Court's
decision that all home arrests would be subject to the same
rule, the Court expressly framed its opinion in terms of "routine felony arrests," see id., at 574, 602. This formulation of
the holding in Payton implies two separate, but related limitations that have yet to be acknowledged completely by the
Court, but which control the present case. In particular, by
its own terms the holding in Payton-limited to "routine felony arrests"-was neither intended to cover arrests for nonserious offenses nor applied to arrests that are considered
nonroutine because they are justified by exigent
circumstances.
A
By concluding that the Fourth Amendment prohibits home
entries to make warrantless felony arrests in the absence of
probable cause and exigent circumstances, the Court in
Payton decided, a fortiori, that warrantless home arrests are
similarly prohibited for offenses less serious than felonies.
It does not necessarily follow, however, that warrantless
home arrests for nonserious offenses would be proper, even if
probable cause and exigent circumstances are found to exist.
That question, yet to be decided by the Court, is presented
by the record in this case. I therefore reach the issue and
conclude that the Fourth Amendment imposes an absolute
ban on warrantless home arrests for certain minor offenses.
In United States v. Watson, 423 U. S. 411 (1976), the
Court upheld a warrantless "midday public" arrest for a felony. In so doing, the Court relied heavily on the common-
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law rule that "a peace officer was permitted to arrest without
a warrant for a misdemeanor or felony committed in his
presence as well as for a felony not committed in his presence
if there was reasonable ground for making the arrest." I d.,
at 418 (emphasis added) (citing sources); id., at 438 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). Although not necessary to the result
in Watson, the italicized portion of the common-law rule suggests that warrantless public arrests for misdemeanors, even
if supported by probable cause and exigent circumstances,
should be prohibited unless the underlying offense is committed in the presence of the arresting officer. See generally
W. LaFave, Arrest 231-243 (1965). Therefore, even accepting the Court's view in Watson that the Fourth Amendment
grants broad authority for warrantless public arrests, adherence to the common-law rule would allow warrantless misdemeanor arrests in public areas only in the most narrow circumstances. 10 It logically follows that warrantless home
1
°For purposes of this case only, I assume that the common-law rule
identified in Watson applied in its literal sense to all misdemeanors.
There is substantial evidence, however, that public arrests were justified
under the common law, even for offenses committed in the officer's presence, only for breaches of the peace-a category of offenses much narrower, and far more serious, than all misdemeanors. See, e. g., W.
LaFave, Arrest 231 (1965); Bohlen & Shulman, Arrest With and Without a
Warrant, 75 U. Pa. L. Rev. 485 (1927). As explained by the New York
Colp't of Appeals:
"The right of a peace officer at common law to arrest summarily was a
limited one. 'The common law did not authorize the arrest of persons
guilty or suspected of misdemeanors, except in cases of an actual breach of
the peace either by an affray or by violence to an individual. In such cases
the arrest had to be made not so much for the purpose of bringing the offender to justice as in order to preserve the peace, and the right to arrest
was accordingly limited to cases in which the person to be arrested was
taken in the act or immediately after its conclusion.' (Stephen's History of
the Criminal Law of England, p. 193; Chase's Blackstone [4th ed.], pp. 998,
999; 6 C. J. S. Arrest, § 6, subd. c.)" People v. Phillips, 284 N. Y. 235,
237, 30 N. E. 2d 488, 489 (1940).
Moreover, I remain convinced that it is incorrect to base current interpretations of the Fourth Amendment solely on the literal words of the com-
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entries to make arrests for public misdemeanors would also
be prohibited, possibly with a similarly narrow exception for
persons committing such misdemeanors in the presence of an
officer and then fleeing, upon hot pursuit, into the home.
Cf. United States v. Santana, 427 U. S. 38, 42-43 (1976) (hot
pursuit of fleeing felon); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294
(1967) (same). And, although the rules for home arrests at
the time of the adoption of the Fourth Amendment were far
from clear, see Payton v. New York, 445 U. S., at 591-598, it
appears that such a severe restriction on home arrests for
misdemeanors was the prevailing view of the common law.
See, e. g., The Queen v. Marsden, 1 L. R.-Cr. Cas. Res. 131
(1868); Wilgus, Arrest Without a Warrant, 22 Mich. L. Rev.
541, 798, 803 (1924) ("Of course since ... an officer ... has
[no] authority to arrest for a past breach of the peace without
a warrant, neither would [he] have the right to break doors in
an attempted arrest therefor, except for one committed in his
presence and on fresh pursuit."). See also Handcock v.
Baker, 126 Eng. Rep. 1270 (1800); Adair v. Williams, 24
Ariz. 422, 210 P: 853 (1922); Wilgus, supra, at 804. Therefore, even if exigent circumstances exist, the common law
suggests that warrantless home arrests for misdemeanors
should be prohibited, with the possible exception of hot pursuit from the commission of a misdemeanor in the officer's
presence.
Surely, the prohibitions of the Fourth Amendment go at
least as far-prohibiting warrantless entries of the home to
arrest for certain minor offenses under all circumstances,
even if probable cause and exigent circumstances are shown
mon-law rules of arrest. Rather, the Fourth Amendment "must be interpreted 'in light of contemporary norms and conditions. ' " Steagald v.
United States, 451 U. S. 204, 217 and n. 10 (1981), quoting Payton v. New
York , 445 U. S. 573, 591 and n. 33 (1980). See also United States v. Watson, 423 U. S. 411, 433, 438-443 (1976) (MARSHALL, J ., dissenting). For
purposes of this case, however, even acceptance of the common-law rule
compels the conclusion that the petitioner's arrest was unlawful.
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to exist. Before agents of the government may invade the
sanctity of the home, the government must be required to
demonstrate a compelling need that overcomes the presumption of unreasonableness that attaches to all warrantless
home entries. See Payton v. New York, supra, at 586.
When the government's interest is only to arrest for a minor
offense, that presumption of unreasonableness should be
irrebuttable, and the government should be allowed to make
such an arrest only with a warrant issued upon probable
cause by a neutral and detached magistrate. Accordingly, I
conclude that there are no circumstances under which a warrantless home entry to arrest for a minor offense could be justified.11 The Fourth Amendment, in my view, compels such
an absolute ban.
Application of this bright-line principle to the facts of this
case proves quite simple. The State of Wisconsin has chosen
to classify the first offense for driving while intoxicated as a
noncriminal, civil forfeiture offense for which no imprisonment is possible. See Wis. Stat. § 346. 65(2) (1975); id.,
§ 346.65(2)(a) (1981-82); supra, at--. This is the best indication of the State's interest in precipitating an arrest, and is
one that can be easily identified both by the courts and by officers faced with a decision to arrest. See supra, note 5.
An offense for which no imprisonment is possible, however,
does not suffice to overcome the presumption of unreasonableness that attaches to a warrantless entry of the home to
arrest. 12 The arrest of the petitioner in this case, therefore,
Even the dissenters in Payton v. Ne:w York, 445 U. S. 573 (1980), although believing that warrantless home arrests are not prohibited by the
Fourth Amendment, recognized the importance of the felony limitation on
such arrests. See i d. , at 603, 616-617 (WHITE, J., dissenting) ("The felony
requirement guards against abusive or arbitrary enforcement and ensures
that invasions of the home occur only in case of the most serious crimes.").
I see little reason to remove this general restriction even if there is ample
support for a finding of exigent circumstances.
12
Although I have previously joined in noting the danger of drawing constitutional lines based on legislative classifications of statutory crimes, see
11
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was prohibited by the Fourth Amendment. As a result of
this unlawful arrest, state law provides that the revocation of
his operating privileges was also improper. See Wise. Stat.
§ 343.305(2)(b)(5) (1975); id., § 343.305(3)(b)(5)(a) (1981-82);
supra, at--. Accordingly, the judgment of the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin should be vacated, and the case remanded
for further proceedings.
B
Even if I were to conclude that an absolute ban on warrantless home arrests for certain nonserious offenses is not compelled by the Fourth Amendment, I would conclude that the
petitioner's arrest was prohibited by the Fourth Amendment
because of the absence of exigent circumstances.
In Payton v. New York, 445 U. S., at 583, the Court declined to consider the scope of any exception for exigent circumstances that might justify warrantless home arrests,
thereby leaving to the lower courts the initial application of
the exigent-circumstances exception. Prior decisions of this
Court, however, have emphasized that exceptions to the warrant requirement are "few in number and carefully delinUnited States v. Watson, 423 U. S., at 438-442, 454-455 (MARSHALL, J. ,
dissenting), it is not necessary to decide in this case whether the Fourth
Amendment prohibits warrantless home arrests for all nonfelonious
crimes. Rather, given the facts of this case, I would simply hold that such
arrests are constitutionally prohibited at least for all minor offenses, defined primarily by looking to the extent of punishment provided for by the
state statute.
Nor do I mean to suggest that the prevention of drunk driving is not
properly of major concern to the States. The State of Wisconsin, however, along with several other states, see, e. g. , Minn. Stat.§ 169.121 subd.
4 (1982); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 39-669.07(1) (Supp. 1982); S. D. Codified Laws
§ 32-23-2 (Supp. 1983), has chosen to limit severely the penalties that may
be imposed after a first conviction for driving while intoxicated. Given
that the classification of state crimes differs widely among the States, the
penalty that may attach to any particular offense seems to provide the
clearest and most consistent indication of the state's interest in arresting
individuals suspected of committing that offense.
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eated," United States v. United States District Court, 407
U. S., at 318, and that the police have a heavy burden to
meet when attempting to demonstrate an urgent need that
might justify warrantless searches or arrests. Indeed, the
Court has recognized only a few such emergency conditions,
see, e. g., United States v. Santana, 427 U. S., at 42-43
(1976) (hot pursuit of a fleeing felon); Warden v. Hayden, 387
U. S., at 29~299 (1967) (same); Schmerber v. California, 384
U. S. 757, 770-771 (1966) (destruction of evidence); Michigan
v. Tyler, 436 U. S. 499, 509 (1978) (ongoing fire), and has actually applied only the "hot pursuit" doctrine to arrests in the
home, see Santana, supra. The record in this case, however, requires that the Court clarify this area of Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence. In so doing, I conclude that an
important factor to be considered when determining whether
any exigency exists is the gravity of the underlying offense
for which the arrest is being made. Moreover, although no
exigency is created simply because there is probable cause to
believe that a serious crime has been committed, I conclude
that application of the exigent-circumstances exception
should be severely restricted when only a minor offense is
involved.
This is not a novel idea. Writing in concurrence in M cDonald v. United States, 335 U. S. 451 (1948), Justice Jackson explained why a finding of exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless home entry should be severely restricted:
"Even if one were to conclude that urgent circumstances might justify a forced entry without a warrant,
no such emergency was present in this case. This
method of law enforcement displays a shocking lack of all
sense of proportion. Whether there is reasonable necessity for a search without waiting to obtain a warrant
certainly depends somewhat upon the gravity of the offense thought to be in progress as well as the hazards of
the method of attempting to reach it. . . . It is to me a
shocking proposition that private homes, even quarters
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in a tenement, may be indiscriminately invaded at the
discretion of any suspicious police officer engaged in
following up offenses that involve no violence or threats
of it. While I should be human enough to apply the letter of the law with some indulgence to officers acting to
deal with threats or crimes of violence which endanger
life or security, it is notable that few of the searches
found by this Court to be unlawful dealt with that category of crime. . . . While the enterprise of parting fools
from their money by the "numbers" lottery is one that
ought to be suppressed, I do not think that its suppression is more important to society than the security of the
people against unreasonable searches and seizures.
When an officer undertakes to act as his own magistrate,
he ought to be in a position to justify it by pointing to
some real immediate and serious consequences if he postponed action to get a warrant." ld., at 459-460 (Jackson, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
Consistent with this approach, the lower courts have
looked to the nature of the underlying offense as an important factor to be considered in the exigent-circumstances calculus. In the leading federal case defining exigent circumstances, for example, the en bane United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia recognized that the
gravity of the underlying offense was a principal factor to be
weighed. Dorman v. United States, 435 F. 2d 385, 392
(CADC 1970). 13 Without approving all of the factors included in the standard adopted by that court, it is sufficient
to note that many other lower courts have also considered the
gravity of the offense an important part of their constitutional analysis.
See generally Donnino & Girese, Exigent Circumstances for a Warrantless Home Arrest, 45 Alb. L. Rev. 90 (1980); Harbaugh & Faust,
"Knock on Any Door"-Home Arrests After Payton and Steagald, 86
Dick. L. Rev. 191, 220-233 (1982); Note, Exigent Circumstances for Warrantless Home Arrests, 23 Ariz. L. Rev. 1171 (1981).
13
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As a result, courts have permitted warrantless home arrests for major felonies if identifiable exigencies, independent
of the gravity of the offense, existed at the time of the arrest.
Compare United States v. Campbell, 581 F. 2d 22 (CA2 1978)
(allowing warrantless home arrest for armed robbery when
exigent circumstances existed), with Commonwealth v. Williams, 483 Pa. 293, 396 A. 2d 1177 (1978) (disallowing warrantless home arrest for murder due to absence of exigent
circumstances). But I am aware of no case that has permitted a warrantless home arrest for a nonfelonious crime. Cf.
People v. Sanders, 59 Ill. App. 3d 6, 374 N. E. 2d 139 (1978)
(burglary without weapons not grave offense of violence for
this purpose); State v. Bennett, 295 N. W. 2d 5 (S. D. 1980)
(distribution of controlled substances not a grave offense for
these purposes). This should not be surprising. It is, indeed, difficult to conceive of a warrantless home arrest that
would not be unreasonable when the underlying offense is
relatively minor. I therefore conclude that the commonsense result reached by most lower courts is required by the
Fourth Amendment prohibition on "unreasonable searches
and seizures," and would hold that application of the exigentcircumstances exception in the context of a home entry is severely restricted when there is probable cause to believe that
only a minor offense has been committed.
Again, application of this principle to the facts of the
present case is relatively straightforward. The petitioner
was arrested in the privacy of his own bedroom for a noncriminal, traffic offense. The State attempts to justify the
arrest by relying on the hot-pursuit doctrine, on the threat to
public safety, and on the need to preserve evidence of the petitioner's blood-alcohol level. The claim of hot pursuit is unconvincing, however, because there was no immediate or continuous pursuit of the petitioner from the scene of a crime.
Moreover, because the petitioner had already arrived home,
and had abandoned his car at the scene of the accident, there
was little remaining threat to the public safety. Hence, the
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only potentially viable emergency claimed by the State was
the need to ascertain the petitioner's blood-alcohol level.
But even assuming that the underlying facts would support a
finding of this exigent circumstance, mere similarity to other
cases involving the imminent destruction of evidence is not
suffient. In the context of a minor, nonjailable traffic offense, a warrantless home arrest simply cannot be upheld using this otherwise plausible justification. The principles of
the Fourth Amendment do not sanction such unreasonable
police behavior.
III
For unexplained reasons, the Court has chosen to dismiss
the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted. As a result,
the Court lets stand a warrantless, nighttime entry into the
petitioner's home to arrest him for violation of a civil traffic
offense. In my view, such an arrest is clearly prohibited by
prevailing case law and by the special protection afforded the
home under the Fourth Amendment. The petitioner's arrest was therefore invalid, the judgment of the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin should be vacated, and the case remanded
for further proceedings.
I respectfully dissent.
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EDWARD G. WELSH, PETITIONER v. WISCONSIN
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WISCONSIN
[January-, 1984]

JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom JUSTICE MARSHALL joins,
and with whom JUSTICE STEVENS joins in all but Part II-A,
dissenting.
In Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573 (1980), the Court
concluded that, absent probable cause and exigent circumstances, warrantless arrests in the home are prohibited by
the Fourth Amendment. At the same time, we explicitly refused "to consider the sort of emergency or dangerous situation, qescribed in our cases as 'exigent circumstances,' that
would justify a warrantless entry into a home for the purpose
of either arrest or search." I d., at 583. Certiorari was
originally granted in this case to decide at least one aspect of
the unresolved question: whether, and if so under what circumstances, the Fourth Amendment prohibits the police
from making a warrantless night entry of a person's home in
order to arrest him for violation of a nonjailable traffic offense. Because, in my view, this case presents a record that
compels us to decide that question, I cannot agree that the
Court should dismiss the writ of certiorari as improvidently
granted. I therefore reach the merits of the question presented and would reverse the judgment of the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin.
I
A
Shortly before 9:00 p. m. on the rainy night of April 24,
1978, a lone witness, Randy J al;>lonic, observed a car that was
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being driven erratically. After changing speeds and veering
from side to side, the car eventually swerved off the road and
came to a stop in an open field. No damage to any person or
property occurred. Apparently worrying about the driver
and fearing that the car would get back on the highway,
J ablonic drove his truck up behind the car so as to block it
from returning to the road. Another passerby also stopped
at the scene, and J ablonic asked her to call the police. Before the police arrived, however, the driver of the car
emerged from his vehicle, approached Jablonic's truck, and
asked J ablonic for a ride home. J ablonic instead suggested
that they wait for assistance in removing or repairing the car.
Ignoring Jablonic's suggestion, the driver walked away from
the scene.
A few minutes later, the police arrived and questioned
J ablonic. He told one officer what he had seen, specifically
noting that the driver was either very inebriated or very
sick. The officer checked the motor vehicle registration of
the abandoned car and learned that it was registered to the
petitioner, Edward G. Welsh. In addition, the officer noted
that the petitioner's residence was a short distance from the
scene, and therefore easily within walking distance.
Without securing any type of warrant, the police proceeded to the petitioner's home, arriving about 9:00 p. m.
When the petitioner's stepdaughter answered the door, the
police successfully sought entry into the house. 1 They proceeded upstairs to the petitioner's bedroom, where they
found him lying naked in bed. At this point, the petitioner
' The state trial court never decided whether there was consent to the
entry because it deemed decision of that issue unnecessary in light of its
finding that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless arrest. After
reversing the lower court's finding of exigent circumstances, the Wisconsin
Court of Appeals remanded for full consideration of the consent issue. See
State v. Welsh, No. 80-1686, App. 114-125. That remand never occurred,
however, because the Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed its court of appeals and reinstated the trial court's judgment. See State v. Welsh, 108
Wis. 2d 319, 321 N. W. 2d 245 (1982).
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was placed under arrest for driving or operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant, in violation of
Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1) (1977). 2 The petitioner was taken to
the police station, where he refused to submit to a breathalyzer test.
B
As a result of these events, the petitioner was subjected to
two separate but related proceedings: one concerning his refusal to submit to a breath test and the other involving the
alleged code violation for driving while intoxicated. Under
the Wisconsin vehicle code as it appeared in April1978, anyone arrested for driving while intoxicated under § 346.63(1)
could be requested by a law enforcement officer to provide
breath, blood, or urine samples for the purpose of determining the presence or quantity of alcohol. Wis. Stat.
§ 343.305(1) (1975). If such a request was made, the arrestee
was required to submit to the appropriate testing or risk a
revocation of operating privileges. Cf. South Dakota v.
Neville, 459 U. S. - - (1983) (admission into evidence of a
defendant's refusal to submit to a blood-alcohol test does not
offend constitutional right against self-incrimination). The
arrestee could challenge the officer's request, however, by
refusing to undergo testing and then asking for a hearing to
determine whether the refusal was justified. If, after the
hearing, it was determined that the refusal was not justified,
the arrestee's operating privileges would be revoked for 60
days. 3
Since the time of the petitioner's arrest, § 346.63 has been amended to
provide for a code violation if someone drives or operates a motor vehicle
while under the influence of an intoxicant or while evidencing certain
blood- or breath-alcohol levels.
See Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(a)-(b)
(1981-1982). This amendment, however, has no bearing on the issues
raised by the present case.
3
Since the time of the petitioner's arrest, this statute also has been
amended, with the current version found at Wis. Stat. § 343.305
(1981-1982). Although the procedures to be followed by the law enforcement officer and the arrestee have remained essentially unchanged,
2
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The statute also set forth specific criteria to be applied by a
court when determining whether an arrestee's refusal to take
a breath test was justified. Included among these criteria
was a requirement that, before revoking the arrestee's operating privileges, the court determine that "the refusal ...
to submit to a test was unreasonable." § 343.305(2)(b)(5)
(1975). It is not disputed that an arrestee's refusal to take a
breath test would be reasonable, and therefore operating
privileges could not be revoked, if the underlying arrest was
not lawful. Indeed, state law has consistently provided that
a valid arrest is a necessary prerequisite to the imposition of
a breath test. See Scales v. State, 64 Wis. 2d 485, 494, 219
N. W. 2d 286, 292 (1974). Although the statute in effect in
April 1978 referred to reasonableness, the current version of
§ 343.305 explicitly recognizes that one of the issues that an
arrestee may raise at a refusal hearing is "whether [he] was
lawfully placed under arrest for violation of s.346.63(1)."
§ 343.305(3)(b)(5)(a), (8)(b) (1981--82). See also 67 Op. Wis.
Atty. Gen. 93--78 (Dec. 27, 1978) ("statutory scheme ... contemplates that a lawful arrest be made prior to a request for
submission to a test"). 4
Separate statutory provisions control the penalty that
might be imposed for the substantive offense of driving while
intoxicated. At the time in question, the vehicle code provided that a first offense for driving while intoxicated was a
noncriminal violation subject to a civil forfeiture proceeding
for a maximum fine of $200; a second or subsequent offense in
§ 343.305(3), (8), the potential length of any revocation of operating privileges has been increased, depending on the arrestee's prior driving record,
§ 343.305(9)(a)-(b). An arrestee who improperly refuses to submit to arequired test may also be required to comply with an assessment order and a
driver safety plan. § 343.305(9)(c)-(e). These amendments, however,
also have no direct bearing on the issues raised by the present case.
• Because state law provides that evidence of the petitioner's refusal to
submit to a breath test is inadmissible if the underlying arrest was unlawful, this case does not implicate the exclusionary rule under the Federal
Constitution.
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the previous five years was a potential misdemeanor that
could be punished by imprisonment for up to one year and a
maximum fine of $500. Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2) (1975). Since
that time, the state has made only minor amendments to
these penalty provisions. Indeed, the statute continues to
categorize a first offense as a civil violation that allows for
only a monetary forfeiture of no more than $300.
§ 346.65(2)(a) (1981-82). See State v. Albright, 98 Wis. 2d
663, 672-673, 298 N. W. 2d 196, 202 (App. 1980).

c
As noted, in this case the petitioner refused to submit to a
breath test; he subsequently filed a timely request for a refusal hearing. Before that hearing was held, however, the
state filed a criminal complaint against the petitioner for
driving while intoxicated. 5 The petitioner responded by filing a motion to dismiss the complaint, relying on his contention that the unde-rlying arrest was invalid. After receiving
evidence at a hearing on this motion in July 1980, the trial
court concluded that the criminal complaint would not be dismissed because the existence of both probable cause and exigent circumstances justified the warrantless arrest. The decision at the refusal hearing, which was not held until
September 1980, was therefore preordained. In fact, the
primary issue at the refusal hearing-whether the petitioner
acted reasonably in refusing to submit to a breath test because he was unlawfully placed under arrest, see supra, at
6
The petitioner was charged with a criminal misdemeanor because this
was his second such citation in the previous five years. See § 346.65(2)
(1975). Although the petitioner was subject to a criminal charge, the police conducting the warrantless entry of his home did not know that the
petitioner had ever been charged with, or much less convicted of, a prior
violation for driving while intoxicated. It must be assumed, therefore,
that at the time of the arrest the police were acting as if they were investigating and eventually arresting for a civil violation only. See Beck v.
Ohio, 379 U. S. 89, 91, 96 (1964).
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4-had now been determined two months earlier by the same
trial court.
As expected, after the refusal hearing, the trial court concluded that the arrest of the petitioner was lawful and that
the petitioner's refusal to take the breath test was therefore
unreasonable. 6 Accordingly, the court issued an order suspending the petitioner's operating license for 60 days. On
appeal, the suspension order was vacated by the Wisconsin
Court of Appeals. See State v. Welsh, No. 80-1686, App.
114-125. Contrary to the trial court, the appellate court
concluded that the warrantless arrest of the petitioner in his
home violated the Fourth Amendment because the State, although demonstrating probable cause to arrest, had not established the existence of exigent circumstances. The petitioner's refusal to submit to a breath test was therefore
reasonable. 7 The Wisconsin Supreme Court in turn reversed the court of appeals, relying on the existence of three
factors that it b~lieved constituted exigent circumstances:
the need for "hot pursuit" of a suspect, the need to prevent
physical harm to the offender and the public, and the need to
prevent destruction of evidence. See State v. Welsh, 108
Wis. 2d 319, 336--338, 321 N. W. 2d 245, 254-255 (1982). Because of the important Fourth Amendment implications of
the decision below, we granted certiorari. 459 U. S. - (1983).8
.
6
When ruling from the bench after the refusal hearing, the trial judge
specifically indicated:
"[T]he Court is bound by its earlier ruling that that was a valid arrest.
And, I think [counsel for the petitioner] certainly will have the right to
challenge that on appeal if he appeals this matter, as well as the previous
ruling should there be a conviction on the underlying charge." App. 111.
See also App. 112-113.
7
The court remanded the case for further findings as to whether the
police had entered the petitioner's home with consent. Seen. 1, supra.
8
Although the state courts differed in their respective conclusions concerning exigent circumstances, they each found that the facts known to the
police at the time of the warrantless home entry were sufficient to establish
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II

It is axiomatic that "the physical entry of the home is the
chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed." United States v. United States District
Court, 407 U. S. 297, 313 (1972). And a principal protection
against unnecessary intrusions into private dwellings is the
warrant requirement imposed by the Fourth Amendment on
agents of the government who seek to enter the home for
purposes of search or arrest. See Johnson v. United States,
333 U. S. 10, 13-14 (1948). 9 It is not surprising, therefore,
that the Court has recognized, as "a 'basic principle of Fourth
Amendment law[,]' that searches and seizures inside a home
without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable." Payton v. New York, 445 U. S., at 586. See Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 474-475 (1971) ("a search or seizure carried out on a suspect's premises without a warrant is
probable cause to arrest. The petitioner has not challenged that finding
before this Court.
The parallel criminal proceedings against the petitioner, see supra, at 5
and n. 5, resulted in a misdemeanor conviction for driving while intoxicated. During the jury trial, held in early 1982, the state introduced evidence of the petitioner's refusal to submit to a breath test. His appeal
from that conviction, now before the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, has been
stayed pending our decision in this case. See Brief for Petitioner 17, n. 5.
9
In Johnson, Justice Jackson eloquently explained the warrant requirement in the context of a home search:
"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by
zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the
usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and
detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the
often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime. . . . The right of officers to thrust themselves into a home is ... a grave concern, not only to
the individual but to a society which chooses to dwell in reasonable security
and freedom from surveillance. When the right of privacy must reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial
officer, not by a policeman or government enforcement agent." Id., at
13-14 (footnote omitted).
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per se unreasonable, unless the police can show ... the presence of 'exigent circumstances'"). See also Steagald v.
United States, 451 U. S. 204, 211-212 (1981); McDonald v.
United States, 335 U. S. 451, 456 (1948); Johnson v. United
States, supra, at 13-15; Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616,
630 (1886).
Consistent with these long-recognized principles, the
Court decided in Payton v. New York, supra, that warrantless arrests in the home are prohibited by the Fourth Amendment, absent probable cause and exigent circumstances.
Id., at 583-590. Although one might infer from the Court's
decision that all home arrests would be subject to the same
rule, the Court expressly framed its opinion in terms of "routine felony arrests," see id., at 574, 602. This formulation of
the holding in Payton implies two separate, but related limitations that have yet to be acknowledged completely by the
Court, but which control the present case. In particular, by
its own terms the holding in Payton-limited to "routine felony arrests"-was neither intended to cover arrests for nonserious offenses nor applied to arrests that are considered
nonroutine because they are justified by exigent
circumstances.
A

By concluding that the Fourth Amendment prohibits home
entries to make warrantless felony arrests in the absence of
probable cause and exigent circumstances, the Court in
Payton decided, a fortiori, that warrantless home arrests are
similarly prohibited for offenses less serious than felonies.
It does not necessarily follow, however, that warrantless
home arrests for nonserious offenses would be proper, even if
probable cause and exigent circumstances are found to exist.
That question, yet to be decided by the Court, is presented
by the record in this case. I therefore reach the issue and
conclude that the Fourth Amendment imposes an absolute
ban on warrantless home arrests for certain minor offenses.
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In United States v. Watson, 423 U. S. 411 (1976), the
Court upheld a warrantless "midday public" arrest for a felony. In so doing, the Court relied heavily on the commonlaw rule that "a peace officer was permitted to arrest without
a warrant for a misdemeanor or felony committed in his
presence as well as for a felony not committed in his presence
if there was reasonable ground for making the arrest." I d.,
at 418 (emphasis added) (citing sources); id., at 438 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). Although not necessary to the result
in Watson, the italicized portion of the common-law rule suggests that warrantless public arrests for misdemeanors, even
if supported by probable cause and exigent circumstances,
should be prohibited unless the underlying offense is committed in the presence of the arresting officer. See generally
W. LaFave, Arrest 231-243 (1965). Therefore, even accepting the Court's view in Watson that the Fourth Amendment
grants broad authority for warrantless public arrests, adherence to the common-law rule would allow warrantless misdemeanor arrests in public areas only in the most narrow circumstances. 10 It logically follows that warrantless home
'°For purposes of this case only, I assume that the common-law rule
identified in Watson applied in its literal sense to all misdemeanors.
There is substantial evidence, however, that public arrests were justified
under the common law, even for offenses committed in the officer's presence, only for breaches of the peace-a category of offenses much narrower, and far more serious, than all misdemeanors. See, e. g., W.
LaFave, Arrest 231 (1965); Bohlen & Shulman, Arrest With and Without a
Warrant, 75 U. Pa. L. Rev. 485 (1927). As explained by the New York
Court of Appeals:
"The right of a peace officer at common law to arrest summarily was a
limited one. 'The common law did not authorize the arrest of persons
guilty or suspected of misdemeanors, except in cases of an actual breach of
the peace either by an affray or by violence to an individual. In such cases
the arrest had to be made not so much for the purpose of bringing the offender to justice as in order to preserve the peace, and the right to arrest
was accordingly limited to cases in which the person to be arrested was
taken in the act or immediately after its conclusion.' (Stephen's History of
the Criminal Law of England, p. 193; Chase's Blackstone [4th ed.], pp. 998,
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entries to make arrests for public misdemeanors would also
be prohibited, possibly with a similarly narrow exception for
persons committing such misdemeanors in the presence of an
officer and then fleeing, upon hot pursuit, into the home.
Cf. United States v. Santana, 427 U. S. 38, 42-43 (1976) (hot
pursuit of fleeing felon); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294
(1967) (same). And, although the rules for home arrests at
the time of the adoption of the Fourth Amendment were far
from clear, see Payton v. New York, 445 U. S., at 591-598, it
appears that such a severe restriction on home arrests for
misdemeanors was the prevailing view of the common law.
See, e. g., The Queen v. Marsden, 1 L. R.-Cr. Cas. Res. 131
(1868); Wilgus, Arrest Without a Warrant, 22 Mich. L. Rev.
541, 798, 803 (1924) ("Of course since ... an officer ... has
[no] authority to arrest for a past breach of the peace without
a warrant, neither would [he] have the right to break doors in
an attempted arrest therefor, except for one committed in his
presence and on fresh pursuit."). See also Handcock v.
Baker, 126 Eng. -Rep. 1270 (1800); Adair v. Williams, 24
Ariz. 422, 210 P. 853 (1922); Wilgus, supra, at 804. Therefore, even if exigent circumstances exist, the common law
suggests that warrantless home arrests for misdemeanors
should be prohibited, with the possible exception of hot pursuit from the commission of a misdemeanor in the officer's
presence.
999; 6 C. J. S. Arrest, § 6, subd. c.)" People v. Phillips, 284 N. Y. 235,
237, 30 N. E. 2d 488, 489 (1940).
Moreover, I remain convinced that it is incorrect to base current interpretations of the Fourth Amendment solely on the literal words of the common-law rules of arrest. Rather, the Fourth Amendment "must be interpreted 'in light of contemporary norms and conditions.' " Steagald v.
United States, 451 U. S. 204, 217 and n. 10 (1981), quoting Payton v. New
York, 445 U. S. 573, 591 and n. 33 (1980). See also United States v. Watson, 423 U. S. 411, 433, 438-443 (1976) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). For
purposes of this case, however, even acceptance of the common-law rule
compels the conclusion that the petitioner's arrest was unlawful.
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Surely, the prohibitions of the Fourth Amendment go at
least as far-prohibiting warrantless entries of the home to
arrest for certain minor offenses under all circumstances,
even if probable cause and exigent circumstances are shown
to exist. Before agents of the government may invade the
sanctity of the home, the government must be required to
demonstrate a compelling need that overcomes the presumption of unreasonableness that attaches to all warrantless
home entries. See Payton v. New York, supra, at 586.
When the government's interest is only to arrest for a minor
offense, that presumption of unreasonableness should be
irrebuttable, and the government should be allowed to make
such an arrest only with a warrant issued upon probable
cause by a neutral and detached magistrate. Accordingly, I
conclude that there are no circumstances under which a warrantless home entry to arrest for a minor offense could be justified.11 The Fourth Amendment, in my view, compels such
an absolute ban.
Application of this bright-line principle to the facts of this
case proves quite simple. The State of Wisconsin has chosen
to classify the first offense for driving while intoxicated as a
noncriminal, civil forfeiture offense for which no imprisonment' is possible. See Wis. Stat. § 346. 65(2) (1975); id.,
§ 346.65(2)(a) (1981-82); supra, at 4-5. This is the best indication of the state's interest in precipitating an arrest, and is
one that can be easily identified both by the courts aHd by officers faced with a decision to arrest. See supra, note 5.
An offense for which no imprisonment is possible, however,
does not suffice to overcome the presumption of unreasonEven the dissenters in Payton v. New York , 445 U. S. 573 (1980), although believing that warrantless home arrests are not prohibited by the
Fourth Amendment, recognized the importance of the felony limitation on
such arrests. See id. , at 603, 616-Q17 (WHITE, J., dissenting) ("The felony
requirement guards against abusive or arbitrary enforcement and ensures
that invasions of the home occur only in case of the most serious crimes.").
I see little reason to remove this general restriction even if there is ample
support for a finding of exigent circumstances.
11
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ableness that attaches to a warrantless entry of the home to
arrest. 12 The arrest of the petitioner in this case, therefore,
was prohibited by the Fourth Amendment. As a result of
this unlawful arrest, state law provides that the revocation of
his operating privileges was also improper. See Wise. Stat.
§ 343.305(2)(b)(5) (1975); id., § 343.305(3)(b)(5)(a) (1981-82);
supra, at 4 and n. 4. Accordingly, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin should be vacated, and the case remanded for further proceedings.
B

Even if I were to conclude that an absolute ban on warrantless home arrests for certain nonserious offenses is not compelled by the Fourth Amendment, I would conclude that the
petitioner's arrest was prohibited by the Fourth Amendment
because of the absence of exigent circumstances.
In Payton v. New Y ark, 445 U. S., at 583, the Court declined to consider· the scope of any exception for exigent circumstances that might justify warrantless home arrests,
thereby leaving to the lower courts the initial application of
12
Although I have previously joined in noting the danger of drawing constitutional lines based on legislative classifications of statutory crimes, see
United States v. Watson, 423 U. S., at 438-442, 454-455 (MARSHALL, J.,
dissenting), it is not necessary to decide in this case whether the Fourth
Amendment prohibits warrantless home arrests for all nonfelonious
crimes. Rather, given the facts of this case, I would simply hold that such
arrests are constitutionally prohibited at least for all minor offenses, defined primarily by looking to the extent of punishment provided for by the
state statute.
Nor do I mean to suggest that the prevention of drunk driving is not
properly of major concern to the States. The State of Wisconsin, however, along with several other States, see, e. g., Minn. Stat. § 169.121
subd. 4 (1982); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 39--669.07(1) (Supp. 1982); S. D. Codified
Laws § 32-23-2 (Supp. 1983), has chosen to limit severely the penalties
that may be imposed after a first conviction for driving while intoxicated.
Given that the classification of state crimes differs widely among the
States, the penalty that may attach to any particular offense seems to provide the clearest and most consistent indication of the state's interest in
arresting individuals suspected of committing that offense.
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the exigent-circumstances exception. Prior decisions of this
Court, however, have emphasized that exceptions to the warrant requirement are "few in number and carefully delineated," United States v. United States District Court, 407
U. S., at 318, and that the police have a heavy burden to
meet when attempting to demonstrate an urgent need that
might justify warrantless searches or arrests. Indeed, the
Court has recognized only a few such emergency conditions,
see, e. g., United States v. Santana, 427 U. S., at 42--43
(1976) (hot pursuit of a fleeing felon); Warden v. Hayden, 387
U. S., at 298-299 (1967) (same); Schmerber v. California, 384
U. S. 757, 77~771 (1966) (destruction of evidence); Michigan
v. Tyler, 436 U. S. 499, 509 (1978) (ongoing fire), and has actually applied only the "hot pursuit" doctrine to arrests in the
home, see Santana, supra. The record in this case, however, requires that the Court clarify this area of Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence. In so doing, I conclude that an
important factor to be considered when determining whether
any exigency exists is the gravity of the underlying offense
for which the arrest is being made. Moreover, although no
exigency is created simply because there is probable cause to
believe that a serious crime has been committed, I conclude
that application of the exigent-circumstances exception
should be severely restricted when only a minor offense is
involved.
This is not a novel idea. Writing in concurrence in M cDonald v. United States, 335 U. S. 451 (1948), Justice Jackson explained why a finding of exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless home entry should be severely restricted:
"Even if one were to conclude that urgent circumstances might justify a forced entry without a warrant,
no such emergency was present in this case. This
method of law enforcement displays a shocking lack of all
sense of proportion. Whether there is reasonable necessity for a search without waiting to obtain a warrant
certainly depends somewhat upon the gravity of the of-
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fense thought to be in progress as well as the hazards of
the method of attempting to reach it. . . . It is to me a
shocking proposition that private homes, even quarters
in a tenement, may be indiscriminately invaded at the
discretion of any suspicious police officer engaged in
following up offenses that involve no violence or threats
of it. While I should be human enough to apply the letter of the law with some indulgence to officers acting to
deal with threats or crimes of violence which endanger
life or security, it is notable that few of the searches
found by this Court to be unlawful dealt with that category of crime. . . . While the enterprise of parting fools
from their money by the 'numbers' lottery is one that
ought to be suppressed, I do not think that its suppression is more important to society than the security of the
people against unreasonable searches and seizures.
When an officer undertakes to act as his own magistrate,
he ought to be in a position to justify it by pointing to
some real immediate and serious consequences if he postponed action to get a warrant." I d., at 459-460 (Jackson, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
Consistent with this approach, the lower courts have
looked to the nature of the underlying offense as an important factor to be considered in the exigent-circumstances calculus. In the leading federal case defining exigent circumstances, for example, the en bane United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia recognized that the
gravity of the underlying offense was a principal factor to be
weighed. Dorman v. United States, 435 F. 2d 385, 392
(CADC 1970). 13 Without approving all of the factors included in the standard adopted by that court, it is sufficient
13
See generally Donnino & Girese, Exigent Circumstances for a Warrantless Home Arrest, 45 Alb. L. Rev. 90 (1980); Harbaugh & Faust,
"Knock on Any Door"-Home Arrests After Payton and Steagald, 86
Dick. L. Rev. 191, 220-233 (1982); Note, Exigent Circumstances for Warrantless Home Arrests, 23 Ariz. L. Rev. 1171 (1981).
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to note that many other lower courts have also considered the
gravity of the offense an important part of their constitutional analysis.
As a result, courts have permitted warrantless horne arrests for major felonies if identifiable exigencies, independent
of the gravity of the offense, existed at the time of the arrest.
Compare United States v. Campbell, 581 F. 2d 22 (CA2 1978)
(allowing warrantless horne arrest for armed robbery when
exigent circumstances existed), with Commonwealth v. Williams, 483 Pa. 293, 396 A. 2d 1177 (1978) (disallowing warrantless horne arrest for murder due to absence of exigent
circumstances). But I am aware of no case that has permitted a warrantless horne arrest for a nonfelonious crime. Cf.
People v. Sanders, 59 Ill. App. 3d 6, 374 N. E. 2d 139 (1978)
(burglary without weapons not grave offense of violence for
this purpose); State v. Bennett, 295 N. W. 2d 5 (S. D. 1980)
(distribution of controlled substances not a grave offense for
these purposes) . . This should not be surprising. It is, indeed, difficult to conceive of a warrantless horne arrest that
would not be unreasonable when the underlying offense is
relatively minor. I therefore conclude that the commonsense result reached by most lower courts is required by the
Fourth Amendment prohibition on "unreasonable searches
and seizures," and would hold that application of the exigentcircumstances exception in the context of a horne entry is severely restricted when there is probable cause to believe that
only a minor offense has been committed.
Again, application of this principle to the facts of the
present case is relatively straightforward. The petitioner
was arrested in the privacy of his own bedroom for a noncriminal, traffic offense. The State attempts to justify the
arrest by relying on the hot-pursuit doctrine, on the threat to
public safety, and on the need to preserve evidence of the petitioner's blood-alcohol level. The claim of hot pursuit is unconvincing, however, because there was no immediate or continuous pursuit of the petitioner from the scene of a crime.
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Moreover, because the petitioner had already arrived home,
and had abandoned his car at the scene of the accident, there
was little remaining threat to the public safety. Hence, the
only potentially viable emergency claimed by the State was
the need to ..-ascertain the petitioner's blood-alcohol level.
But even assuming that the underlying facts would support a
finding of this exigent circumstance, mere similarity to other
cases involving the imminent destruction of evidence is not
sufficient. In the context of a minor, nonjailable traffic offense, a warrantless home arrest simply cannot be upheld using this otherwise plausible justification. The principles of
the Fourth Amendment do not sanction such unreasonable
police behavior.
III
For unexplained reasons, the Court has chosen to dismiss
the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted. As a result,
the Court lets stand a warrantless, nighttime entry into the
petitioner's home to arrest him for violation of a civil traffic
offense. In my v:iew, such an arrest is clearly prohibited by
prevailing case law and by the special protection afforded the
home under the Fourth Amendment. The petitioner's arrest was therefore invalid, the judgment of the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin should be vacated, and the case remanded
for further proceedings.
I respectfully dissent.
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JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom JUSTICE MARSHALL joins,)
and with whom JUSTICE BLACKMUN and JUSTICE STEVENS
join in all but Part II-A, dissenting.
In Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573 (1980), the Court
concluded that, absent probable cause and exigent circumstances, warrantless arrests in the home are prohibited by
the Fourth Amendment. At the same time, we explicitly refused "to consider the sort of emergency or dangerous situation, described in our cases as 'exigent circumstances,' that
would justify a warrantless entry into a home for the purpose
of either arrest or search." I d., at 583. Certiorari was
originally granted in this case to decide at least one aspect of
the unresolved question: whether, and if so under what circumstances, the Fourth Amendment prohibits the police
from making a warrantless night entry of a person's home in
order to arrest him for violation of a nonjailable traffic offense. Because, in my view, this case presents a record that
compels us to decide that question, I cannot agree that the
Court should dismiss the writ of certiorari as improvidently
granted. I therefore reach the merits of the question presented and would reverse the judgment of the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin.
I
A
Shortly before 9:00 p. m. on the rainy night of April 24,
1978, a lone witness, Randy Jablonic, observed a car that was
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being driven erratically. After changing speeds and veering
from side to side, the car eventually swerved off the road and
came to a stop in an open :field. No damage to any person or
property occurred. Apparently worrying about the driver
and fearing that the car would get back on the highway,
J ablonic drove his truck up behind the car so as to block it
from returning to the road. Another passerby also stopped
at the scene, and J ablonic asked her to call the police. Before the police arrived, however, the driver of the car
emerged from his vehicle, approached Jablonic's truck, and
asked J ablonic for a ride home. J ablonic instead suggested
that they wait for assistance in removing or repairing the car.
Ignoring Jablonic's suggestion, the driver walked away from
the scene.
A few minutes later, the police arrived and questioned
J ablonic. He told one officer what he had seen, specifically
noting that the driver was either very inebriated or very
sick. The officer checked the motor vehicle registration of
the abandoned car and learned that it was registered to the
petitioner, Edward G. Welsh. In addition, the officer noted
that the petitioner's residence was a short distance from the
scene, and therefore easily within walking distance.
Without securing any type of warrant, the police proceeded to the petitioner's home, arriving about 9:00 p. m.
When the petitioner's stepdaughter answered the door, the
police successfully sought entry into the house. 1 They proceeded upstairs to the petitioner's bedroom, where they
found him lying naked in bed. At this point, the petitioner
1
The state trial court never decided whether there was consent to the
entry because it deemed decision of that issue unnecessary in light of its
finding that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless arrest. After
reversing the lower court's finding of exigent circumstances, the Wisconsin
Court of Appeals remanded for full consideration of the consent issue. See
State v. Welsh, No. 80-1686, App. 114-125. That remand never occurred,
however, because the Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed its court of appeals and reinstated the trial court's judgment. See State v. Welsh, 108
Wis. 2d 319, 321 N. W. 2d 245 (1982).
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was placed under arrest for driving or operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant, in violation of
Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1) (1977). 2 The petitioner was taken to
the police station, where he refused to submit to a breathalyzer test.
B
As a result of these events, the petitioner was subjected to
two separate but related proceedings: one concerning his refusal to submit to a breath test and the other involving the
alleged code violation for driving while intoxicated. Under
the Wisconsin vehicle code as it appeared in April1978, anyone arrested for driving while intoxicated under § 346.63(1)
could be requested by a law enforcement officer to provide
breath, blood, or urine samples for the purpose of determining the presence or quantity of alcohol. Wis. Stat.
§ 343.305(1) (1975). If such a request was made, the arrestee
was required to submit to the appropriate testing or risk a
revocation of operating privileges. Cf. South Dakota v.
Neville, 459 U. S. - - (1983) (admission into evidence of a
defendant's refusal to submit to a blood-alcohol test does not
offend constitutional right against self-incrimination). The
arrestee could challenge the officer's request, however, by
refusing to undergo testing and then asking for a hearing to
determine whether the refusal was justified. If, after the
hearing, it was determined that the refusal was not justified,
the arrestee's operating privileges would be revoked for 60
days. 3
2

Since the time of the petitioner's arrest, § 346.63 has been amended to
provide for a code violation if someone drives or operates a motor vehicle
while under the influence of an intoxicant or while evidencing certain
blood- or breath-alcohol levels.
See Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(a)-(b)
(1981-82). This amendment, however, has no bearing on the issues raised
by the present case.
3
Since the time of the petitioner's arrest, this statute also has been
amended , with the current version found at Wis. Stat. § 343.305 (1981-82).
Although the procedures to be followed by the law enforcement officer and
the arrestee have remained essentially unchanged, § 343.305(3), (8) , the po-
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The statute also set forth specific criteria to be applied by a
court when determining whether an arrestee's refusal to take
a breath test was justified. Included among these criteria
was a requirement that, before revoking the arrestee's operating privileges, the court determine that "the refusal ...
to submit to a test was unreasonable." § 343.305(2)(b)(5)
(1975). It is not disputed that an arrestee's refusal to take a
breath test would be reasonable, and therefore operating
privileges could not be revoked, if the underlying arrest was
not lawful. Indeed, state law has consistently provided that
a valid arrest is a necessary prerequisite to the imposition of
a breath test. See Scales v. State, 64 Wis. 2d 485, 494, 219
N. W. 2d 286, 292 (1974). Although the statute in effect in
April 1978 referred to reasonableness, the current version of
§ 343.305 explicitly recognizes that one of the issues that an
arrestee may raise at a refusal hearing is "whether [he] was
lawfully placed under arrest for violation of s.346.63(1)."
§ 343.305(3)(b)(5)(a), (8)(b) (1981-82). See also 67 Op. Wis.
Atty. Gen. 93-78 (Dec. 27, 1978) ("statutory scheme ... contemplates that a lawful arrest be made prior to a request for
submission to a test"). 4
Separate statutory provisions control the penalty that
might be imposed for the substantive offense of driving while
intoxicated. At the time in question, the vehicle code provided that a first offense for driving while intoxicated was a
noncriminal violation subject to a civil forfeiture proceeding
for a maximum fine of $200; a second or subsequent offense in
tentiallength of any revocation of operating privileges has been increased,
depending on the arrestee's prior driving record , § 343.305(9)(a)-(b). An
arrestee who improperly refuses to submit to a required test may also be
required to comply with an assessment order and a driver safety plan.
§ 343.305(9)(c)-(e). These amendments, however, also have no direct
bearing on the issues raised by the present case.
• Because state law provides that evidence of the petitioner's refusal to
submit to a breath test is inadmissible if the underlying arrest was unlawful, this case does not implicate the exclusionary rule under the Federal
Constitution.
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the previous five years was a potential misdemeanor that
could be punished by imprisonment for up to one year and a
maximum fine of $500. Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2) (1975). Since
that time, the state has made only minor amendments to
these penalty provisions. Indeed, the statute continues to
categorize a first offense as a civil violation that allows for
only a monetary forfeiture of no more than $300.
§ 346.65(2)(a) (1981--82). See State v. Albright, 98 Wis. 2d
663, 672-673, 298 N. W. 2d 196, 202 (App. 1980).

c
As noted, in this case the petitioner refused to submit to a
breath test; he subsequently filed a timely request for a refusal hearing. Before that hearing was held, however, the
state filed a criminal complaint against the petitioner for
driving while intoxicated. 5 The petitioner responded by filing a motion to dismiss the complaint, relying on his contention that the underlying arrest was invalid. After receiving
evidence at a hearing on this motion in July 1980, the trial
court concluded that the criminal complaint would not be dismissed because the existence of both probable cause and exigent circumstances justified the warrantless arrest. The decision at the refusal hearing, which was not held until
September 1980, was therefore preordained. In fact, the
primary issue at the refusal hearing-whether the petitioner
acted reasonably in refusing to submit to a breath test because he was unlawfully placed under arrest, see supra, at
• The petitioner was charged with a criminal misdemeanor because this
was his second such citation in the previous five years. See § 346.65(2)
(1975). Although the petitioner was subject to a criminal charge, the police conducting the warrantless entry of his home did not know that the
petitioner had ever been charged with, or much less convicted of, a prior
violation for driving while intoxicated. It must be assumed, therefore,
that at the time of the arrest the police were acting as if they were investigating and eventually arresting for a civil violation only. See Beck v.
Ohio, 379 U. S. 89, 91, 96 (1964).

I
I
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4--had now been determined two months earlier by the same
trial court.
As expected, after the refusal hearing, the trial court concluded that the arrest of the petitioner was lawful and that
the petitioner's refusal to take the breath test was therefore
unreasonable. 6 Accordingly, the court issued an order suspending the petitioner's operating license for 60 days. On
appeal, the suspension order was vacated by the Wisconsin
Court of Appeals. See State v. Welsh, No. 80-1686, App.
114-125. Contrary to the trial court, the appellate court
concluded that the warrantless arrest of the petitioner in his
home violated the Fourth Amendment because the State, although demonstrating probable cause to arrest, had not established the existence of exigent circumstances. The petitioner's refusal to submit to a breath test was therefore
reasonable. 7 The Wisconsin Supreme Court in turn reversed the court of appeals, relying on the existence of three
factors that it believed constituted exigent circumstances:
the need for "hot pursuit" of a suspect, the need to prevent
physical harm to the offender and the public, and the need to
prevent destruction of evidence. See State v. Welsh, 108
Wis. 2d 319, 33&-338, 321 N. W. 2d 245, 254-255 (1982). Because of the important Fourth Amendment implications of
the decision below, we granted certiorari. 459 U. S. - (1983). 8
6
When ruling from the bench after the refusal hearing, the trial judge
specifically indicated:
"[T]he Court is bound by its earlier ruling that that was a valid arrest.
And, I think [counsel for the petitioner] certainly will have the right to
challenge that on appeal if he appeals this matter, as well as the previous
ruling should there be a conviction on the underlying charge." App. 111.
See also App. 112-113.
7
The court remanded the case for further findings as to whether the
police had entered the petitioner's home with consent. See n. 1, supra.
8
Although the state courts differed in their respective conclusions concerning exigent circumstances, they each found that the facts known to the
police at the time of the warrantless home entry were sufficient to establish
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II

It is axiomatic that "the physical entry of the home is the
chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed." United States v. United States District
Court, 407 U. S. 297, 313 (1972). And a principal protection
against unnecessary intrusions into private dwellings is the
warrant requirement imposed by the Fourth Amendment on
agents of the government who seek to enter the home for
purposes of search or arrest. See Johnson v. United States,
333 U. S. 10, 13--14 (1948). 9 It is not surprising, therefore,
that the Court has recognized, as "a 'basic principle of Fourth
Amendment law[,]' that searches and seizures inside a home
without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable." Payton v. New York, 445 U. S., at 586. See Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 474-475 (1971) ("a search or seizure carried out on a suspect's premises without a warrant is
probable cause to arrest. The petitioner has not challenged that finding
before this Court.
The parallel criminal proceedings against the petitioner, see supra, at 5
and n. 5, resulted in a misdemeanor conviction for driving while intoxicated. During the jury trial, held in early 1982, the state introduced evidence of the petitioner's refusal to submit to a breath test. His appeal
from that conviction, now before the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, has been
stayed pending our decision in this case. See Brief for Petitioner 17, n. 5.
• In Johnson, Justice Jackson eloquently explained the warrant requirement in the context of a home search:
"The point of the Fourth Amehdment, which often is not grasped by
zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the
usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and
detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the
often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime. . . . The right of officers to thrust themselves into a home is ... a grave concern, not only to
the individual but to a society which chooses to dwell in reasonable security
and freedom from surveillance. When the right of privacy must reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial
officer, not by a policeman or government enforcement agent." Id., at
13-14 (footnote omitted).
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per se unreasonable, unless the police can show ... the presence of 'exigent circumstances'"). See also Steagald v.
United States, 451 U. S. 204, 211-212 (1981); McDonald v.
United States, 335 U. S. 451, 456 (1948); Johnson v. United
States, supra, at 1~15; Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616,
630 (1886).

Consistent with these long-recognized principles, the
Court decided in Payton v. New York, supra, that warrantless arrests in the home are prohibited by the Fourth Amendment, absent probable cause and exigent circumstances.
Id., at 58~90. Although one might infer from the Court's
decision that all home arrests would be subject to the same
rule, the Court expressly framed its opinion in terms of "routine felony arrests," see id., at 574, 602. This formulation of
the holding in Payton implies two separate, but related limitations that have yet to be acknowledged completely by the
Court, but which control the present case. In particular, by
its own terms the holding in Payto~limited to "routine felony arrests"-was neither intended to cover arrests for
nonserious offenses nor applied to arrests that are considered nonroutine because they are justified by exigent
circumstances.
A
By concluding that the Fourth Amendment prohibits home
entries to make warrantless felony arrests in the absence of
probable cause and exigent circumstances, the Court in
Payton decided, a fortiori, that warrantless home arrests are
similarly prohibited for offenses less serious than felonies.
It does not necessarily follow, however, that warrantless
home arrests for nonserious offenses would be proper, even if
probable cause and exigent circumstances are found to exist.
That question, yet to be decided by the Court, is presented
by the record in this case. I therefore reach the issue and
conclude that the Fourth Amendment imposes an absolute
ban on warrantless home arrests for certain minor offenses.
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In United States v. Watson, 423 U. S. 411 (1976), the
Court upheld a warrantless "midday public" arrest for a felony. In so doing, the Court relied heavily on the commonlaw rule that "a peace officer was permitted to arrest without
a warrant for a misdemeanor or felony committed in his
presence as well as for a felony not committed in his presence
if there was reasonable ground for making the arrest." I d.,
at 418 (emphasis added) (citing sources); id., at 438 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). Although not necessary to the result
in Watson, the italicized portion of the common-law rule suggests that warrantless public arrests for misdemeanors, even
if supported by probable cause and exigent circumstances,
should be prohibited unless the underlying offense is committed in the presence of the arresting officer. See generally
W. LaFave, Arrest 231-243 (1965). Therefore, even accepting the Court's view in Watson that the Fourth Amendment
grants broad authority for warrantless public arrests, adherence to the common-law rule would allow warrantless misdemeanor arrests in public areas only in the most narrow circumstances. 10 It logically follows that warrantless home
'°For purposes of this case only, I assume that the common-law rule
identified in Watson applied in its literal sense to all misdemeanors.
There is substantial evidence, however, that public arrests were justified
under the common law, even for offenses committed in the officer's presence, only for breaches of the peace-a category of offenses much narrower, and far more serious, than all misdemeanors. See, e. g., W.
LaFave, Arrest 231 (1965); Bohlen & Shulman, Arrest With and Without a
Warrant, 75 U. Pa. L. Rev. 485 (1927). As explained by the New York
Court of Appeals:
"The right of a peace officer at common law to arrest summarily was a
limited one. 'The common law did not authorize the arrest of persons
guilty or suspected of misdemeanors, except in cases of an actual breach of
the peace either by an affray or by violence to an individual. In such cases
the arrest had to be made not so much for the purpose of bringing the offender to justice as in order to preserve the peace, and the right to arrest
was accordingly limited to cases in which the person to be arrested was
taken in the act or immediately after its conclusion.' (Stephen's History of
the Criminal Law of England, p. 193; Chase's Blackstone [4th ed.], pp. 998,
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entries to make arrests for public misdemeanors would also
be prohibited, possibly with a similarly narrow exception for
persons committing such misdemeanors in the presence of an
officer and then fleeing, upon hot pursuit, into the home.
Cf. United States v. Santana, 427 U. S. 38, 42-43 (1976) (hot
pursuit of fleeing felon); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294
(1967) (same). And, although the rules for home arrests at
the time of the adoption of the Fourth Amendment were far
from clear, see Payton v. New York, 445 U. S., at 591-598, it
appears that such a severe restriction on home arrests for
misdemeanors was the prevailing view of the common law.
See, e. g., The Queen v. Marsden, 1 L. R.-Cr. Cas. Res. 131
(1868); Wilgus, Arrest Without a Warrant, 22 Mich. L. Rev.
541, 798, 803 (1924) ("Of course since ... an officer ... has
[no] authority to arrest for a past breach of the peace without
a warrant, neither would [he] have the right to break doors in
an attempted arrest therefor, except for one committed in his
presence and on fresh pursuit."). See also H andcock v.
Baker, 126 Eng. Rep. 1270 (1800); Adair v. Williams, 24
Ariz. 422, 210 P. 853 (1922); Wilgus, supra, at 804. Therefore, even if exigent circumstances exist, the common law
suggests that warrantless home arrests for misdemeanors
should be prohibited, with the possible exception of hot pursuit from the commission of a misdemeanor in the officer's
presence.
999; 6 C. J. S. Arrest, § 6, subd. c.)" People v. Phillips, 284 N. Y. 235,
237, 30 N. E. 2d 488, 489 (1940).
Moreover, I remain convinced that it is incorrect to base current interpretations of the Fourth Amendment solely on the literal words of the common-law rules of arrest. Rather, the Fourth Amendment "must be interpreted 'in light of contemporary norms and conditions.'" Steagald v.
United States, 451 U. S. 204, 217 and n. 10 (1981), quoting Payton v. New
York, 445 U. S. 573, 591 and n. 33 (1980). See also United States v. Watson, 423 U. S. 411, 433, 438--443 (1976) (MARSHALL, J. , dissenting). For
purposes of this case, however, even acceptance of the common-law rule
compels the conclusion that the petitioner's arrest was unlawful.

•
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Surely, the prohibitions of the Fourth Amendment go at
least as far-prohibiting warrantless entries of the home to
arrest for certain minor offenses under all circumstances,
even if probable cause and exigent circumstances are shown
to exist. Before agents of the government may invade the
sanctity of the home, the government must be required to
demonstrate a compelling need that overcomes the presumption of unreasonableness that attaches to all warrantless
home entries. See Payton v. New York, supra, at 586.
When the government's interest is only to arrest for a minor
offense, that presumption of unreasonableness should be
irrebuttable, and the government should be allowed to make
such an arrest only with a warrant issued upon probable
cause by a neutral and detached magistrate. Accordingly, I
conclude that there are no circumstances under which a warrantless home entry to arrest for a minor offense could be justified.11 The Fourth Amendment, in my view, compels such
an absolute ban.
Application of this bright-line principle to the facts of this
case proves quite simple. The State of Wisconsin has chosen
to classify the first offense for driving while intoxicated as a
noncriminal, civil forfeiture offense for which no imprisonment is possible. See Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2) (1975); id.,
§ 346.65(2)(a) (1981--82); supra, at 4-5. This is the best indication of the state's interest in precipitating an arrest, and is
one that can be easily identified both by the courts and by officers faced with a decision to arrest. See n. 5, supra. An
offense for which no imprisonment is possible, however, does
not suffice to overcome the presumption of unreasonableness
11
Even the dissenters in Payton v. New York , 445 U. S. 573 (1980) , although believing that warrantless home arrests are not prohibited by the
Fourth Amendment, recognized the importance of the felony limitation on
such arrests. See id., at 603, 616--617 (WHITE, J., dissenting) ("The felony
requirement guards against abusive or arbitrary enforcement and ensures
that invasions of the home occur only in case of the most serious crimes.").
I see little reason to remove this general restriction even if there is ample
support for a finding of exigent circumstances.

I
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that attaches to a warrantless entry of the home to arrest. 12
The arrest of the petitioner in this case, therefore, was prohibited by the Fourth Amendment. As a result of this unlawful arrest, state law provides that the revocation of his operating privileges was also improper. See Wise. Stat.
§ 343.305(2)(b)(5) (1975); id., § 343.305(3)(b)(5)(a) (1981-82);
supra, at 4 and n. 4. Accordingly, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin should be vacated, and the case remanded for further proceedings.
B
Even if I were to conclude that an absolute ban on warrantless home arrests for certain nonserious offenses is not com.pelled by the Fourth Amendment, I would conclude that the
petitioner's arrest was prohibited by the Fourth Amendment
because of the absence of exigent circumstances.
In Payton v. New York, 445 U. S., at 583, the Court declined to consider the scope of any exception for exigent circumstances that might justify warrantless home arrests,
thereby leaving to the lower courts the initial application of
12

Although I have previously joined in noting the danger of drawing constitutional lines based on legislative classifications of statutory crimes, see
United States v. Watson, 423 U. S., at 438-442, 454-455 (MARSHALL, J.,
dissenting), it is not necessary to decide in this case whether the Fourth
Amendment prohibits warrantless home arrests for all nonfelonious
crimes. Rather, given the facts of this case, I would simply hold that such
arrests are constitutionally prohibited at least for all minor offenses, defined primarily by looking to the extent of punishment provided for by the
state statute.
Nor do I mean to suggest that the prevention of drunk driving is not
properly of major concern to the States. The State of Wisconsin, however, along with several other States, see, e. g., Minn. Stat. § 169.121
subd. 4 (1982); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 39--669.07(1) (Supp. 1982); S. D. Codified
Laws § 32-23-2 (Supp. 1983), has chosen to limit severely the penalties
that may be imposed after a first conviction for driving while intoxicated.
Given that the classification of state crimes differs widely among the
States, the penalty that may attach to any particular offense seems to provide the clearest and most consistent indication of the state's interest in
arresting individuals suspected of committing that offense.
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the exigent-circumstances exception. Prior decisions of this
Court, however, have emphasized that exceptions to the warrant requirement are "few in number and carefully delineated," United States v. United States District Court, 407
U. S., at 318, and that the police have a heavy burden to
meet when attempting to demonstrate an urgent need that
might justify warrantless searches or arrests. Indeed, the
Court has recognized only a few such emergency conditions,
see, e. g., United States v. Santana, 427 U. S., at 42-43
(1976) (hot pursuit of a fleeing felon); Warden v. Hayden, 387
U.S., at 298-299 (1967) (same); Schmerberv. California, 384
U. S. 757, 770-771 (1966) (destruction of evidence); Michigan
v. Tyler, 436 U. S. 499, 509 (1978) (ongoing fire), and has actually applied only the "hot pursuit" doctrine to arrests in the
home, see Santana, supra. The record in this case, however, requires that the Court clarify this area of Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence. In so doing, I conclude that an
important factor to be considered when determining whether
any exigency exists is the gravity of the underlying offense
for which the arrest is being made. Moreover, although no
exigency is created simply because there is probable cause to
believe that a serious crime has been committed, I conclude
that application of the exigent-circumstances exception
should be severely restricted when only a minor offense is
involved.
This is not a novel idea. Writing in concurrence in M cDonald v. United States, 335 U. S. 451 (1948), Justice Jackson explained why a finding of exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless home entry should be severely restricted:
"Even if one were to conclude that urgent circumstances might justify a forced entry without a warrant,
no such emergency was present in this case. This
method of law enforcement displays a shocking lack of all
sense of proportion. Whether there is reasonable necessity for a search without waiting to obtain a warrant
certainly depends somewhat upon the gravity of the of-
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fense thought to be in progress as well as the hazards of
the method of attempting to reach it. . . . It is to me a
shocking proposition that private homes, even quarters
in a tenement, may be indiscriminately invaded at the
discretion of any suspicious police officer engaged in
following up offenses that involve no violence or threats
of it. While I should be human enough to apply the letter of the law with some indulgence to officers acting to
deal with threats or crimes of violence which endanger
life or security, it is notable that few of the searches
found by this Court to be unlawful dealt with that category of crime. . . . While the enterprise of parting fools
from their money by the 'numbers' lottery is one that
ought to be suppressed, I do not think that its suppression is more important to society than the security of the
people against unreasonable searches and seizures.
When an officer undertakes to act as his own magistrate,
he ought to be in a position to justify it by pointing to
some real immediate and serious consequences if he postponed action to get a warrant." I d., at 459-460 (Jackson, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
Consistent with this approach, the lower courts have
looked to the nature of the underlying offense as an important factor to be considered in the exigent-circumstances calculus. In the leading federal case defining exigent circumstances, for example, the en bane United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia recognized that the
gravity of the underlying offense was a principal factor to be
weighed. Dorman v. United States, 435 F. 2d 385, 392
(CADC 1970). 13 Without approving all of the factors included in the standard adopted by that court, it is sufficient
13
See generally Donnino & Girese, Exigent Circumstances for a Warrantless Home Arrest, 45 Alb. L. Rev. 90 (1980); Harbaugh & Faust,
"Knock on Any Door"-Home Arrests Mter Payton and Steagald, 86
Dick. L. Rev. 191, 220-233 (1982); Note, Exigent Circumstances for Warrantless Home Arrests, 23 Ariz. L. Rev. 1171 (1981).
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to note that many other lower courts have also considered the
gravity of the offense an important part of their constitutional analysis.
As a result, courts have permitted warrantless home arrests for major felonies if identifiable exigencies, in~ependent
of the gravity of the offense, existed at the time of the arrest.
Compare United States v. Campbell, 581 F. 2d 22 (CA2 1978)
(allowing warrantless home arrest for armed robbery when
exigent circumstances existed), with Commonwealth v. Williams, 483 Pa. 293, 396 A. 2d 1177 (1978) (disallowing warrantless home arrest for murder due to absence of exigent
circumstances). But I am aware of no case that has permitted a warrantless home arrest for a nonfelonious crime. Cf.
People v. Sanders, 59 Ill. App. 3d 6, 374 N. E. 2d 139 (1978)
(burglary without weapons not grave offense of violence for
this purpose); State v. Bennett, 295 N. W. ·2d 5 (S. D. 1980)
(distribution of controlled substances not a grave offense for
these purposes). This should not be surprising. It is, indeed, difficult to conceive of a warrantless home arrest that
would not be unreasonable when the underlying offense is
relatively minor. I therefore conclude that the commonsense re&ult reached by most lower courts is required by the
Fourth Amendment prohibition on "unreasonable searches
and seizures," and would hold that application of the exigentcircumstances exception in the context of a home entry is severely restricted when there is probable cause to believe •that
only a minor offense has been committed.
Again, application of this principle to the facts of the
present case is relatively straightforward. The petitioner
was arrested in the privacy of his own bedroom for a noncriminal, traffic offense. The State attempts to justify the
arrest by relying on the hot-pursuit doctrine, on the threat to
public safety, and on the need to preserve evidence of the petitioner's blood-alcohol level. The claim of hot pursuit is unconvincing, however, because there was no immediate or continuous pursuit of the petitioner from the scene of a crime.
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Moreover, because the petitioner had already arrived home,
and had abandoned his car at the scene of the accident, there
was little remaining threat to the public safety. Hence, the )
only potential emergency claimed by the State was the need
to ascertain the petitioner's blood-alcohol level. But even
assuming that the underlying facts would support a finding of
this exigent circumstance, mere similarity to other cases involving the imminent destruction of evidence is not sufficient.
In the context of a minor, nonjailable traffic offense, a warrantless home arrest simply cannot be upheld using this otherwise plausible justification. The principles of the Fourth
Amendment do not sanction such unreasonable police
behavior.
III
The Court's dismissal of the writ as improvidently granted
is especially troublesome because it seriously impairs the
Court's Rule of Four, under which the votes of four Justices
to grant the writ requires that the case be set for full briefing, oral argument, and plenary consideration on the merits.
When, as in this case, those four Justices remain persuaded
that the merits of the case should be decided, adherence to
the Court's orderly procedures requires that a decision on the
merits be reached, absent any intervening change in circumstances or the revelation of any factors suggesting that the
original grant of certiorari was inappropriate. Otherwise,
the Court's discretionary jurisdiction becomes an essentially
arbitrary jurisdiction. See generally Burrell v. McCray,
426 U. S. 471, 473 (1976) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting).
Various Justices of this Court have previously acknowledged that the Rule of Four requires decision on the merits in
this situation. As Justice Harlan explained in his muchquoted discussion of this area:
"I think the Court should not have heard any of these
four cases. Nevertheless, the cases having been taken,
I have conceived it to be my duty to consider them on
their merits, because I cannot reconcile voting to dismiss
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the writs as 'improvidently granted' with the Court's
'rule of four.' In my opinion due adherence to that rule
requires that once certiorari has been granted a case
should be disposed of on the premise that it is properly
here, in the absence of considerations appearing which
were not manifest or fully apprehended at the time certiorari was granted." Ferguson v. Moore-McCormack
Lines, Inc., 352 U. S. 521, 559 (1957) (separate opinion).
See The Monrosa v. Carbon Black Export, Inc., 359 U. S.
180 (1959) (dismissal only appropriate when "[e]xamination of
a case on the merits, on oral argument, ... bring[s] into
'proper focus' a consideration which, though present in the
record at the time of granting the writ, only later indicates
that the grant was improvident"). Compare Triangle Improvement Council v. Ritchie, 402 U. S. 497, 502 (1971)
(Harlan, J., concurring) (dismissal appropriate "in light of
... changed posture of the case") with id., at 508 (Douglas,
J., dissenting, joined by Black, BRENNAN, and MARSHALL,
JJ.) (so as not to impair the Rule of Four, it is "the duty of
the five opposing certiorari to persuade others at Conference,
but, failing that, to vote on the merits of the case"). See also
Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U. S. 637, 648 (1974) (Stewart, J., .concurring, joined by WHITE, J.) ("If as many as four
Justices remain so minded after oral argument, due adherence to that rule requires me to address the merits of a case,
however strongly I may feel that it does not belong in this
Court."); Burrell v. McCray, 426 U. S. 471, 472 (1976) (STE. ). 14
VENS, J . , concurrmg
"In Burrell v. McCray, 426 U.S. 471, 474-475 (1976) (BRENNAN, J.,
dissenting), I explained when, in my view, a Justice who has initially voted
to deny certiorari may nonetheless join in dismissing the writ as improvidently granted.
"Further, a Justice who originally voted to deny the petition for writ of
certiorari is, of course, privileged to participate in a dismissal as improvidently granted that is justified under the Monrosa standard. See Ferguson v. Moore-McCorrnack Lines, 352 U. S. 521, 559 (1957) (Harlan, J., con-
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In this case, neither the Court nor the parties have even
attempted to suggest any change in circumstances that has
occurred since the writ of certiorari was granted last Term.
Nor has consideration of the case on the merits focused the
Court on any factors that were unknown at the time the case
was originally set for oral argument. Indeed, if anything, I
believe the posture of the case has been clarified by the written briefs and oral arguments presented to the Court. In
the absence of any explanation for the Court's action, therefore, I can only conclude that the Court is willing to ignore
the Rule of Four that has traditionally controlled the Court's
docket. 15
curring and dissenting); United States v. Shannon, 342 U. S. 288, 294
(1952). But I hold the view that impennissible violence is done the Rule of
Four when a Justice who voted to deny the petition for certiorari participates after oral argument in a dismissal that, as here, is not justified under
the governing standard, but which rather reflects only the factors that motivated the original vote to deny. Ferguson v. Moore-McCormack Lines,
supra, at 559--462 (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting). In this circumstance, I share the view stated by Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting in
United States v. Shannon, supra, at 298:
"A Justice who has voted to deny the writ of certiorari is in no position
after argument to vote to dismiss the writ as improvidently granted.
Only those who have voted to grant the writ have that privilege. The
reason strikes deep. If after the writ is granted or after argument,
those who voted to deny certiorari vote to dismiss the writ as improvidently granted, the integrity of our certiorari jurisdiction is impaired.
By long practice-announced to the Congress and well-known to this
Bar-it takes four votes out of a Court of nine to grant a petition for
certiorari. If four can grant and the opposing five dismiss, then the
four cannot get a decision of the case on the merits. The integrity of
the four-vote rule on certiorari would then be impaired."
Given that the Court has offered absolutely no reason for its decision to
dismiss the writ in this case, I can only conclude that there are no justifiable reasons for the dismissal that were unknown last Term when at least
four Justices, who remain persuaded that the case should be decided on the
merits, originally voted to give plenary consideration to the case.
16
The dismissal of the writ in this case despite the votes of four Justices
to decide the case on the merits is even more troubling because of the pend-
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IV

For unexplained reasons, the Court has chosen to dismiss
the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted. As a result,
the Court lets stand a warrantless, nighttime entry into the
petitioner's home to arrest him for violation of a civil traffic
offense. In my view, such an arrest is clearly prohibited by
prevailing case law and by the special protection afforded the
home under the Fourth Amendment. The petitioner's arrest was therefore invalid, the judgment of the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin should be vacated, and the case remanded
for further proceedings.
I respectfully dissent.

ing criminal action against the petitioner. See n. 8, supra. It indeed
would be ironic if his conviction were affirmed by the Wisconsin courts, and
the petitioner then filed another petition for certiorari from that state court
judgment. If (as is not improbable) the four Justices dissenting today
would vote to grant that petition, the Court would be forced either to decide precisely the same question presented by this case or to do even more
damage to the Rule of Four.

To: The Chief Justice
Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
ustice Powell
Justice Rehnquist
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor
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Justice Brennan
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JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom JUSTICE MARSHALL joins,
and with whom JUSTICE BLACKMUN and JUSTICE STEVENS
join in all but Part II-A, dissenting.
In Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573 (1980), the Court
concluded that, absent probable cause and exigent circumstances, warrantless arrests in the home are prohibited by
the Fourth Amendment. At the same time, we explicitly refused "to consider the sort of emergency or dangerous situation, described in our cases as 'exigent circumstances,' that
would justify a warrantless entry into a home for the purpose
of either arrest or search." Id., at 583. Certiorari was
originally granted in this case to decide at least one aspect of
the unresolved question: whether, and if so under what circumstances, the Fourth Amendment prohibits the police
from making a warrantless night entry of a person's home in
order to arrest him for violation of a nonjailable traffic offense. Because, in my view, this case presents a record that
compels us to decide that question, I cannot agree that the
Court should dismiss the writ of certiorari as improvidently
granted. I therefore reach the merits of the question presented and would reverse the judgment of the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin.
I
A
Shortly before 9:00 p. m. on the rainy night of April 24,
1978, a lone witness, Randy J ablonic, observed a car that was

No~~ ·

--+~-+«
- -'-"-+/£
-(;1-,YL- _ _

82-5466---DISSENT
2

WELSH v. WISCONSIN

being driven erratically. After changing speeds and veering
from side to side, the car eventually swerved off the road and
came to a stop in an open field. No damage to any person or
property occurred. Apparently worrying about the driver
and fearing that the car would get back on the highway,
J ablonic drove his truck up behind the car so as to block it
from returning to the road. Another passerby also stopped
at the scene, and Jablonic asked her to call the police. Before the police arrived, however, the driver of the car
emerged from his vehicle, approached Jablonic's truck, and
asked J ablonic for a ride home. J ablonic instead suggested
that they wait for assistance in removing or repairing the car.
Ignoring J ablonic's suggestion, the driver walked away from
the scene.
A few minutes later, the police arrived and questioned
J ablonic. He told one officer what he had seen, specifically
noting that the driver was either very inebriated or very
sick. The officer checked the motor vehicle registration of
the abandoned car and learned that it was registered to the
petitioner, Edward G. Welsh. In addition, the officer noted
that the petitioner's residence was a short distance from the
scene, and therefore easily within walking distance.
Without securing any type of warrant, the police proceeded to the petitioner's home, arriving about 9:00 p. m.
When the petitioner's stepdaughter answered the door, the
police successfully sought entry into the house. 1 They proceeded upstairs to the petitioner's bedroom, where they
found him lying naked in bed. At this point, the petitioner
' The state trial court never decided whether there was consent to the
entry because it deemed decision of that issue unnecessary in light of its
finding that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless arrest. After
reversing the lower court's finding of exigent circumstances, the Wisconsin
Court of Appeals remanded for full consideration of the consent issue. See
State v. Welsh , No. 80-1686, App. 114-125. That remand never occurred,
however, because the Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed its court of appeals and reinstated the trial court's judgment. See State v. Welsh, 108
Wis. 2d 319, 321 N. W. 2d 245 (1982).
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was placed under arrest for driving or operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant, in violation of
Wis. Stat. § 346. 63(1) (1977). 2 The petitioner was taken to
the police station, where he refused to submit to a breathalyzer test.
B
As a result of these events, the petitioner was subjected to
two separate but related proceedings: one concerning his refusal to submit to a breath test and the other involving the
alleged code violation for driving while intoxicated. Under
the Wisconsin vehicle code as it appeared in April1978, anyone arrested for driving while intoxicated under § 346.63(1)
could be requested by a law enforcement officer to provide
breath, blood, or urine samples for the purpose of determining the presence or quantity of alcohol. Wis. Stat.
§ 343.305(1) (1975). If such a request was made, the arrestee
was required to submit to the appropriate testing or risk a
revocation of operating privileges. Cf. South Dakota v.
Neville, 459 U. S. - - (1983) (admission into evidence of a
defendant's refusal to submit to a blood-alcohol test does not
offend constitutional right against self-incrimination). The
arrestee could challenge the officer's request, however, by
refusing to undergo testing and then asking for a hearing to
determine whether the refusal was justified. If, after the
hearing, it was determined that the refusal was not justified,
the arrestee's operating privileges would be revoked for 60
days.3
Since the time of the petitioner's arrest, § 346.63 has been amended to
provide for a code violation if someone drives or operates a motor vehicle
while under the influence of an intoxicant or while evidencing certain
blood- or breath-alcohol levels.
See Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(a}-(b)
(1981--82). This amendment, however, has no bearing on the issues raised
by the present case.
3
Since the time of the petitioner's arrest, this statute also has been
amended , with the current version found at Wis. Stat. § 343.305 (1981--82).
Although the procedures to be followed by the law enforcement officer and
the arrestee have remained essentially unchanged, § 343.305(3), (8), the po2
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The statute also set forth specific criteria to be applied by a
court when determining whether an arrestee's refusal to take
a breath test was justified. Included among these criteria
was a requirement that, before revoking the arrestee's operating privileges, the court determine that "the refusal . . .
to submit to a test was unreasonable." § 343.305(2)(b)(5)
(1975). It is not disputed that an arrestee's refusal to take a
breath test would be reasonable, and therefore operating
privileges could not be revoked, if the underlying arrest was
not lawful. Indeed, state law has consistently provided that
a valid arrest is a necessary prerequisite to the imposition of
a breath test. See Scales v. State, 64 Wis. 2d 485, 494, 219
N. W. 2d 286, 292 (1974). Although the statute in effect in
April 1978 referred to reasonableness, the current version of
§ 343.305 explicitly recognizes that one of the issues that an
arrestee may raise at a refusal hearing is "whether [he] was
lawfully placed under arrest for violation of s.346.63(1)."
§ 343.305(3)(b)(5)(a), (8)(b) (1981-82). See also 67 Op. Wis.
Atty. Gen. 93-78 (Dec. 27, 1978) ("statutory scheme ... contemplates that a lawful arrest be made prior to a request for
submission to a test"). 4
Separate statutory provisions control the penalty that
might be imposed for the substantive offense of driving while
intoxicated. At the time in question, the vehicle code provided that a first offense for driving while intoxicated was a
noncriminal violation subject to a civil forfeiture proceeding
for a maximum fine of $200; a second or subsequent offense in
tentiallength of any revocation of operating privileges has been increased,
depending on the arrestee's prior driving record, § 343.305(9)(a)-(b). An
arrestee who improperly refuses to submit to a required test may also be
required to comply with an assessment order and a driver safety plan.
§ 343.305(9)(c)-(e). These amendments, however, also have no direct
bearing on the issues raised by the present case.
• Because state law provides that evidence of the petitioner's refusal to
submit to a breath test is inadmissible if the underlying arrest was unlawful, this case does not implicate the exclusionary rule under the Federal
Constitution.
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the previous five years was a potential misdemeanor that
could be punished by imprisonment for up to one year and a
maximum fine of $500. Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2) (1975). Since
that time, the state has made only minor amendments to
these penalty provisions. Indeed, the statute continues to
categorize a first offense as a civil violation that allows for
only a monetary forfeiture of no more than $300.
§ 346.65(2)(a) (1981-82). See State v. Albright, 98 Wis. 2d
663, 672-673, 298 N. W. 2d 196, 202 (App. 1980).

c
As noted, in this case the petitioner refused to submit to a
breath test; he subsequently filed a timely request for a refusal hearing. Before that hearing was held, however, the
state filed a criminal complaint against the petitioner for
driving while intoxicated. 5 The petitioner responded by filing a motion to dismiss the complaint, relying on his contention that the underlying arrest was invalid. After receiving
evidence at a hearing on this motion in July 1980, the trial
court concluded that the criminal complaint would not be dismissed because the existence of both probable cause and exigent circumstances justified the warrantless arrest. The decision at the refusal hearing, which was not held until
September 1980, was therefore preordained. In fact, the
primary issue at the refusal hearing-whether the petitioner
acted reasonably in refusing to submit to a breath test because he was unlawfully placed under arrest, see supra, at
' The petitioner was charged with a criminal misdemeanor because this
was his second such citation in the previous five years. See § 346.65(2)
(1975). Although the petitioner was subject to a criminal charge, the police conducting the warrantless entry of his home did not know that the
petitioner had ever been charged with, or much less convicted of, a prior
violation for driving while intoxicated. It must be assumed, therefore,
that at the time of the arrest the police were acting as if they were investigating and eventually arresting for a civil violation only. See Beck v.
Ohio, 379 U. S. 89, 91, 96 (1964).
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4--had now been determined two months earlier by the same
trial court.
As expected, after the refusal hearing, the trial court concluded that the arrest of the petitioner was lawful and that
the petitioner's refusal to take the breath test was therefore
unreasonable. 6 Accordingly, the court issued an order suspending the petitioner's operating license for 60 days. On
appeal, the suspension order was vacated by the Wisconsin
Court of Appeals. See State v. Welsh, No. 80-1686, App.
114-125. Contrary to the trial court, the appellate court
concluded that the warrantless arrest of the petitioner in his
home violated the Fourth Amendment because the State, although demonstrating probable cause to arrest, had not established the existence of exigent circumstances. The petitioner's refusal to submit to a breath test was therefore
reasonable.7 The Wisconsin Supreme Court in turn reversed the court of appeals, relying on the existence of three
factors that it believed constituted exigent circumstances:
the need for "hot pursuit" of a suspect, the need to prevent
physical harm to the offender and the public, and the need to
prevent destruction of evidence. See State v. Welsh, 108
Wis. 2d 319, 336-338, 321 N. W. 2d 245, 254-255 (1982). Because of the important Fourth Amendment implications of
the decision below, we granted certiorari. 459 U. S. - (1983). 8
6
When ruling from the bench after the refusal hearing, the trial judge
specifically indicated:
"[T]he Court is bound by its earlier ruling that that was a valid arrest.
And, I think [counsel for the petitioner] certainly will have the right to
challenge that on appeal if he appeals this matter, as well as the previous
ruling should there be a conviction on the underlying charge." App. 111.
See also App. 112-113.
7
The court remanded the case for further findings as to whether the
police had entered the petitioner's home with consent. See n. 1, supra.
8
Although the state courts differed in their respective conclusions concerning exigent circumstances, they each found that the facts known to the
police at the time of the warrantless home entry were sufficient to establish
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II
It is axiomatic that "the physical entry of the home is the
chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed." United States v. United States District
Court, 407 U. S. 297, 313 (1972). And a principal protection
against unnecessary intrusions into private dwellings is the
warrant requirement imposed by the Fourth Amendment on
agents of the government who seek to enter the home for
purposes of search or arrest. See Johnson v. United States,
333 U. S. 10, 13-14 (1948). 9 It is not surprising, therefore,
that the Court has recognized, as "a 'basic principle of Fourth
Amendment law[,]' that searches and seizures inside a home
without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable." Payton v. New York, 445 U. S., at 586. See Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 474-475 (1971) ("a search or seizure carried out on a suspect's premises without a warrant is
probable cause to arrest. The petitioner has not challenged that finding
before this Court.
The parallel criminal proceedings against the petitioner, see supra, at 5
and n. 5, resulted in a misdemeanor conviction for driving while intoxicated. During the jury trial, held in early 1982, the state introduced evidence of the petitioner's refusal to submit to a breath test. His appeal
from that conviction, now before the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, has been
stayed pending our decision in this case. See Brief for Petitioner 17, n. 5.
9
In Johnson, Justice Jackson eloquently explained the warrant requirement in the context of a home search:
"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by
zealous· officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the
usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and
detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the
often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime. . . . The right of officers to thrust themselves into a home is ... a grave concern, not only to
the individual but to a society which chooses to dwell in reasonable security
and freedom from surveillance. When the right of privacy must reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial
officer, not by a policeman or government enforcement agent." Id., at
13-14 (footnote omitted).
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per se unreasonable, unless the police can show ... the presence of 'exigent circumstances'"). See also Steagald v.
United States, 451 U. S. 204, 211-212 (1981); McDonald v.
United States, 335 U. S. 451, 456 (1948); Johnson v. United
States, supra, at 1~15; Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616,
630 (1886).
Consistent with these long-recognized principles, the
Court decided in Payton v. New York, supra, that warrantless arrests in the home are prohibited by the Fourth Amendment, absent probable cause and exigent circumstances.
I d., at 58~90. Although one might infer from the Court's
decision that all home arrests would be subject to the same
rule, the Court expressly framed its opinion in terms of "routine felony arrests," see id., at 574, 602. This formulation of
the holding in Payton implies two separate, but related limitations that have yet to be acknowledged completely by the
Court, but which control the present case. In particular, by
its own terms the holding in Payton-limited to "routine felony arrests"-was neither intended to cover arrests for
nonserious offenses nor applied to arrests that are considered nonroutine because they are justified by exigent
circumstances.
A

By concluding that the Fourth Amendment prohibits home
entries to make warrantless felony arrests in the absence of
probable cause and exigent circumstances, the Court in
Payton decided, a fortiori, that warrantless home arrests are
similarly prohibited for offenses less serious than felonies.
It does not necessarily follow, however, that warrantless
home arrests for nonserious offenses would be proper, even if
probable cause and exigent circumstances are found to exist.
That question, yet to be decided by the Court, is presented
by the record in this case. I therefore reach the issue and
conclude that the Fourth Amendment imposes an absolute
ban on warrantless home arrests for certain minor offenses.
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In United States v. Watson, 423 U. S. 411 (1976), the
Court upheld a warrantless "midday public" arrest for a felony. In so doing, the Court relied heavily on the commonlaw rule that "a peace officer was permitted to arrest without
a warrant for a misdemeanor or felony committed in his
presence as well as for a felony not committed in his presence
if there was reasonable ground for making the arrest." I d.,
at 418 (emphasis added) (citing sources); id., at 438 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). Although not necessary to the result
in Watson, the italicized portion of the common-law rule suggests that warrantless public arrests for misdemeanors, even
if supported by probable cause and exigent circumstances,
should be prohibited unless the underlying offense is committed in the presence of the arresting officer. See generally
W. LaFave, Arrest 231-243 (1965). Therefore, even accepting the Court's view in Watson that the Fourth Amendment
grants broad authority for warrantless public arrests, adherence to the common-law rule would allow warrantless misdemeanor arrests in public areas only in the most narrow circumstances. 10 It logically follows that warrantless home

'° For purposes of this case only, I assume that the common-law rule
identified in Watson applied in its literal sense to all misdemeanors.
There is substantial evidence, however, that public arrests were justified
under the common law, even for offenses committed in the officer's presence, only for breaches of the peace-a category of offenses much narrower, and far more serious, than all misdemeanors. See, e. g., W.
LaFave, Arrest 231 (1965); Bohlen & Shulman, Arrest With and Without a
Warrant, 75 U. Pa. L. Rev. 485 (1927). As explained by the New York
Court of Appeals:
"The right of a peace officer at common law to arrest summarily was a
limited one. 'The common law did not authorize the arrest of persons
guilty or suspected of misdemeanors, except in cases of an actual breach of
the peace either by an affray or by violence to an individual. In such cases
the arrest had to be made not so much for the purpose of bringing the offender to justice as in order to preserve the peace, and the right to arrest
was accordingly limited to cases in which the person to be arrested was
taken in the act or immediately after its conclusion.' (Stephen's History of
the Criminal Law of England, p. 193; Chase's Blackstone [4th ed.], pp. 998,

t

82-5466--DISSENT
10

WELSH v. WISCONSIN

entries to make arrests for public misdemeanors would also
be prohibited, possibly with a similarly narrow exception for
persons committing such misdemeanors in the presence of an
officer and then fleeing, upon hot pursuit, into the home.
Cf. United States v. Santana, 427 U. S. 38, 42-43 (1976) (hot
pursuit of fleeing felon); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294
(1967) (same). And, although the rules for home arrests at
the time of the adoption of the Fourth Amendment were far
from clear, see Payton v. New York, 445 U. S., at 591-598, it
appears that such a severe restriction on home arrests for
misdemeanors was the prevailing view of the common law.
See, e. g., The Queen v. Marsden, 1 L. R.-Cr. Cas. Res. 131
(1868); Wilgus, Arrest Without a Warrant, 22 Mich. L. Rev.
541, 798, 803 (1924) ("Of course since ... an officer ... has
[no] authority to arrest for a past breach of the peace without
a warrant, neither would [he] have the right to break doors in
an attempted arrest therefor, except for one committed in his
presence and on fresh pursuit."). See also Handcock v.
Baker, 126 Eng. Rep. 1270 (1800); Adair v. Williams, 24
Ariz. 422, 210 P. 853 (1922); Wilgus, supra, at 804. Therefore, even if exigent circumstances exist, the common law
suggests that warrantless home arrests for misdemeanors
should be prohibited, with the possible exception of hot pursuit from the commission of a misdemeanor in the officer's
presence.
999; 6 C. J. S. Arrest, § 6, subd. c.)" People v. Phillips, 284 N. Y. 235,
237, 30 N. E. 2d 488, 489 (1940).
Moreover, I remain convinced that it is incorrect to base current interpretations of the Fourth Amendment solely on the literal words of the common-law rules of arrest. Rather, the Fourth Amendment "must be interpreted 'in light of contemporary norms and conditions.'" Steagald v.
United States , 451 U. S. 204, 217 and n. 10 (1981), quoting Payton v. New
York, 445 U. S. 573, 591 and n. 33 (1980). See also United States v. Watson, 423 U. S. 411, 433, 438-443 (1976) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). For
purposes of this case, however, even acceptance of the common-law rule
compels the conclusion that the petitioner's arrest was unlawful.
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Surely, the prohibitions of the Fourth Amendment go at
least as far-prohibiting warrantless entries of the home to
arrest for certain minor offenses under all circumstances,
even if probable cause and exigent circumstances are shown
to exist. Before agents of the government may invade the
sanctity of the home, the government must be required to
demonstrate a compelling need that overcomes the presumption of unreasonableness that attaches to all warrantless
home entries. See Payton v. New York, supra, at 586.
When the government's interest is only to arrest for a minor
offense, that presumption of unreasonableness should be
irrebuttable, and the government should be allowed to make
such an arrest only with a warrant issued upon probable
cause by a neutral and detached magistrate. Accordingly, I
conclude that there are no circumstances under which a warrantless home entry to arrest for a minor offense could be justified.11 The Fourth Amendment, in my view, compels such
an absolute ban.
Application of this bright-line principle to the facts of this
case proves quite simple. The State of Wisconsin has chosen
to classify the first offense for driving while intoxicated as a
noncriminal, civil forfeiture offense for which no imprisonment is possible. See Wis. Stat. §346.65(2) (1975); id.,
§ 346.65(2)(a) (1981-82); supra, at 4-5. This is the best indication of the state's interest in precipitating an arrest, and is
one that can be easily identified both by the courts and by officers faced with a decision to arrest. See n. 5, supra. An
offense for which no imprisonment is possible, however, does
not suffice to overcome the presumption of unreasonableness
Even the dissenters in Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573 (1980), although believing that warrantless home arrests are not prohibited by the
Fourth Amendment, recognized the importance of the felony limitation on
such arrests. See id., at 603, 616--Q17 (WHITE, J., dissenting) ("The felony
requirement guards against abusive or arbitrary enforcement and ensures
that invasions of the home occur only in case of the most serious crimes.").
I see little reason to remove this general restriction even if there is ample
support for a finding of exigent circumstances.
11

82-546&-DISSENT
12

WELSH v. WISCONSIN

that attaches to a warrantless entry of the home to arrest. 12
The arrest of the petitioner in this case, therefore, was prohibited by the Fourth Amendment. As a result of this unlawful arrest, state law provides that the revocation of his operating privileges was also improper. See Wise. Stat.
§ 343.305(2)(b)(5) (1975); id., § 343.305(3)(b)(5)(a) (1981-82);
supra, at 4 and n. 4. Accordingly, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin should be vacated, and the case remanded for further proceedings.
B

Even if I were to conclude that an absolute ban on warrantless home arrests for certain nonserious offenses is not compelled by the Fourth Amendment, I would conclude that the
petitioner's arrest was prohibited by the Fourth Amendment
because of the absence of exigent circumstances.
In Payton v. New York, 445 U. S., at 583, the Court declined to consider the scope of any exception for exigent circumstances that might justify warrantless home arrests,
thereby leaving to the lower courts the initial application of
12
Although I have previously joined in noting the danger of drawing constitutional lines based on legislative classifications of statutory crimes, see
United States v. Watson, 423 U. S., at 438-442, 454-455 (MARSHALL, J.,
dissenting), it is not necessary to decide in this case whether the Fourth
Amendment prohibits warrantless home arrests for all nonfelonious
crimes. Rather, given the facts of this case, I would simply hold that such
arrests are constitutionally prohibited at least for all minor offenses, defined primarily by looking to the extent of punishment provided for by the
state statute.
Nor do I mean to suggest that the prevention of drunk driving is not
properly of major concern to the States. The State of Wisconsin, however, along with several other States, see, e. g., Minn. Stat. § 169.121
subd. 4 (1982); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 39-669.07(1) (Supp. 1982); S. D. Codified
Laws § 32-23-2 (Supp. 1983), has chosen to limit severely the penalties
that may be imposed after a first conviction for driving while intoxicated.
Given that the classification of state crimes differs widely among the
States, the penalty that may attach to any particular offense seems to provide the clearest and most consistent indication of the state's interest in
arresting individuals suspected of committing that offense.
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the exigent-circumstances exception. Prior decisions of this
Court, however, have emphasized that exceptions to the warrant requirement are "few in number and carefully delineated," United States v. United States District Court, 407
U. S., at 318, and that the police have a heavy burden to
meet when attempting to demonstrate an urgent need that
might justify warrantless searches or arrests. Indeed, the
Court has recognized only a few such emergency conditions,
see, e. g., United States v. Santana, 427 U. S., at 42-43
(1976) (hot pursuit of a fleeing felon); Warden v. Hayden, 387
U. S., at 298-299 (1967) (same); Schmerber v. California, 384
U. S. 757, 770-771 (1966) (destruction of evidence); Michigan
v. Tyler, 436 U. S. 499, 509 (1978) (ongoing fire), and has actually applied only the "hot pursuit" doctrine to arrests in the
home, see Santana, supra. The record in this case, however, requires that the Court clarify this area of Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence. In so doing, I conclude that an
important factor to be considered when determining whether
any exigency exists is the gravity of the underlying offense
for which the arrest is being made. Moreover, although no
exigency is created simply because there is probable cause to
believe that a serious crime has been committed, I conclude
that application of the exigent-circumstances exception
should be severely restricted when only a minor offense is
involved.
This is not a novel idea. Writing in concurrence in M cDonald v. United States, 335 U. S. 451 (1948), Justice Jackson explained why a finding of exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless home entry should be severely restricted:
"Even if one were to conclude that urgent circumstances might justify a forced entry without a warrant,
no such emergency was present in this case. This
method of law enforcement displays a shocking lack of all
sense of proportion. Whether there is reasonable necessity for a search without waiting to obtain a warrant
certainly depends somewhat upon the gravity of the of-
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fense thought to be in progress as well as the hazards of
the method of attempting to reach it. . . . It is to me a
shocking proposition that private homes, even quarters
in a tenement, may be indiscriminately invaded at the
discretion of any suspicious police officer engaged in
following up offenses that involve no violence or threats
of it. While I should be human enough to apply the letter of the law with some indulgence to officers acting to
deal with threats or crimes of violence which endanger
life or security, it is notable that few of the searches
found by this Court to be unlawful dealt with that category of crime. . . . While the enterprise of parting fools
from their money by the 'numbers' lottery is one that
ought to be suppressed, I do not think that its suppression is more important to society than the security of the
people against unreasonable searches and seizures.
When an officer undertakes to act as his own magistrate,
he ought to be in a position to justify it by pointing to
some real immediate and serious consequences if he postponed action to get a warrant." Id., at 459--460 (Jackson, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
Consistent with this approach, the lower courts have
looked to the nature of the underlying offense as an important factor to be considered in the exigent-circumstances calculus. In the leading federal case defining exigent circumstances, for example, the en bane United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia recognized that the
gravity of the underlying offense was a principal factor to be
weighed. Dorman v. United States, 435 F. 2d 385, 392
(CADC 1970). 13 Without approving all of the factors included in the standard adopted by that court, it is sufficient
18
See generally Donnino & Girese, Exigent Circumstances for a Warrantless Home Arrest, 45 Alb. L. Rev. 90 (1980); Harbaugh & Faust,
"Knock on Any Door"-Home Arrests After Payton and Steagald, 86
Dick. L. Rev. 191, 220-233 (1982); Note, Exigent Circumstances for Warrantless Home Arrests, 23 Ariz. L. Rev. 1171 (1981).
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to note that many other lower courts have also considered the
gravity of the offense an important part of their constitutional analysis.
As a result, courts have permitted warrantless home arrests for major felonies if identifiable exigencies, independent
of the gravity of the offense, existed at the time of the arrest.
Compare United States v. Campbell, 581 F. 2d 22 (CA21978)
(allowing warrantless home arrest for armed robbery when
exigent circumstances existed), with Commonwealth v. Williams, 483 Pa. 293, 396 A. 2d 1177 (1978) (disallowing warrantless home arrest for murder due to absence of exigent
circumstances). But of those courts addressing the issue,
most refuse to permit a .warrantless home arrest for a
nonfelonious crime. See, e. g., State v. Guertin, 190 Conn.
440, 453, 461 A. 2d 963, 970 (1983) ("The [exigent circumstances] exception is narrowly drawn to cover cases of real
and not contrived emergencies. The exception is limited to
the investigation of serious crimes; misdemeanors are excluded."); People v. Strelow, 96 Mich. App. 182, 190-193, 292
N. W. 2d 517, 521--522 (1980). See also People v. Sanders,
59 Ill. App. 3d 6, 374 N. E. 2d 139 (1978) (burglary without
weapons not a grave offense of violence for these purposes);
State v. Bennett, 295 N. W. 2d 5 (S. D. 1980) (distribution of
controlled substances not a grave offense for these purposes).
But cf. State v. Penas, 200 Neb. 387, 263 N. W. 2d 835 (1978)
(allowing warrantless home arrest upon hot pursuit from
commission of misdemeanor in the officer's presence; decided
before Payton); State v. Niedermeyer, 48 Or. App. 665, 617
P. 2d 911 (1980) (allowing warrantless home arrest upon hot
pursuit from commission of misdemeanor in the officer's presence). This should not be surprising. It is, indeed, difficult
to conceive of a warrantless home arrest that would not be
unreasonable when the underlying offense is relatively
minor. I therefore conclude that the commonsense result
reached by most lower courts is required by the Fourth
Amendment prohibition on "unreasonable searches and sei-

I
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zures," and would hold that application of the exigent-circumstances exception in the context of a home entry is severely
restricted when there is probable cause to believe that only a
minor offense has been committed.
Again, application of this principle to the facts of the
present case is relatively straightforward. The petitioner
was arrested in the privacy of his own bedroom for a noncriminal, traffic offense. The State attempts to justify the
arrest by relying on the hot-pursuit doctrine, on the threat to
public safety, and on the need to preserve evidence of the petitioner's blood-alcohollevel. The claim of hot pursuit is unconvincing, however, because there was no immediate or continuous pursuit of the petitioner from the scene of a crime.
Moreover, because the petitioner had already arrived home,
and had abandoned his car at the scene of the accident, there
was little remaining threat to the public safety. Hence, the
only potential emergency claimed by the State was the need
to ascertain the petitioner's blood-alcohol level. But even
assuming that the underlying facts would support a finding of
this exigent circumstance, mere similarity to other cases involving the imminent destruction of evidence is not sufficient.
In the context of a minor, nonjailable traffic offense, a warrantless home arrest simply cannot be upheld using this otherwise plausible justification. The principles of the Fourth
Amendment do not sanction such unreasonable police
behavior.
III
The Court's dismissal of the writ as improvidently granted
is especially troublesome because it seriously impairs the
Court's Rule of Four, under which the votes of four Justices
to grant the writ requires that the case be set for full briefing, oral argument, and plenary consideration on the merits.
When, as in this case, those four Justices remain persuaded
that the merits of the case should be decided, adherence to
the Court's orderly procedures requires that a decision on the
merits be reached, absent any intervening change in circum-
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stances or the revelation of any factors suggesting that the
original grant of certiorari was inappropriate. Otherwise,
the Court's discretionary jurisdiction becomes an essentially
arbitrary jurisdiction. See generally Burrell v. McCray,
426 U. S. 471, 473 (1976) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting).
Various Justices of this Court have previously acknowledged that the Rule of Four requires decision on the merits in
this situation. As Justice Harlan explained in his muchquoted discussion of this area:

See The Monrosa v. Carbon Black Export, InC:, 359 U. S.
180 (1959) (dismissal only appropriate when "[e]xamination of
a case on the merits, on oral argument, ... bring[s] into
'proper focus' a consideration which, though present in the
record at the time of granting the writ, only later indicates
that the grant was improvident"). Compare Triangle Improvement Council v. Ritchie, 402 U. S. 497, 502 (1971)
(Harlan, J., concurring) (dismissal appropriate "in light of
... changed posture of the case") with id., at 508 (Douglas,
J., dissenting, joined by Black, BRENNAN, and MARSHALL,
JJ.) (so as not to impair the Rule of Four, it is "the duty of
the five opposing certiorari to persuade others at Conference,
but, failing that, to vote on the merits of the case"). See also
Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U. S. 637, 648 (1974) (Stewart, J., concurring, joined by WHITE, J.) ("If as many as four

I

I
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Justices remain so minded after oral argument, due adherence to that rule requires me to address the merits of a case,
however strongly I may feel that it does not belong in this
Court."); Burrell v. McCray, 426 U. S. 471, 472 (1976) (STE. ) 14
VENS, J ., concurrmg.
In this case, neither the Court nor the parties have even
attempted to suggest any change in circumstances that has
"In Burrell v. McCray, 426 U.S. 471, 474-475 (1976) (BRENNAN, J.,
dissenting), I explained when, in my view, a Justice who has initially voted
to deny certiorari may nonetheless join in dismissing the writ as improvidently granted:
"Further, a Justice who originally voted to deny the petition for writ of
certiorari is, of course, privileged to participate in a dismissal as improvidently granted that is justified under the Monrosa standard. See Ferguson v. Moore-McCormack Lines, 352 U. S. 521, 559 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting); United States v. Shannon, 342 U. S. 288, 294
(1952). But I hold the view that impermissible violence is done the Rule of
Four when a Justice who voted to deny the petition for certiorari participates after oral argument in a dismissal that, as here, is not justified under
the governing standard, but which rather reflects only the factors that motivated the original vote to deny. Ferguson v. Moore-McCormack Lines,
supra, at 559-462 (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting). In this circumstance, I share the view stated by Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting in
United States v. Shannon, supra, at 298:
'A Justice who has voted to deny the writ of certiorari is in no position
after argument to vote to dismiss the writ as improvidently granted.
Only those who have voted to grant the writ have that privilege. The
reason strikes deep. If after the writ is granted or after argument,
those who voted to deny certiorari vote to dismiss the writ as improvidently granted, the integrity of our certiorari jurisdiction is impaired.
By long practice-announced to the Congress and well-known to this
Bar-it takes four votes out of a Court of nine to grant a petition for
certiorari. If four can grant and the opposing five dismiss, then the
four cannot get a decision of the case on the merits. The integrity of
the four-vote rule on certiorari would then be impaired."'
Given that the Court has offered absolutely no reason for its decision to
dismiss the writ in this case, I can only conclude that there are no justifiable reasons for the dismissal that were unknown last Term when at least
four Justices, who remain persuaded that the case should be decided on the
merits, originally voted to give plenary consideration to the case.
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occurred since the writ of certiorari was granted last Term.
Nor has consideration of the case on the merits focused the
Court on any factors that were unknown at the time the case
was originally set for oral argument. Indeed, if anything, I
believe the posture of the case has been clarified by the written briefs and oral arguments presented to the Court. In
the absence of any explanation for the Court's action, therefore, I can only conclude that the Court is willing to ignore
the Rule of Four that has traditionally controlled the Court's
docket. 16
IV
For unexplained reasons, the Court has chosen to dismiss
the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted. As a result,
the Court lets stand a warrantless, nighttime entry into the
petitioner's home to arrest him for violation of a civil traffic
offense. In my view, such an arrest is clearly prohibited by
prevailing case law and by the special protection afforded the
home under the Fourth Amendment. The petitioner's arrest was therefore invalid, the judgment of the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin should be vacated, and the case remanded
for further proceedings.
I respectfully dissent.

The dismissal of the writ in this case despite the votes of four Justices
to decide the case on the merits is even more troubling because of the pending criminal action against the petitioner. See n. 8, supra. It indeed
would be ironic if his conviction were affirmed by the Wisconsin courts, and
the petitioner then filed another petition for certiorari from that state court
judgment. If (as is not improbable) the four Justices dissenting today
would vote to grant that petition, the Court would be forced either to decide precisely the same question presented by this case or to do even more
damage to the Rule of Four.
16
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BRENNA with whom JUSTICE MARSHALL joins,
ho
STICE BLACKMUN and JUSTICE STEVENS
join in all but Part 11-A, dissenting.
In Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573 (1980), the Court
concluded that, absent probable cause and exigent circumstances, warrantless arrests in the home are prohibited by
the Fourth Amendment. At the same time, we explicitly refused "to consider the sort of emergency or dangerous situation, described in our cases as 'exigent circumstances,' that
would justify a warrantless entry into a home for the purpose
of either arrest or search." I d., at 583. Certiorari was
originally granted in this case to decide at least one aspect of
the unresolved question: whether, and if so under what circumstances, the Fourth Amendment prohibits the police
from making a warrantless night entry of a person's home in
order to arrest him for violation of a nonjailable traffic offense. Because, in my view, this case presents a record that
compels us to decide that question, I cannot agree that the
Courtshouffi dismiss the writ of certiorari as improvidently
granted. I therefore reach the merits of the question presented and would reverse the judgment of the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin.
I
A
Shortly before 9:00 p. m. on the rainy night of April 24,
1978, a lone witness, Randy Jablonic, observed a car that was

1

f
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being driven erratically. After changing speeds and veering
from side to side, the car eventually swerved off the road and
came to a stop in an open field. No damage to any person or
property occurred. Apparently worrying about the driver
and fearing that the car would get back on the highway,
J ablonic drove his truck up behind the car so as to block it
from returning to the road. Another passerby also stopped
at the scene, and J ablonic asked her to call the police. Before the police arrived, however, the driver of the car
emerged from his vehicle, approached Jablonic's truck, and
asked J ablonic for a ride home. J ablonic instead suggested
that they wait for assistance in removing or repairing the car.
Ignoring Jablonic's suggestion, the driver walked away from
the scene.
A few minutes later, the police arrived and questioned
J ablonic. He told one officer what he had seen, specifically
noting that the driver was either very inebriated or very
sick. The officer checked the motor vehicle registration of
the abandoned car and learned that it was registered to the
petitioner, Edward G. Welsh. In addition, the officer noted
that the petitioner's residence was a short distance from the
scene, and therefore easily within walking distance.
Without securing any type of warrant, the police proceeded to the petitioner's home, arriving about 9:00 p. m.
When the petitioner's stepdaughter answered the door, the
police successfully sought entry into the house. 1 They proceeded upstairs to the petitioner's bedroom, where they
found him lying naked in bed. At this point, the petitioner
' The state trial court never decided whether there was consent to the
entry because it deemed decision of that issue unnecessary in light of its
finding that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless arrest. After
reversing the lower court's finding of exigent circumstances, the Wisconsin
Court of Appeals remanded for full consideration of the consent issue. See
State v. Welsh, No. 80-1686, App. 114-125. That remand never occurred,
however, because the Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed its court of appeals and reinstated the trial court's judgment. See State v. Welsh, 108
Wis. 2d 319, 321 N. W. 2d 245 (1982).
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was placed under arrest for driving or operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant, in violation of
Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1) (1977). 2 The petitioner was taken to
the police station, where he refused to submit to a breathalyzer test.
B
As a result of these events, the petitioner was subjected to
two separate but related proceedings: one concerning his refusal to submit to a breath test and the other involving the
alleged code violation for driving while intoxicated. Under
the Wisconsin vehicle code as it appeared in April1978, anyone arrested for driving while intoxicated under § 346.63(1)
could be requested by a law enforcement officer to provide
breath, blood, or urine samples for the purpose of determining the presence or quantity of alcohol. Wis. Stat.
§ 343.305(1) (1975). If such a request was made, the arrestee
was required to submit to the appropriate testing or risk a
revocation of operating privileges. Cf. South Dakota v.
Neville, 459 U. S. - - (1983) (admission into evidence of a
defendant's refusal to submit to a blood-alcohol test does not
offend constitutional right against self-incrimination). The
arrestee could challenge the officer's request, however, by
refusing to undergo testing and then asking for a hearing to
determine whether the refusal was justified. If, after the
hearing, it was determined that the refusal was not justified,
the arrestee's operating privileges would be revoked for 60
days. 3
Since the time of the petitioner's arrest, § 346.63 has been amended to
provide for a code violation if someone drives or operates a motor vehicle
while under the influence of an intoxicant or while evidencing certain
blood- or breath-alcohol levels. See Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(a)-(b)
(1981--82). This amendment, however, has no bearing on the issues raised
by the present case.
8
Since the time of the petitioner's arrest, this statute also has been
amended, with the current version found at Wis. Stat. § 343.305 (1981--82).
Although the procedures to be followed by the law enforcement officer and
the arrestee have remained essentially unchanged, § 343.305(3), (8), the po2
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The statute also set forth specific criteria to be applied by a
court when detennining whether an arrestee's refusal to take
a breath test was justified. Included among these criteria
was a requirement that, before revoking the arrestee's operating privileges, the court determine that "the refusal ...
to submit to a test was unreasonable." §343.305(2)(b)(5)
~
(1975). It is not disputed that an arrestee's refusal to take al
~
breath test would be reasonable, and therefore operating
~privileges could not be revoked, if the underlying arrest was
jP
not lawful. Indeed, state 1 has con is e 1 rov'ded that
a v li
est is a necessa
rere ui ite to the imposition of
a breath test. See Scales v. tate, 64 Wis. 2d 485, 494, 219 \2.-J..
N. W. 2d 286, 292 (1974). Although the statute in effect in
April 1978 referred to reasonableness, the current version of
1 § 343.305 explicitly recognizes that one of the issues that an
arrestee may raise at a refusal hearing is "whether [he] was
lawfully placed under arrest for violation of s.346.63(1)."
§ 343.305(3)(b)(5)(a), (8)(b) (1981-82). See also 67 Op. Wis.
[
Atty. Gen. 93-78 (Dec. 27, 1978) ("statutory scheme ... contemplates that a lawful arrest be made prior to a request for
submission to a test"). 4
Separate statutory provisions control the penalty that
might be imposed for the substantive offense of driving while
intoxicated. At the time in question, the vehicle code provided that a first offense for driving while intoxicated was a
noncriminal violation subject to a civil forfeiture proceeding
for a maximum fine of $200; a second or subsequent offense in

J

tentiallength of any revocation of operating privileges has been increased,
depending on the arrestee's prior driving record, § 343.305(9)(a)-(b). An
arrestee who improperly refuses to submit to a required test may also be
required to comply with an assessment order and a driver safety plan.
§ 343.305(9)(c)-(e). These amendments, however, also have no direct
bearing on the issues raised by the present case.
• Because state law provides that evidence of the petitioner's refusal to
submit to a breath test is inadmissible if the underlying arrest was unlawful, this case does not implicate the exclusionary rule under the Federal
Constitution.

kvJ
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the previous five years was a potential misd meanor that
could be punished by imprisonment for up to o e year and a
maximum fine of $500. Wis. Stat. §
75 . Since
that time, the state has made oruy minor arne
these penalty provisions. Indee ,
eo
categorize a first offense as a civil violation that allows for
only a monetary forfeiture of no more than $300.
§ 346.65(2)(a) (1981-82). See State v. Albright, 98 Wis. 2d
663, 672-673, 298 N. W. 2d 196, 202 (App. 1980).

c
As noted, in this case the petitioner refused to submit to a
breath test; he subsequently filed a timely request for a refusal hearing. Before that hearing was held, however, the
state filed a criminal complaint against the petitioner for
driving while intoxicated. 5 The petitioner responded by filing a motion to dismiss the complaint, relying on his contention that the underlying arrest was invalid. After receiving
evidence at a hearing on this motion in July 1980, the trial
court concluded that the criminal complaint would not be dismissed because the existence of both probable cause and exigent circumstances justified the warrantless arrest. The decision at the refusal hearing, which was not held until
September 1980, was therefore preordained. In fact, the
primary issue at the refusal hearing-whether the petitioner
acted reasonably in refusing to submit to a breath test because he was unlawfully placed under arrest, see supra, at
' The petitioner was charged with a criminal misdemeanor because this
was his second such citation in the previous five years. See § 346.65(2)
(1975). Although the petitioner was subject to a criminal charge, the police conducting the warrantless entry of his home did not know that the
petitioner had ever been charged with, or much less convicted of, a prior
violation for driving while intoxicated. It must be assumed, therefore,
that at the time of the arrest the police were acting as if they were investigating and eventually arresting for a civil violation only. See Beck v.
Ohio, 379 U. S. 89, 91, 96 (1964).
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4-had now been determined two months earlier by the same
trial court.
As expected, after the refusal hearing, the trial court concluded that the arrest of the petitioner was lawful and that
the petitioner's refusal to take the breath test was therefore
unreasonable. 6 Accordingly, the court issued an order suspending the petitioner's operating license for 60 days. On
appeal, the suspension order was vacated by the Wisconsin
Co~¢ A~e_:ls.
See State v. Welsh, No. 80-1686, App.
114-125.
ontrary to the trial court, the appellate ....c..ourt
concluded that the warrantless arrest of the petitioner in his
home violated the Fourth Amendment because the State, although demonstrating probable cause to arrest, had not established the existence of exi ent circumstances. The petitioner's re~al to submit to a breat test was therefore
reasonabl~ The~ Cou~ in turn reex1; ence of three]
versed the court of
factors that it believed constituted exigent circumstances:
the need for "hot pursuit" of a suspect, the need to prevent
physical harm to the offender and the public, and the need to
prevent destruction of evidence. See State v. Welsh, 108
Wis. 2d 319, 336-338, 321 N. W. 2d 245, 254-255 (1982). Because of the important Fourth Amendment implications of
the decision below, we granted certiorari. 459 U. S. - (1983). 8

:ppeas, :::::~

6
When ruling from the bench after the refusal hearing, the trial judge
specifically indicated:
"[T]he Court is bound by its earlier ruling that that was a valid arrest.
And, I think [counsel for the petitioner] certainly will have the right to
challenge that on appeal if he appeals this matter, as well as the previous
ruling should there be a conviction on the underlying charge." App. 111.
See also App. 112-113.
7
The co
emanded the case for further findings as to whether the
police had enterectthe petitioner's home with consent. Seen. 1, supra.
8
Although the state courts differed in their respective conclusions concerning exigent circumstances, they each found that the facts known to the
police at the time of the warrantless home entry were sufficient to establish
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II

It is axiomatic that "the physical entry of the home is the
chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed." United States v. United States District
Court, 407 U. S. 297, 313 (1972). And a principal protection
against unnecessary intrusions into private dwellings is the
warrant requirement imposed by the Fourth Amendment on
agents of the government who seek to enter the home for
purposes of search or arrest. See Johnson v. United States,
333 U. S. 10, 13-14 (1948). 9 It is not surprising, therefore,
that the Court has recognized, as "a 'basic principle of Fourth
Amendment law[,]' that searches and seizures inside a home
without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable." Payton v. New York, 445 U. S., at 586. See Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 474-475 (1971) ("a search or seizure carried out on a suspect's premises without a warrant is
probable cause to arrest. The petitioner has not challenged that finding
before this Court.
The parallel criminal proceedings against the petitioner, see supra, at 5
and n. 5, resulted in a misdemeanor conviction for driving while intoxicated. During the jury trial, held in early 1982, the state introduced evidence of the petitioner's refusal to submit to a breath test. His appeal
from that conviction, now before the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, has been
stayed pending our decision in this case. See Brief for Petitioner 17, n. 5.
9
In Johnson, Justice Jackson eloquently explained the warrant requirement in the context of a home search:
"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by
zealous· officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the
usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and
detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the
often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime. . . . The right of officers to thrust themselves into a home is ... a grave concern, not only to
the individual but to a society which chooses to dwell in reasonable security
and freedom from surveillance. When the right of privacy must reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial
officer, not by a policeman or government enforcement agent." Id., at
13-14 (footnote omitted).
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per se unreasonable, unless the police can show ... the presence of 'exigent circumstances'"). See also Steagald v.
United States, 451 U. S. 204, 211-212 (1981); McDonald v.
United States, 335 U. S. 451, 456 (1948); Johnson v. United
States, supra, at 13-15; Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616,
630 (1886).
Consistent with these long-recognized principles, the
Court decided in Payton v. New York, supra, that warrantless arrests in the home are prohibited by the Fourth Amendment, absent probable cause and exigent circumstances.
I d., at 583-590. Although one might infer from the Court's
decision that all home arrests would be subject to the same
rule, the Court expressly framed its opinion in terms of "routine felony arrests," see id., at 574, 602. This formulation of
the holding in Payton implies two separate, but related limitations that have yet to be acknowledged completely by the
Court, but which control the present case. In particular, by
its own terms the holding in Payton-limited to "routine felony arrests"-was neither intended to cover arrests for
nonserious offenses nor applied to arrests that are considered nonroutine because they are justified by exigent
circumstances.
A
By concluding that the Fourth Amendment prohibits home
entries to make warrantless felony arrests in the absence of
probable cause and exigent circumstances, the Court in
Payton decided, a fortiori, that warrantless home arrests are
similarly prohibited for offenses less serious than felonies.
It does not necessarily follow, however, that warrantless
home arrests for nonserious offenses would be proper, even if
probable cause and exigent circumstances are found to exist.
That question, yet to be decided by the Court, is presented
by the record in this case. I therefore reach the issue and
conclude that the Fourth Amendment imposes an absolute
ban on warrantless home arrests for certain minor offenses.

--------------.

...

I
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In United States v. Watson, 423 U. S. 411 (1976), the
Court upheld a warrantless "midday public" arrest for a felony. In so doing, the Court relied heavily on the commonlaw rule that "a peace officer was permitted to arrest without
a warrant for a misdemeanor or felony committed in his
presence as well as for a felony not committed in his presence
if there was reasonable ground for making the arrest." I d.,
at 418 (emphasis added) (citing sources); id., at 438 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). Although not necessary to the result
in Watson, the italicized portion of the common-law rule suggests that warrantless public arrests for misdemeanors, even
if supported by probable cause and exigent circumstances,
should be prohibited unless the underlying offense is committed in the presence of the arresting officer. See generally
W. LaFave, Arrest 231-243 (1965). Therefore, even accepting the Court's view in Watson that the Fourth Amendment
grants broad authority for warrantless public arrests, adherence to the common-law rule would allow warrantless misdemeanor arrests in public areas only in the most narrow circumstances. 10 It logically follows that warrantless home
'°For purposes of this case only, I assume that the common-law rule
identified in Watson applied in its literal sense to all misdemeanors.
There is substantial evidence, however, that public arrests were justified
under the common law, even for offenses committed in the officer's presence, only for breaches of the peace-a category of offenses much narrower, and far more serious, than all misdemeanors. See, e. g., W.
LaFave, Arrest 231 (1965); Bohlen & Shulman, Arrest With and Without a
Warrant, 75 U. Pa. L. Rev. 485 (1927). As explained by the New York
Court of Appeals:
"The right of a peace officer at common law to arrest summarily was a
limited one. 'The common law did not authorize the arrest of persons
guilty or suspected of misdemeanors, except in cases of an actual breach of
the peace either by an affray or by violence to an individual. In such cases
the arrest had to be made not so much for the purpose of bringing the offender to justice as in order to preserve the peace, and the right to arrest
was accordingly limited to cases in which the person to be arrested was
taken in the act or immediately after its conclusion.' (Stephen's History of
the Criminal Law of England, p. 193; Chase's Blackstone [4th ed.], pp. 998,

82-5466--DISSENT
10

WELSH v. WISCONSIN

entries to make arrests for public misdemeanors would also
be prohibited, possibly with a similarly narrow exception for
persons committing such misdemeanors in the presence of an
officer and then fleeing, upon hot pursuit, into the home.
Cf. United States v. Santana, 427 U. S. 38, 42-43 (1976) (hot
pursuit of fleeing felon); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294
(1967) (same). And, although the rules for home arrests at
the time of the adoption of the Fourth Amendment were far
from clear, see Payton v. New York, 445 U. S., at 591-598, it
appears that such a severe restriction on home arrests for
misdemeanors was the prevailing view of the common law.
See, e. g., The Queen v. Marsden, 1 L. R.-Cr. Cas. Res. 131
(1868); Wilgus, Arrest Without a Warrant, 22 Mich. L. Rev.
541, 798, 803 (1924) ("Of course since ... an officer ... has
[no] authority to arrest for a past breach of the peace without
a warrant, neither would [he] have the right to break doors in
an attempted arrest therefor, except for one committed in his
presence and on fresh pursuit."). See also Handcock v.
Baker, 126 Eng. Rep. 1270 (1800); Adair v. Williams, 24
Ariz. 422, 210 P. 853 (1922); Wilgus, supra, at 804. Therefore, even if exigent circumstances exist, the common law]
sugges s tha warran ess orne arrests for misdemeanors
should be prohibited, with the possible exception of hot pursuit from the commission of a misdemeanor in the officer's
presence.
999; 6 C. J. S. Arrest, § 6, subd. c.)" People v. Phillips, 284 N. Y. 235,
237, 30 N. E. 2d 488, 489 (1940).
Moreover, I remain convinced that it is incorrect to base current interpretations of the Fourth Amendment solely on the literal words of the common-law rules of arrest. Rather, the Fourth Amendment "must be interpreted 'in light of contemporary norms and conditions."' Steagald v.
United States, 451 U. S. 204, 217 and n. 10 (1981), quoting Payton v. New
York, 445 U. S. 573, 591 and n. 33 (1980). See also United States v. Watson, 423 U. S. 411, 433, 438-443 (1976) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). For
purposes of this case, however, even acceptance of the common-law rule
compels the conclusion that the petitioner's arrest was unlawful.
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Surely, the prohibitions of the Fourth Amendment go at
least as far-prohibiting warrantless entries of the home to
arrest for certain minor offenses under all circumstances,
even if prob~t circumstances are shown
to exist. Before agents of the government may invade the
sanctity of the home, the government must be required to
demonstrate a compelling need that overcomes the presumption of unreasonableness that attaches to all warrantless
home entries. See Payton v. New York, supra, at 586.
When the government's interest is only to arrest for a minor
offense, that presumption of unreasonableness should be
irrebuttable, and the government should be allowed to make
such an arrest only with a warrant issued upon probable
cause by a neutral and detached magistra~. Accordingly, I
conclude that there ar~ 'no circumstances ~nder which a warushome entry to arrest for a minor offen coul
tified.11 The ourt
mendment, in my view, compels such
an absolute ban.
Application of this bright-line principle to the facts of this
case proves quite simple. The State of Wisconsin has chosen
to classify the first offense for driving while intoxicated as a
noncriminal, civil forfeiture offense for which no imprisonment is possible. See Wis. Stat. § 346. 65(2) (1975); id.,
§ 346.65(2)(a) (1981-82); supra, at 4-5. This is the best indication of the state's interest in precipitating an arrest, and is
one that can be easily identified both by the courts and by officers faced with a decision to arrest. See n. 5, supra. An
offense for which no imprisonment is possible, however, does
not suffice to overcome the presumption of unreasonableness

-

11
Even the dissenters in Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573 (1980), although believing that warrantless home arrests are not prohibited by the
Fourth Amendment, recognized the importance of the felony limitation on
such arrests. See id., at 603, 616-617 (WHITE, J., dissenting) ("The felony
requirement guards against abusive or arbitrary enforcement and ensures
that invasions of the home occur only in case of the most serious crimes.").
I see little reason to remove this general restriction even if there is ample
support for a finding of exigent circumstances.
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that attaches to a warrantless entry of the home to arrest. 12
The arrest of the petitioner in this case, therefore, was prohibited by the Fourth Amendment. As a result of this unlawful arrest, state law provides that the revocation of his operating privileges was also improper. See Wise. Stat.
§ 343.305(2)(b)(5) (1975); id., § 343.305(3)(b)(5)(a) (1981-82);
supra, at 4 and n. 4. Accordingly, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin should be vacated, and the case remanded for further proceedings.
B
Even if I were to conclude that an absolute ban on warrantless home arrests for certain nonserious offenses is not compelled by the Fourth Amendment, I would conclude that the
petitioner's arrest was prohibited by the Fourth Amendment
because of the absence of exi ent circumstances.
In Payton v. New Y or , 44 U. . , at
, the Court declined to consider the scope of any exception for exigent circumstances that might justify warrantless home arrests,
thereby leaving to the lower courts the initial application of
12
Although I have previously joined in noting the danger of drawing constitutional lines based on legislative classifications of statutory crimes, see
United States v. Watson, 423 U. S., at 438-442, 454-455 (MARSHALL, J.,
dissenting), it is not necessary to decide in this case whether the Fourth
Amendment prohibits warrantless home arrests for all nonfelonious
crimes. Rather, given the facts of this case, I would simply hold that such
arrests are constitutionally prohibited at least for all minor offenses, defined primarily by looking to the extent of punishment provided for by the
state statute.
Nor do I mean to suggest that the prevention of drunk driving is not
properly of major concern to the States. The State of Wisconsin, however, along with several other States, see, e. g., Minn. Stat. § 169.121
subd. 4 (1982); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 39--669.07(1) (Supp. 1982); S. D. Codified
Laws § 32-23-2 (Supp. 1983), has chosen to limit severely the penalties
that may be imposed after a first conviction for driving while intoxicated.
Given that the classification of state crimes differs widely among the
States, the penalty that may attach to any particular offense seems to provide the clearest and most consistent indication of the state's interest in
arresting individuals suspected of committing that offense.
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the exigent-circumstances exception. Prior decisions of this
Court, however, have emphasized that exceptions to the warrant requirement are "few in number and carefully delineated," United States v. United States District Court, 407
U. S., at 318, and that the police have a heavy burden to
meet when attempting to demonstrate an urgent need that
might justify warrantless searches or arrests. Indeed, the
Court has recognized only a few such emergency conditions,
see, e. g., United States v. Santana, 427 U. S., at 42-43
(1976) (hot pursuit of a fleeing felon); Warden v. Hayden, 387
U. S., at 29~299 (1967) (same); Schmerber v. California, 384
U. S. 757, 770-771 (1966) (destruction of evidence); Michigan
v. Tyler, 436 U. S. 499, 509 (1978) (ongoing fire), and has actually applied only the "hot pursuit" doctrine to arrests in the
home, see Santana, supra. The record in this case, however, requires that the Court clarify this area of Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence. In so doing, I conclude that an
important factor to be considered when determining whether
any exigency exists is the gravity of the underlying offense
for which the arrest is being made. Moreover, although no
exigency is created simply because there is probable cause to
believe that a serious crime has been committed, I conclude
that application of the exigent-circumstances exception
should be severely restricted when only a minor offense is
involved.
This is not a novel idea. Writing in concurrence in M cDonald v. United States, 335 U. S. 451 (1948), Justice Jackson explained why a finding of exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless home entry should be severely restricted:
"Even if one were to conclude that urgent circumstances might justify a forced entry without a warrant,
no such emergency was present in this case. This
method of law enforcement displays a shocking lack of all
sense of proportion. Whether there is reasonable necessity for a search without waiting to obtain a warrant
certainly depends somewhat upon the gravity of the of-

I

I
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fense thought to be in progress as well as the hazards of
the method of attempting to reach it. . . . It is to me a
shocking proposition that private homes, even quarters
in a tenement, may be indiscriminately invaded at the
discretion of any suspicious police officer engaged in
following up offenses that involve no violence or threats
of it. While I should be human enough to apply the letter of the law with some indulgence to officers acting to
deal with threats or crimes of violence which endanger
life or security, it is notable that few of the searches
found by this Court to be unlawful dealt with that category of crime. . . . While the enterprise of parting fools
from their money by the 'numbers' lottery is one that
ought to be suppressed, I do not think that its suppression is more important to society than the security of the
people against unreasonable searches and seizures.
When an officer undertakes to act as his own magistrate,
he ought to be in a position to justify it by pointing to
some real immediate and serious consequences if he postponed action to get a warrant." ld., at 459-460 (Jackson, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
Consistent with this approach, the lower courts have
looked to the nature of the underlying offense as an important factor to be considered in the exigent-circumstances calculus. In the leading federal case defining exigent circumstances, for example, the en bane United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia recognized that the
gravity of the underlying offense was a principal factor to be
weighed. Dorman v. United States, 435 F. 2d 385, 392
(CADC 1970). 13 Without approving all of the factors included in the standard adopted by that court, it is sufficient
18

See generally Donnino & Girese, Exigent Circumstances for a Warrantless Home Arrest, 45 Alb. L. Rev. 90 (1980); Harbaugh & Faust,
"Knock on Any Door"-Home Arrests Mter Payton and Steagald, 86
Dick. L. Rev. 191, 220-233 (1982); Note, Exigent Circumstances for Warrantless Home Arrests, 23 Ariz. L. Rev. 1171 (1981).
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to note that many other lower courts have also considered the
gravity of the offense an important part of their constitutional analysis.
As a result, courts have permitted warrantless home arrests for major felonies if identifiable exigencies, independent
of the gravity of the offense, existed at the time of the arrest.
Compare United States v. Campbell, 581 F. 2d 22 (CA21978)
(allowing warrantless home arrest for armed robbery when
exigent circumstances existed), with Commonwealth v. Williams, 483 Pa. 293, 396 A. 2d 1177 (1978) (disallowing warrantless home arrest for murder due to absence of exigent
circumstances). But of those courts addressing the issue,
most refuse to permit a warrantless home arrest for a
nonfelonious crime. See, e. g., State v. Guertin, 190 Conn.
440, 453, 461 A. 2d 963, 970 (1983) ("The [exigent circumstances] exception is narrowly drawn to cover cases of real
and not contrived emergencies. The exception is limited to
the investigation of serious crimes; misdemeanors are excluded."); People v. Strelow, 96 Mich. App. 182, 190-193, 292
N. W. 2d 517, 521-522 (1980). See also People v. Sanders,
59 Ill. App. 3d 6, 374 N. E. 2d 139 (1978) (burglary without
weapons not a grave offense of violence for these purposes);
State v. Bennett, 295 N. W. 2d 5 (S. D. 1980) (distribution of
controlled substances not a grave offense for these purposes).
But cf. State v. Penas, 200 Neb. 387, 263 N. W. 2d 835 (1978)
(allowing warrantless home arrest upon hot pursuit from
commission of misdemeanor in the officer's presence; decided
before Payton); State v. Niedermeyer, 48 Or. App. 665, 617
P. 2d 911 (1980) (allowing warrantless home arrest upon hot
pursuit from commission of misdemeanor in the officer's presence). This should not be surprising. It is, indeed, difficult
to conceive of a warrantless home arrest that would not be
unreasonable when the underlying offense is relatively
minor. I therefore conclude that the commonsense result
reached by most lower courts is required by the Fourth
Amendment prohibition on "unreasonable searches and sei-
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zures," and would hold that application of the exigent-circumstances exception in the context of a home entry is severely
restricted when there is probable cause to believe that only a
minor offense has been committed.
Again, application of this principle to the facts of the
present case is relatively straightforward. The petitioner
was arrested in the privacy of his own bedroom for a noncriminal, traffic offense. The State attempts to justify the
arrest by relying on the hot-pursuit doctrine, on the threat to
public safety, and on the need to preserve evidence of the petitioner's blood-alcohollevel. The claim of hot pursuit is unconvincing, however, because there was no immediate or continuous pursuit of the petitioner from the scene of a crime.
Moreover, because the petitioner had already arrived home,
and had abandoned his car at the scene of the accident, there
was little remaining threat to the public safety. Hence, the
only potential emergency claimed by the State was the need
to ascertain the petitioner's blood-alcohol level. But even
assuming that the underlying facts would support a finding of
this exigent circumstance, mere similarity to other cases involving the imminent destruction of evidence is not sufficient.
In the context of a minor, nonjailable traffic offense, a warrantless home arrest simply cannot be upheld using this otherwise plausible justification. The principles of the Fourth
Amendment do not sanction such unreasonable police
behavior.
III
The Court's dismissal of the writ as improvidently granted
is especially troublesome because it seriously impairs the
Court's Rule of Four, under which the votes of four Justices
to grant the writ requires that the case be set for full briefing, oral argument, and plenary consideration on the merits.
When, as in this case, those four Justices remain persuaded
that the merits of the case should be decided, adherence to
the Court's orderly procedures requires that a decision on the
merits be reached, absent any intervening change in circum-
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stances or the revelation of any factors suggesting that the
original grant of certiorari was inappropriate. Otherwise,
the Court's discretionary jurisdiction becomes an essentially
arbitrary jurisdiction. See generally Burrell v. McCray,
426 U. S. 471, 473 (1976) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting).
Various Justices of this Court have previously acknowledged that the Rule of Four
·
· · non the merits in
this situation. As Justic Harlan expl · ed in his muchquoted discussion of this are..,·,____
"I think the Court should not have heard any of these
four cases. Nevertheless, the cases having been taken,
I have conceived it to be my duty to consider them on
their merits, because I cannot reconcile voting to dismiss
the writs as 'improvidently granted' with the Court's
'rule of four.' In my opinion due adherence to that rule
requires that once certiorari has been granted a case
should be disposed of on the premise that it is properly
here, in the absence of considerations appearing which
were not manifest or fully apprehended at the time certiorari was granted." Ferguson v. Moore-McCormack
Lines, 352 U. S. 521, 559 (1957) (separate opinion).
See The Monrosa v. Carbon Black Export, Inc., 359 U. S.
180 (1959) (dismissal only appropriate when "[e]xamination of
a case on the merits, on oral argument, ... bring[s] into
'proper focus' a consideration which, though present in the
record at the time of granting the writ, only later indicates
that the grant was improvident"). Compare Triangle Improvement Council v. Ritchie, 402 U. S. 497, 502 (1971)
(Harlan, J., concurring) (dismissal appropriate "in light of
... changed posture of the case") with id., at 508 (Douglas,
J., dissenting, joined by Black, BRENNAN, and MARSHALL,
JJ.) (so as not to impair the Rule of Four, it is "the duty of
the five opposing certiorari to persuade others at Conference,
but, failing that, to vote on the merits of the case"). See also
Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U. S. 637, 648 (1974) (Stewart, J., concurring, joined by WHITE, J.) ("If as many as four
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Justices remain so minded after oral argument, due adherence to that rule requires me to address the merits of a case,
however strongly I may feel that it does not belong in this
Court."); Burrell v. McCray, 426 U. S. 471, 472 (1976) (STE. ). 14
VENS, J . , concurrmg
In this case, neither the Court nor the parties have even
attempted to suggest any change in circumstances that has
"In Burrell v. McCray, 426 U.S. 471, 474-475 (1976) (BRENNAN, J.,
dissenting), I explained when, in my view, a Justice who has initially voted
to deny certiorari may nonetheless join in dismissing the writ as improvidently granted:
"Further, a Justice who originally voted to deny the petition for writ of
certiorari is, of course, privileged to participate in a dismissal as improvidently granted that is justified under the Monrosa standard. See Ferguson v. Moore-McCormack Lines, 352 U. S. 521,559 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting); United States v. Shannon, 342 U. S. 288, 294
(1952). But I hold the view that impermissible violence is done the Rule of
Four when a Justice who voted to deny the petition for certiorari participates after oral argument in a dismissal that, as here, is not justified under
the governing standard, but which rather reflects only the factors that motivated the original vote to deny. Ferguson v. Moore-McCormack Lines,
supra, at 559-462 (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting). In this circumstance, I share the view stated by Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting in
United States v. Shannon, supra, at 298:
'A Justice who has voted to deny the writ of certiorari is in no position
after argument to vote to dismiss the writ as improvidently granted.
Only those who have voted to grant the writ have that privilege. The
reason strikes deep. If after the writ is granted or after argument,
those who voted to deny certiorari vote to dismiss the writ as improvidently granted, the integrity of our certiorari jurisdiction is impaired.
By long practice-announced to the Congress and well-known to this
Bar-it takes four votes out of a Court of nine to grant a petition for
certiorari. If four can grant and the opposing five dismiss, then the
four cannot get a decision of the case on the merits. The integrity of
the four-vote rule on certiorari would then be impaired.' "
Given that the Court has offered absolutely no reason for its decision to
dismiss the writ in this case, I can only conclude that there are no justifiable reasons for the dismissal that were unknown last Term when at least
four Justices, who remain persuaded that the case should be decided on the
merits, originally voted to give plenary consideration to the case.
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occurred since the writ of certiorari was granted last Term.
Nor has consideration of the case on the merits focused the
Court on any factors that were unknown at the time the case
was originally set for oral argument. Indeed, if anything, I
believe the posture of the case has been clarified by the written briefs and oral arguments presented to the Court. In
the absence of any explanation for the Court's action, therefore, I can only conclude that the Court is willing to ignore
the Rule of Four that has traditionally controlled the Court's
docket. 15
IV
For unexplained reasons, the Court has chosen to dismiss
the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted. As a result,
the Court lets stand a warrantless, nighttime entry into the
petitioner's home to arrest him for violation of a civil traffic
offense. In my view, such an arrest is clearly prohibited by
prevailing case law and by the special protection afforded the
home under the Fourth Amendment. The petitioner's arrest was therefore invalid, the judgment of the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin should be vacated, and the case remanded
for further proceedings.
I respectfully dissent.

16
The dismissal of the writ in this case despite the votes of four Justices
to decide the case on the merits is even more troubling because of the pending criminal action against the petitioner. See n. 8, supra. It indeed
would be ironic if his conviction were affirmed by the Wisconsin courts, and
the petitioner then filed another petition for certiorari from that state court
judgment. If (as is not improbable) the four Justices dissenting today
would vote to grant that petition, the Court would be forced either to decide precisely the same question presented by this case or to do even more
damage to the Rule of Four.
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JUSTICE BRENNAN, dissenting.
In Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573 (1980), the Court
concluded that, absent probable cause and exigent circumstances, warrantless arrests in the home are prohibited by
the Fourth Amendment. At the same time, we explicitly refused "to consider the sort of emergency or dangerous situation, described in our cases as 'exigent circumstances,' that
would justify a warrantless entry into a home for the purpose
of either arrest or search." I d., at 583. · Certiorari was
originally granted in this case to decide at least one aspect of
the unresolved question: whether, and if so under what circumstances, the Fourth Amendment prohibits the police
from making a warrantless night entry of a person's home in
order to arrest him for violation of a nonjailable traffic offense. Because, in my view, this case presents a record that
compels us to decide that question, I cannot agree that the
Court should dismiss the writ of certiorari as improvidently
granted. I therefore reach the merits of the question presented and would reverse the judgment of the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin.
I
A
Shortly before 9:00 p. m. on the rainy night of April 24,
1978, a lone witness, Randy Jablonic, observed a car that was
being driven erratically. After changing speeds and veering

I
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from side to side, the car eventually swerved off the road and
came to a stop in an open field. No damage to any person or
property occurred. Apparently worrying about the driver
and fearing that the car would get back on the highway,
J ablonic drove his truck up behind the car so as to block it
from returning to the road. Another passerby also stopped
at the scene, and Jablonic asked her to call the police. Before the police arrived, however, the driver of the car
emerged from his vehicle, approached J ablonic's truck, and
asked J ablonic for a ride home. J ablonic instead suggested
that they wait for assistance in removing or repairing the car.
Ignoring J ablonic's suggestion, the driver walked away from
the scene.
A few minutes later, the police arrived and questioned
J ablonic. He told one officer what he had seen, specifically
noting that the driver was either very inebriated or very
sick. The officer checked the motor vehicle registration of
the abandoned car and learned that it was registered to the
petitioner, Edward G. Welsh. In addition, the officer noted
that the petitioner's residence was a short distance from the
scene, and therefore easily within walking distance.
Without securing any type of warrant, the police proceeded to the petitioner's home, arriving about 9:00 p. m.
When the petitioner's stepdaughter answered the door, the
police successfully sought entry into the house. 1 They proceeded upstairs to the petitioner's bedroom, where they
found him lying naked in bed. At this point, the petitioner
was placed under arrest for driving or operating a motor ve1
The state trial court never decided whether there was consent to the
entry because it deemed decision of that issue unnecessary in light of its
finding that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless arrest. After
reversing the lower court's finding of exigent circumstances, the Wisconsin
Court of Appeals remanded for full consideration of the consent issue. See
State v. Welsh, No. 80-1686, App. 114-125. That remand never occurred,
however, because the Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed its court of appeals and reinstated the trial court's judgment. See State v. Welsh, 10$
Wis. 2d 319, 321 N. W. 2d 245 (1982).
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hicle while under the influence of an intoxicant, in violation of
Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1) (1977). 2 The petitioner was taken to
the police station, where he refused to submit to a breathalyzer test.
B
As a result of these events, the petitioner was subjected to
two separate but related proceedings: one concerning his refusal to submit to a breath test and the other involving the
alleged code violation for driving while intoxicated. Under
the Wisconsin vehicle code as it appeared in April 1978, anyone arrested for driving while intoxicated under § 346.63(1)
could be requested by a law enforcement officer to provide
breath, blood, or urine samples for the purpose of determining the presence or quantity of alcohol. Wis. Stat.
§ 343.305(1) (1975). If such a request was made, the arrestee
was required to submit to the appropriate testing or risk a
revocation of operating privileges. Cf. South Dakota v.
Neville, 459 U. S. - - (1983) (admission into evidence of a
defendant's refusal to submit to a blood-alcohol test does not
offend constitutional right against self-incrimination). The
arrestee could challenge the officer's request, however, by
refusing to undergo testing and then asking for a hearing to
determine whether the refusal was justified. If, after the
hearing, it was determined that the refusal was not justified,
the arrestee's operating privileges would be revoked for 60
days. 3
2

Since the time of the petitioner's arrest, § 346.63 has been amended to
provide for a code violation if someone drives or operates a motor vehicle
while under the influence of an intoxicant or while evidencing certain
blood- or breath-alcohol levels.
See Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(a)-(b)
(1981--82). This amendment, however, has no bearing on the issues raised
by the present case.
3
Since the time of the petitioner's arrest, this statute also has been
amended, with the current version found at Wis. Stat. § 343.305 (1981--82).
Although the procedures to be followed by the law enforcement officer and
the arrestee have remained essentially unchanged, § 343.305(3), (8), the potential length of any revocation of operating privileges has been increased,
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The statute also set forth specific criteria to be applied by a
court when determining whether an arrestee's refusal to take
a breath test was justified. Included among these criteria
was a requirement that, before revoking the arrestee's operating privileges, the court determine that "the refusal ...
to submit to a test was unreasonable." § 343.305(2)(b)(5)
(1975). It is not disputed that an arrestee's refusal to take a
breath test would be reasonable, and therefore operating
privileges could not be revoked, if the underlying arrest was
not lawful. Indeed, state law has consistently provided that
a valid arrest is a necessary prerequisite to the imposition of
a breath test. 4 See Scales v. State, 64 Wis. 2d 485, 494, 219
N. W. 2d 286, 292 (1974). Although the statute in effect in
April1978 referred to reasonableness, the current version of
§ 343.305 explicitly recognizes that one of the issues that an
arrestee may raise at a refusal hearing is "whether [he] was
la~fully~E)d under arrest for violation -of s.346.63(1)."
§ 343.30 (3 (b (5)(a), (8)(b) (1981-82). See also 67 Op. Wis.
Atty. Gen. 93-78 (~c. 27, 1978) ("statutory scheme ... condepending on the arrestee's prior driving record, § 343.305(9)(a)-(b). An
arrestee who improperly refuses to submit to a required test may also be
required to comply with an assessment order and a driver safety plan.
§ 343.305(9)(c)-(e). These amendments, however, also have no direct
bearing on the issues raised by the present case.
' Because state law provides that evidence of the petitioner's refusal to
submit to a breath test is inadmissible if the underlying arrest was unlawful, this case does not implicate the exclusionary rule under the Federal
Constitution. The Court's hesitation to apply the exclusionary rule to civil
proceedings, see ante, at 3-4, and n. 3, is therefore totally irrelevant to
this case. Likewise, it is difficult to understand the Court's cryptic suggestion that "the Supreme Court of Wisconsin [did] not discuss any evidence which Welsh sought to exclude, " ante, at 3. It has been clear to all
parties throughout this litigation that, pursuant to state law, evidence of
the petitioner's refusal to submit to an unreasonable breath test could not
be used against the petitioner (i. e., must be excluded). And without evidence of the petitioner's refusal, his operating privileges simply could not
be revoked.
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templates that a lawful arrest be made prior to a request for
submission to a test"). 5
Separate statutory provisions control the penalty that
might be imposed for the substantive offense of driving while
• The Court attempts to cast doubt on whether Wisconsin applies federal constitutional standards to the reasonableness inquiry under Wis.
Stat. § 343.305(2)(b)(5) (1975). But the Court is simply creating its own
doubt, where none could possibly exist. All three state courts which have
rendered decisions in this case have without question applied feder,al c.onstitutionalSranoaras. The Wisconsm Supreme Court could not have been
clear~

"The trial court revoked the defendant's motor vehicle operator's license
for sixty days pursuant to his unreasonable refusal to submit to a breathalyzer test, as required by [state statute].
"The defendant challenges the officer's warrantless arrest in his residence as violating the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution. The [trial
court] upheld this warrantless arrest concluding that probable cause to believe that the defendant had been operating a motor vehicle while under
the influence of an intoxicant, coupled with the existence of exigent circumstances, justified the officers' entry into the defendant's residence ....
[T]he court of appeals reversed the trial court, holding that, although the
officers' warrantless arrest was unreasonable, thereby violating the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, the absence of a finding regarding
the consensual entry necessitated remanding the case on that issue. We
affirm the findings of the [trial court], holding that the co-existence of probable cause and exigent circumstances in this case justifies the warrantless
arrest ....
"To prevail in this case, the state must prove the co-existence of probable
cause and exigent circumstances, justifying the officer's conduct at the defendant's residence. We hold that there was ample evidence supporting
the trial court's ruling that the officer's entry was justified on the basis of
both probable cause and exigent circumstances. Entry to effect a warrantless arrest in a residence is subject to the limitations imposed by both
the United States and the Wisconsin Constitutions. U. S. Const. amend.
IV; Wis. Const. art. I, sec. 11 ." 108 Wis. 2d, at 320-321, 326-327, 321
N. W. 2d, at 24&-247, 249-250 (citations and footnotes omitted).
As if this were not a sufficient expression of relevant state law, the
Court also claims that there is "no authoritative construction from a state
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intoxicated. At the time in question, the vehicle code provided that a first offense for driving while intoxicated was a
noncriminal violation subject to a civil forfeiture proceeding
for a maximum fine of $200; a second or subsequent offense in
the previous five years was a potential misdemeanor that
could be punished by imprisonment for up to one year and a
maximum fine of $500. Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2) (1975). Since
that time, the state has made only minor amendments to
these penalty provisions. Indeed, the statute continues to
categorize a first offense as a civil violation that allows for
only a monetary forfeiture of no more than $300.
§ 346.65(2)(a) (1981-82). See State v. Albright, 98 Wis. 2d
663, 672-673, 298 N. W. 2d 196, 202 (App. 1980).

c
As noted, in this case the petitioner refused to submit to a
breath test; he subsequently filed a timely request for a refusal hearing. Before that hearing was held, however, the
state filed a criminal complaint against the petitioner for
driving while intoxicated. 6 The petitioner responded by filcourt" for the view that the reasonableness inquiry incorporates constitutional standards, ante, n. 5. But the Court ignores §_cales3 . State, 64
Wis. 2d 485, 494, 219 N. W. 2d 286, 292 (1974), which clearly presaged the
constitutional analysis undertaken in this case:
"The implied consent law does not limit the right to take a blood sample as
an incident to a lawful arrest. It should be emphasized, however, that the
arrest, and therefore probable cause for making it, must precede the taking
of the blood sample. We conclude that the sample was constitutionally
taken incident to the lawful arrest."
It is therefore the state supreme court, whose interpretations of state law
are binding on this Court, which has read its statute to predicate operation
of its implied consent law on the existence of a "lawful arrest."
• The petitioner was charged with a criminal misdemeanor because this
was his second such citation in the previous five years. See § 346.65(2)
(1975). Although the petitioner was subject to a criminal charge, the police conducting the warrantless entry of his home did not know that the
petitioner had ever been charged with, or much less convicted of, a prior
violation for driving while intoxicated. It must be assumed, therefore,
that at the time of the arrest the police were acting as if they were investi-
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ing a motion to dismiss the complaint, relying on his contention that the underlying arrest was invalid. After receiving
evidence at a hearing on this motion in July 1980, the trial
court concluded that the criminal complaint would not be dismissed because the existence of both probable cause and exigent circumstances justified the warrantless arrest. The decision at the refusal hearing, which was not held until
September 1980, was therefore preordained. In fact, the
primary issue at the refusal hearing-whether the petitioner
acted reasonably in refusing to submit to a breath test because he was unlawfully placed under arrest, see supra, at
4--had now been determined two months earlier by the same
trial court.
As expected, after the refusal hearing, the trial court concluded that the arrest of the petitioner was lawful and that
the petitioner's refusal to take the breath test was therefore
unreasonable. 7 Accordingly, the court issued an order suspending the petitioner's operating license for 60 days. On
appeal, the suspension order was vacated by the Wisconsin
Court of Appeals. See State v. Welsh, No. 80-1686, App.
114-125. Contrary to the trial court, the appellate court
concluded that the warrantless arrest of the petitioner in his
home violated the Fourth Amendment because the State, although demonstrating probable cause to arrest, had not established the existence of exigent circumstances. The petitioner's refusal to submit to a breath test was therefore
gating and eventually arresting for a civil violation only. See Beck v.
Ohio, 379 U. S. 89, 91, 96 (1964).
' When ruling from the bench after the refusal hearing, the trial judge
specifically indicated:
"[T]he Court is bound by its earlier ruling that that was a valid arrest.
And, I think [counsel for the petitioner] certainly will have the right to
challenge that on appeal if he appeals this matter, as well as the previous
ruling should there be a conviction on the underlying charge." App. 111.
See also App. 112-113.
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reasonable. 8 The Wisconsin Supreme Court in turn reversed the court of appeals, relying on the existence of three
factors that it believed constituted exigent circumstances:
the need for "hot pursuit" of a suspect, the need to prevent
physical harm to the offender and the public, and the need to
prevent destruction of evidence. See State v. Welsh, 108
Wis. 2d 319, 336-338, 321 N. W. 2d 245, 254-255 (1982). Because of the important Fourth Amendment implications of
the decision below, we granted certiorari. 459 U. S. - (1983). 9
II
It is axiomatic that "the physical entry of the home is the
chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed." United States v. United States District
Court, 407 U. S. 297, 313 (1972). And a principal protection
against unnecessary intrusions into private dwellings is the
warrant requirement imposed by the Fourth Amendment on
agents of the government who seek to enter the home for
purposes of search or arrest. See Johnson v. United States,
333 U. S. 10, 13-14 (1948). 10 It is not surprising, therefore,
The court remanded the case for further findings as to whether the
police had entered the petitioner's home with consent. See n. 1, supra.
9
Although the state courts differed in their respective conclusions concerning exigent circumstances, they each found that the facts known to the
police at the time of the warrantless home entry were sufficient to establish
probable cause to arrest. The petitioner has not challenged that finding
before this Court.
The parallel criminal proceedings against the petitioner, see supra, at 5
and n. 5, resulted in a misdemeanor conviction for driving while intoxicated. During the jury trial, held in early 1982, the state introduced evidence of the petitioner's refusal to submit to a breath test. His appeal
from that conviction, now before the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, has been
stayed pending our decision in this case. See Brief for Petitioner 17, n. 5.
10
In Johnson, Justice Jackson eloquently explained the warrant requirement in the context of a home search:
"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by
zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the· support of the
usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protec8

,.
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that the Court has recognized, as "a 'basic principle of Fourth
Amendment law[,]' that searches and seizures inside a home
without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable." Payton v. New York, 445 U. S., at 586. See Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 474-475 (1971) ("a search or seizure carried out on a suspect's premises without a warrant is
per se unreasonable, unless the police can show ... the presence of 'exigent circumstances'"). See also Steagald v.
United States, 451 U. S. 204, 211-212 (1981); McDonald v.
United States, 335 U. S. 451, 456 (1948); Johnson v. United
States, supra, at 1~15; Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616,
630 (1886).
Consistent with these long-recognized principles, the
Court decided in Payton v. New York, supra, that warrantless arrests in the home are prohibited by the Fourth Amendment, absent probable cause and exigent circumstances.
I d., at 58~590. Although one might infer from the Court's
decision that all home arrests would be subject to the same
rule, the Court expressly framed its opinion in terms of "routine felony arrests," see id., at 574, 602. This formulation of
the holding in Payton implies two separate, but related limitations that have yet to be acknowledged completely by the
Court, but which control the present case. In particular, by
its own terms the holding in Payton--limited to "routine felony arrests"-was neither intended to cover arrests for
nonserious offenses nor applied to arrests that are considered nonroutine because they are justified by exigent
circumstances.
tion consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and
detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the
often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime. . . . The right of officers to thrust themselves into a home is ... a grave concern, not only to
the individual but to a society which chooses to dwell in reasonable security
and freedom from surveillance. When the right of privacy must reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial
officer, not by a policeman or government enforcement agent." !d., at
13--14 (footnote omitted).

1
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A
By concluding that the Fourth Amendment prohibits home
entries to make warrantless felony arrests in the absence of
probable cause and exigent circumstances, the Court in
Payton decided, a fortiori, that warrantless home arrests are
similarly prohibited for offenses less serious than felonies.
It does not necessarily follow, however, that warrantless
home arrests for nonserious offenses would be proper, even if
probable cause and exigent circumstances are found to exist.
That question, yet to be decided by the Court, is presented
by the record in this case. I therefore reach the issue and
conclude that the Fourth Amendment imposes an absolute
ban on warrantless home arrests for certain minor offenses.
In United States v. Watson, 423 U. S. 411 (1976), the
Court upheld a warrantless "midday public" arrest for a felony. In so doing, the Court relied heavily on the commonlaw rule that "a peace officer was permitted to arrest without
a warrant for a misdemeanor or felony committed in his
presence as well as for a felony not committed in his presence
if there was reasonable ground for making the arrest." I d.,
at 418 (emphasis added) (citing sources); id., at 438 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). Although not necessary to the result
in Watson, the italicized portion of the common-law rule suggests that warrantless public arrests for misdemeanors, even
if supported by probable cause and exigent Circumstances,
should be prohibited unless the underlying offense is committed in the presence of the arresting officer. See generally
W. LaFave, Arrest 231-243 (1965). Therefore, even accepting the Court's view in Watson that the Fourth Amendment
grants broad authority for warrantless public arrests, adherence to the common-law rule would allow warrantless misdemeanor arrests in public areas only in the most narrow circumstances. 11 It logically follows that warrantless home
11
For purposes of this case only, I assume that the common-law rule
identified in Watson applied in its literal sense to all misdemeanors.
There is substantial evidence, however, that public arrests were justified

,.
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entries to make arrests for public misdemeanors would also
be prohibited, possibly with a similarly narrow exception for
persons committing such misdemeanors in the presence of an
officer and then fleeing, upon hot pursuit, into the home.
Cf. United States v. Santana, 427 U. S. 38, 42-43 (1976) (hot
pursuit · of fleeing felon); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294
(1967) (same). And, although the rules for home arrests at
the time of the adoption of the Fourth Amendment were far
from clear, see Payton v. New York, 445 U. 8., at 591-598, it
appears that such a severe restriction on home arrests for
misdemeanors was the prevailing view of the common law.
See, e. g., The Queen v. Marsden, 1 L. R.-Cr. Cas. Res. 131
(1868); Wilgus, Arrest Without a Warrant, 22 Mich. L. Rev.
under the common law, even for offenses committed in the officer's presence, only for breaches of the peace-a category of offenses much narrower, and far more serious, than all misdemeanors. See, e. g., W.
LaFave, Arrest 231 (1965); Bohlen & Shulman, Arrest With and Without a
Warrant, 75 U. Pa. L. Rev. 485 (1927). As explained by the New York
Court of Appeals:
"The right of a peace officer at common law to arrest summarily was a
limited one. 'The common law did not authorize the arrest of persons
guilty or suspected of misdemeanors, except in cases of an actual breach of
the peace either by an affray or by violence to an individual. In such cases
the arrest had to be made not so much for the purpose of bringing the offender to justice as in order to preserve the peace, and the right to arrest
was accordingly limited to cases in which the person to be arrested was
taken in the act or immediately after its conclusion.' (Stephen's History of
the Criminal Law of England, p. 193; Chase's Blackstone [4th ed. ], pp. 998,
999; 6 C. J. S. Arrest, § 6, subd. c.)" People v. Phillips , 284 N. Y. 235,
237, 30 N. E. 2d 488, 489 (1940).
Moreover, I remain convinced that it is incorrect to base current interpretations of the Fourth Amendment solely on the literal words of the common-law rules of arrest. Rather, the Fourth Amendment "must be interpreted 'in light of contemporary norms and conditions.' " Steagald v.
United States, 451 U. S. 204, 217 and n. 10 (1981), quoting Payton v. New
York, 445 U. S. 573, 591 and n. 33 (1980). See also United States v. Watson, 423 U. S. 411, 433, 438-443 (1976) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). For
purposes of this case, however, even acceptance of the common-law rule
compels the conclusion that the petitioner's arrest was unlawful.
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541, 798, 803 (1924) ("Of course since ... an officer ... has

[no] authority to arrest for a past breach of the peace without
a warrant, neither would [he] have the right to break doors in
an attempted arrest therefor, except for one committed in his
presence and on fresh pursuit."). See also Handcock v.
Baker, 126 Eng. Rep. 1270 (1800); Adair v. Williams, 24
Ariz. 422, 210 P. 853 (1922); Wilgus, supra, at 804. Therefore, even if exigent circumstances exist, the common law
suggests that warrantless home arrests for misdemeanors
should be prohibited, with the possible exception of hot pursuit from the commission of a misdemeanor in the officer's
presence.
Surely, the prohibitions of the Fourth Amendment go at
least as far-prohibiting warrantless entries of the home to
arrest for certain minor offenses under all circumstances,
even if probable cause and exigent circumstances are shown
to exist. Before agents of the government may invade the
sanctity of the home, the government must be required to
demonstrate a compelling need that overcomes the presumption of unreasonableness that attaches to all warrantless
home entries. See Payton v. New York, supra, at 586.
When the government's interest is only to arrest for a minor
offense, that presumption of unreasonableness should be
irrebuttable, and the government should be allowed to make
such an arrest only with a warrant issued upon probable
cause by a neutral and detached magistrate. Accordingly, I
conclude that there are no circumstances under which a warrantless home entry to arrest 1or a minor offense could be justified. 12 'I':tieFOurth Amenament, m my view, compels such
absolute ban.

an

Even the dissenters in Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980), although believing that warrantless home arrests are not prohibited by the
Fourth Amendment, recognized the importance of the felony limitation on
such arrests. See i d., at 603, 616--Q17 (WHITE, J., dissenting) ("The felony
requirement guards against abusive or arbitrary enforcement and ensures
that invasions of the home occur only in case of the most serious crimes.").
12
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Application of this bright-line principle to the facts of this
case proves quite simple. The State of Wisconsin has chosen
to classify the first offense for driving while intoxicated as a
noncriminal, civil forfeiture offense for which no imprisonment is possible. See Wis. Stat. § 346. 65(2) (1975); id.,
§ 346.65(2)(a) (1981-82); supra, at 4-5. This is the best indication of the state's interest in precipitating an arrest, and is
one that can be easily identified both by the courts and by officers faced with a decision to arrest. See n. 5, supra. An
offense for which no imprisonment is possible, however, does
not suffice to overcome the presumption of unreasonableness
that attaches to a warrantless entry of the home to arrest. 13
The arrest of the petitioner in this case, therefore, was prohibited by the Fourth Amendment. As a result of this unlawful arrest, state law provides that the revocation of his operating privileges was also improper. See Wise. Stat.
§ 343.305(2)(b)(5) (1975); id., § 343.305(3)(b)(5)(a) (1981-82);
supra, at 4 and n. 4. Accordingly, the judgment of the SuI see little reason to remove this general restriction even if there is ample
support for a finding of exigent circumstances.
18
Although I have previously joined in noting the danger of drawing constitutional lines based on legislative classifications of statutory crimes, see
United States v. Watson, 423 U. S., at 438-442, 454-455 (MARSHALL, J.,
dissenting), it is not necessary to decide in this case whether the Fourth
Amendment prohibits warrantless home arrests for all nonfelonious
crimes. Rather, given the facts of this case, I would simply hold that such
arrests are constitutionally prohibited at least for all minor offenses, defined primarily by looking to the extent of punishment provided for by the
state statute.
Nor do I mean to suggest that the prevention of drunk driving is not
properly of major concern to the States. The State of Wisconsin, however, along with several other States, see, e. g., Minn. Stat. § 169.121
subd. 4 (1982); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 39-669.07(1) (Supp. 1982); S. D. Codified
Laws § 32-23-2 (Supp. 1983), has chosen to limit severely the penalties
that may be imposed after a first conviction for driving while intoxicated.
Given that the classification of state crimes differs widely among the
States, the penalty that may attach to any particular offense seems to provide the clearest and most consistent indication of the state's interest in
arresting individuals suspected of committing that offense.
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preme Court of Wisconsin should be vacated, and the case remanded for further proceedings.
B

Even if I were to conclude that an absolute ban on warrantless home arrests for certain nonserious offenses is not compelled by the Fourth Amendment, I would conclude that the
petitioner's arrest was prohibited by the Fourth Amendment
because of the absence of exigent circumstances.
In Payton v. New York, 445 U. S., at 583, the Court declined to consider the scope of any exception for exigent circumstances that might justify warrantless home arrests,
thereby leaving to the lower courts the initial application of
the exigent-circumstances exception. Prior decisions of this
Court, however, have emphasized that exceptions to the warrant requirement are "few in number and carefully delineated," United States v. United States District Court, 407
U. S., at 318, and that the police have a heavy burden to
meet when attempting to demonstrate an urgent need that
might justify warrantless searches or arrests. Indeed, the
Court has recognized only a few such emergency conditions,
see, e. g., United States v. Santana, 427 U. S., at 42-43
(1976) (hot pursuit of a fleeing felon); Warden v. Hayden, 387
U. S., at 298-299 (1967) (same); Schmerber v. California, 384
U. S. 757, 770-771 (1966) (destruction of evidence); Michigan
v. Tyler, 436 U. S. 499, 509 (1978) (ongoing fire), and has actually applied only the "hot pursuit" doctrine to arrests in the
home, see Santana, supra. The record in this case, however, requires that the Court clarify this area of Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence. In so doing, I conclude that an
important factor to be considered when determining whether
any exigency exists is the gravity of the underlying offense
for which the arrest is being made. Moreover, although no
exigency is created simply because there is probable cause to
believe that a serious crime has been committed, I conclude
that application of the exigent-circumstances exception
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should be severely restricted when only a minor offense is
involved.
This is not a novel idea. Writing in concurrence in M cDonald v. United States, 335 U. S. 451 (1948), Justice Jackson explained why a finding of exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless home entry should be severely restricted:
"Even if one were to conclude that urgent circumstances might justify a forced entry without a warrant,
no such emergency was present in this case. This
method of law enforcement displays a shocking lack of all
sense of proportion. Whether there is reasonable necessity for a search without waiting to obtain a warrant
certainly depends somewhat upon the gravity of the offense thought to be in progress as well as the hazards of
the method of attempting to reach it. . . . It is to me a
shocking proposition that private homes, even quarters
in a tenement, may be indiscriminately invaded at the
discretion of any suspicious police officer engaged in
following up offenses that involve no violence or threats
of it. While I should be human enough to apply the letter of the law with some indulgence to officers acting to
deal with threats or crimes of violence which endanger
life or security, it is notable that few of the searches
found by this Court to be unlawful dealt with that category of crime. . . . While the enterprise of parting fools
from their money by the 'numbers' lottery is one that
ought to be suppressed, I do not think that its suppression is more important to society than the security of the
people against unreasonable searches and seizures.
When an officer undertakes to act as his own magistrate,
he ought to be in a position to justify it by pointing to
some real immediate and serious consequences if he postponed action to get a warrant." ld., at 459-460 (Jackson, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
Consistent with this approach, the lower courts have
looked to the nature of the underlying offense as an impor-
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tant factor to be considered in the exigent-circumstances calculus. In the leading federal case defining exigent circumstances, for example, the en bane United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia recognized that the
gravity of the underlying offense was a principal factor to be
weighed. Dorman v. United States, 435 F. 2d 385, 392
(CADC 1970). 14 Without approving all of the factors included in the standard adopted by that court, it is sufficient
to note that many other lower courts have also considered the
gravity of the offense an important part of their constitutional analysis.
As a result, courts have permitted warrantless home arrests for major felonies if identifiable exigencies, independent
of the gravity of the offense, existed at the time of the arrest.
Compare United States v. Campbell, 581 F. 2d 22 (CA2 1978)
(allowing warrantless home arrest for armed robbery when
exigent circumstances existed), with Commonwealth v. Williams, 483 Pa. 293, 396 A. 2d 1177 (1978) (disallowing warrantless home arrest for murder due to absence of exigent
circumstances). But of those courts addressing the issue,
most refuse to permit a warrantless home arrest for a
nonfelonious crime. See, e. g., State v. Guertin, 190 Conn.
440, 453, 461 A. 2d 963, 970 (1983) ("The [exigent circumstances] exception is narrowly drawn to cover cases of real
and not contrived emergencies. The exception is limited to
the investigation of serious crimes; misdemeanors are excluded."); People v. Strelow, 96 Mich. App. 182, 190-193, 292
N. W. 2d 517, 521-522 (1980). See also People v. Sanders,
59 Ill. App. 3d 6, 374 N. E. 2d 139 (1978) (burglary without
weapons not a grave offense of violence for these purposes);
State v. Bennett, 295 N. W. 2d 5 (S. D. 1980) (distribution of
14
See generally Donnino & Girese, Exigent Circumstances for a Warrantless Home Arrest, 45 Alb. L. Rev. 90 (1980); Harbaugh & Faust,
"Knock on Any Door"-Home Arrests After Payton and Steagald, 86
Dick. L. Rev. 191, 220-233 (1982); Note, Exigent Circumstances for Warrantless Home Arrests, 23 Ariz. L. Rev. 1171 (1981).
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controlled substances not a grave offense for these purposes).
But cf. State v. Penas, 200 Neb. 387, 263 N. W. 2d 835 (1978)
(allowing warrantless home arrest upon hot pursuit from
commission of misdemeanor in the officer's presence; decided
before Payton); State v. Niedermeyer, 48 Or. App. 665, 617
P. 2d 911 (1980) (allowing warrantless home arrest upon hot
pursuit from commission of misdemeanor in the officer's presence). This should not be surprising. It is, indeed, difficult
to conceive of a warrantless home arrest that would not be
unreasonable when the underlying offense is relatively
minor. I therefore conclude that the commonsense result
reached by most lower courts is required by the Fourth
Amendment prohibition on "unreasonable searches and seizures," and would hold that application of the exigent-circumstances exception in the context of a home entry is severely
restricted when there is probable cause to believe that only a
minor offense has been committed.
Again, application of this principle to the facts of the
present case is relatively straightforward. The petitioner
was arrested in the privacy of his own bedroom for a noncriminal, traffic offense. The State attempts to justify the
arrest by relying on the hot-pursuit doctrine, on the threat to
public safety, and on the need to preserve evidence of the petitioner's blood-alcohol level. The claim of hot pursuit is unconvincing, however, because there was no immediate or continuous pursuit of the petitioner from the scene of a crime.
Moreover, because the petitioner had already arrived home,
and had abandoned his car at the scene of the accident, there
was little remaining threat to the public safety. Hence, the
only potential emergency claimed by the State was the need
to ascertain the petitioner's blood-alcohol level. But even
assuming that the underlying facts would support a finding of
this exigent circumstance, mere similarity to other cases involving the imminent destruction of evidence is not sufficient.
In the context of a minor, nonjailable traffic offense, a warrantless home arrest simply cannot be upheld using this oth-
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erwise plausible justification. The principles of the Fourth
Amendment do not sanction such unreasonable poli;y-~.,4A1 1o~
behavior.
[_!2.)"~
·

III
For unconvincing reasons, the Court has chosen to dismiss
the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted. As a result,
the Court lets stand a warrantless, nighttime entry into the
petitioner's home to arrest him for violation of a civil traffic
offense. In my view, such an arrest is clearly prohibited by
prevailing case law and by the special protection afforded the
home under the Fourth Amendment. The petitioner's arrest was therefore invalid, the judgment of the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin should be vacated, and the case remanded
for further proceedings.
I respectfully dissent.
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OF WISCONSIN
[March - , 1984]

JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573 (1980), held that, absent probable cause and exigent circumstances, warrantless
arrests in the home are prohibited by the Fourth Amendment. But the Court in that case explicitly refused "to consider the sort of emergency or dangerous situation, described
in our cases as 'exigent circumstances,' that would justify a
warrantless entry into a home for the purpose of either arrest
or search." I d., at 583. Certiorari was granted in this case
to decide at least one aspect of the unresolved question:
whether, and if so under what circumstances, the Fourth
Amendment prohibits the police from making a warrantless
night entry of a person's home in order to arrest him for violation of a nonjailable traffic offense.
I
A

Shortly before 9:00 p. m. on the rainy night of April 24,
1978, a lone witness, Randy Jablonic, observed a car being
driven erratically. After changing speeds and veering from
side to side, the car eventually swerved off the road and came
to a stop in an open field. No damage to any person or property occurred. Concerned about the driver and fearing that
the car would get back on the highway, Jablonic drove his
truck up behind the car so as to block it from returning to the
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road. Another passerby also stopped at the scene, and
J ablonic asked her to call the police. Before the police arrived, however, the driver of the car emerged from his vehicle, approached J ablonic's truck, and asked J ablonic for a ride
home. J ablonic instead suggested that they wait for assistance in removing or repairing the car. Ignoring Jablonic's
suggestion, the driver walked away from the scene.
A few minutes later, the police arrived and questioned
J ablonic. He told one officer what he had seen, specifically
noting that the driver was either very inebriated or very
sick. The officer checked the motor vehicle registration of
the abandoned car and learned that it was registered to the
petitioner, Edward G. Welsh. In addition, the officer noted
that the petitioner's residence was· a short distance from the
scene, and therefore easily within walking distance.
Without securing any type of warrant, the police proceeded to the petitioner's home, arriving about 9:00 p. m.
When the petitioner's stepdaughter answered the door, the
police gained entry into the house. 1 Proceeding upstairs to
the petitioner's bedroom, they found him lying naked in bed.
At this point, the petitioner was placed under arrest for driving or operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of
an intoxicant, in violation of Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1) (1977). 2
1
The state trial court never decided whether there was consent to the
entry because it deemed decision of that issue unnecessary in light of its
finding that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless arrest. After
reversing the lower court's finding of exigent circumstances, the Wisconsin
Court of Appeals remanded for full consideration of the consent issue. See
State v. Welsh, No. 80-1686, App. 114-125. That remand never occurred,
however, because the Supreme Court of Wisconsin reversed its court of
appeals and reinstated the trial court's judgment. See State v. Welsh , 108
Wis. 2d 319, 321 N. W. 2d 245 (1982). For purposes of this decision,
therefore, we assume that there was no valid consent to enter the petitioner's home.
2
Since the petitioner's arrest, § 346.63 has been amended to provide
that it is a code violation to drive or operate a motor vehicle while under
the influence of an intoxicant or while evidencing certain blood- or breath-
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The petitioner was taken to the police station, where he refused to submit to a breathalyzer test.
B
As a result of these events, the petitioner was subjected to
two separate but related proceedings: one concerning his refusal to submit to a breath test and the other involving the
alleged code violation for driving while intoxicated. Under
the Wisconsin vehicle code in effect in April 1978, one arrested for driving while intoxicated under§ 346.63(1) could be
requested by a law enforcement officer to provide breath,
blood, or urine samples for the purpose of determining the
presence or quantity of alcohol. Wis. Stat. § 343.305(1)
(1975). .If such a request was made, the arrestee was required to submit to the appropriate testing or risk a revocation of operating privileges. Cf. South Dakota v. Neville,
459 U. S. - - (1983) (admission into evidence of a defendant's refusal to submit to a blood-alcohol test does not offend
constitutional right against self-incrimination). The arrestee
could challenge the officer's request, however, by refusing to
undergo testing and then asking for a hearing to determine
whether the refusal was justified. If, after the hearing, it
was determined that the refusal was not justified, the arrestee's operating privileges would be revoked for 60 days. 3
The statute also set forth specific criteria to be applied by a
court when determining whether an arrestee's refusal to take
alcohol levels. See Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(a}-(b) (1981-82). This amendment, however, has no bearing on the issues raised by the present case.
3
Since the petitioner's arrest, this statute also has been amended, with
the current version found at Wis. Stat. § 343.305 (1981-82). Although the
procedures to be followed by the law enforcement officer and the arrestee
have remained essentially unchanged, § 343.305(3), (8), the potential length
of any revocation of operating privileges has been increased, depending on
the arrestee's prior driving record, § 343.305(9)(a}-(b). An arrestee who
improperly refuses to submit to a required test may also be required to
comply with an assessment order and a driver safety plan.
§ 343.305(9)(c)-(e). These amendments, however, also have no direct
bearing on the issues raised by the present case.
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a breath test was justified. Included among these criteria
was a requirement that, before revoking the arrestee's operating privileges, the court determine that "the refusal . . .
to submit to a test was unreasonable." § 343.305(2)(b)(5)
(1975). It is not disputed by the parties that an arrestee's
refusal to take a breath test would be reasonable, and therefore operating privileges could not be revoked, if the underlying arrest was not lawful. Indeed, state law has consistently
provided that a valid arrest is a necessary prerequisite to the
imposition of a breath test. See Scales v. State, 64 Wis. 2d
485, 494, 219 N. W. 2d 286, 292 (1974). 4 Although the stat• "The implied consent law does not limit the right to take a blood sample as an incident to a lawful arrest. It should be emphasized, however,
that the arrest, and therefore probable cause for making it, must precede
the taking of the blood sample. We conclude that the sample was constitutionally taken incident to the lawful arrest." 64 Wis. 2d, at 494, 219
N. W. 2d, at 292 (emphasis added).
Nor is there any doubt that the Supreme Court of Wisconsin applies federal constitutional standards when determining whether an arrest, even
for a nonjailable traffic offense, is lawful. The court, for example, explained the basis for its holding in this case as follows:
"The trial court revoked the defendant's motor vehicle operator's license
for sixty days pursuant to his unreasonable refusal to submit to a breathalyzer test, as required by [state statute].
"The defendant challenges the officer's warrantless arrest in his residence as violating the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution. The [trial
court] upheld this warrantless arrest concluding that probable cause to believe that the defendant had been operating a motor vehicle while under
the influence of an intoxicant, coupled with the existence of exigent circumstances, justified the officers' entry into the defendant's residence . ...
[T]he court of appeals reversed the trial court, holding that, although the
officers' warrantless arrest was unreasonable, thereby violating the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, the absence of a finding regarding
the consensual entry necessitated remanding the case on that issue. We
affirm the findings of the [trial court], holding that the co-existence of probable cause and exigent circumstances in this case justifies the warrantless
arrest....
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ute in effect in April1978 referred to reasonableness, the current version of § 343.305 explicitly recognizes that one of the
issues that an arrestee may raise at a refusal hearing is
"whether [he] was lawfully placed under arrest for violation
of s.346.63(1)." § 343.305(3)(b)(5)(a), (8)(b) (1981-82). See
also 67 Op. Wis. Atty. Gen. 93-78 (Dec. 27, 1978) ("statutory
scheme ... contemplates that a lawful arrest be made prior
to a request for submission to a test"). 5
Separate statutory provisions control the penalty that
might be imposed for the substantive offense of driving while
intoxicated. At the time in question, the vehicle code provided that a first offense for driving while intoxicated was a
noncriminal violation subject to a civil forfeiture proceeding
for a maximum fine of $200; a second or subsequent offense in
the previous five years was a potential misdemeanor that
could be punished by imprisonment for up to one year and a
maximum fine of $500. Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2) (1975). Since
that time, the State has made only minor amendments to
these penalty provisions. Indeed, the statute continues to
categorize a first offense as a civil violation that allows for
only a monetary forfeiture of no more than $300.
§ 346.65(2)(a) (1981-82). See State v. Albright, 98 Wis. 2d
663, 672-673, 298 N. W. 2d 196, 202 (App. 1980).
"To prevail in this case, the state must prove the co-existence of probable
cause and exigent circumstances, justifying the officer's conduct at the defendant's residence. We hold that there was ample evidence supporting
the trial court's ruling that the officer's entry was justified on the basis of
both probable cause and exigent circumstances. Entry to effect a warrantless arrest in a residence is subject to the limitations imposed by both
the United States and the Wisconsin Constitutions. U. S. Const. amend.
N ; Wis. Const. art. I, sec. 11 ." 108 Wis. 2d, at 320-321, 326-327, 321
N. W. 2d, at 24&-247, 249-250 (emphasis added) (citations and footnotes
omitted).
6
Because state law provides that evidence of the petitioner's refusal to
submit to a breath test is inadmissible if the underlying arrest was unlawful, this case does not implicate the exclusionary rule under the Federal
Constitution.

,.
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c
As noted, in this case the petitioner refused to submit to a
breath test; he subsequently filed a timely request for a refusal hearing. Before that hearing was held, however, the
State filed a criminal complaint against the petitioner for
driving while intoxicated. 6 The petitioner responded by filing a motion to dismiss the complaint, relying on his contention that the underlying arrest was invalid. After receiving
evidence at a hearing on this motion in July 1980, the trial
court concluded that the criminal complaint would not be dismissed because the existence of both probable cause and exigent circumstances justified the warrantless arrest. The decision at the refusal hearing, which was not held until
September 1980, was therefore preordained. In fact, the
primary issue at the refusal hearing-whether the petitioner
acted reasonably in refusing to submit to a breath test because he was unlawfully placed under arrest, see supra, at
- - -.had already been determined two months earlier by
the same trial court.
As expected, after the refusal hearing, the trial court concluded that the arrest of the petitioner was lawful and that
the petitioner's refusal to take the breath test was therefore
unreasonable. 7 Accordingly, the court issued an order sus6

The petitioner was charged with a criminal misdemeanor because this
was his second such citation in the previous five years. See § 346.65(2)
(1975). Although the petitioner was subject to a criminal charge, the police conducting the warrantless entry of his home did not know that the
petitioner had ever been charged with, or much less convicted of, a prior
violation for driving while intoxicated. It must be assumed , therefore,
that at the time of the arrest the police were acting as if they were investigating and eventually arresting for a nonjailable traffic offense that constituted only a civil violation under the applicable state law. See Beck v.
Ohi o, 379 U. S. 89, 91, 96 (1964).
7
When ruling from the bench after the refusal hearing, the trial judge
specifically indicated:
"[T]he Court is bound by its earlier ruling that that was a valid arrest.
And, I think [counsel for the petitioner] certainly will have the right to
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pending the petitioner's operating license for 60 days. On
appeal, the suspension order was vacated by the Wisconsin
Court of Appeals. See State v. Welsh, No. 80-1686, App.
114--125. Contrary to the trial court, the appellate court
concluded that the warrantless arrest of the petitioner in his
home violated the Fourth Amendment because the State, although demonstrating probable cause to arrest, had not established the existence of exigent circumstances. The petitioner's refusal to submit to a breath test was therefore
reasonable. 8 The Supreme Court of Wisconsin in turn reversed the Court of Appeals, relying on the existence of
three factors that it believed constituted exigent circumstances: the need for "hot pursuit" of a suspect, the need to
prevent physical harm to the offender and the public, and the
need to prevent destruction of evidence. See State v.
Welsh, 108 Wis. 2d 319, 336--338, 321 N. W. 2d 245, 254--255
(1982). Because of the important Fourth Amendment implications of the decision below, we granted certiorari. 459
u. s. - (1983). 9
II

It is axiomatic that "the physical entry of the home is the
chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendchallenge that on appeal if he appeals this matter, as well as the previous
ruling should there be a conviction on the underlying charge. " App. 111.
See also App. 112-113.
8
The court remanded the case for further findings as to whether the
police had entered the petitioner's home with consent. See n. 1, supra.
• Although the state courts differed in their respective conclusions concerning exigent circumstances, they each found that the facts known to the
police at the time of the warrantless home entry were sufficient to establish
probable cause to arrest. The petitioner has not challenged that finding
before this Court.
The parallel criminal proceedings against the petitioner, see supra, at
, and n. 6, resulted in a misdemeanor conviction for driving while intoxicated. During the jury trial, held in early 1982, the State introduced
evidence of the petitioner's refusal to submit to a breath test. His appeal
from that conviction, now before the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, has been
stayed pending our decision in this case. See Brief for Petitioner 17, n. 5.
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ment is directed." United States v. United States District
Court, 407 U. S. 297, 313 (1972). And a principal protection
against unnecessary intrusions into private dwellings is the
warrant requirement imposed by the Fourth Amendment on
agents of the government who seek to enter the home for
purposes of search or arrest. See Johnson v. United States,
333 U. S. 10, 13-14 (1948). 10 It is not surprising, therefore,
that the Court has recognized, as "a 'basic principle of Fourth
Amendment law[,]' that searches and seizures inside a home
without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable."
Payton v. New York, 445 U. S., at 586. See Coolidge v.
New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 474-475 (1971) ("a search or
seizure carried out on a suspect's premises without a warrant
is per se unreasonable, unless the police can show . . . the
presence of 'exigent circumstances'"). See also Michigan v.
Clifford, U.S. - , (1984) (plurality opinion);
Steagald v. United States, 451 U. S. 204, 211-212 (1981); McDonald v. United States, 335 U. S. 451, 456 (1948); Johnson
v. United States, supra, at 13-15; Boyd v. United States, 116

u. s. 616, 630 (1886).

Consistently with these long-recognized principles, the
Court decided in Payton v. New York, supra, that warrantless felony arrests in the home are prohibited by the Fourth
10
In Johnson, Justice Jackson eloquently explained the warrant requirement in the context of a home search:
"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by
zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the
usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and
detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the
often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime .... The right of officers to thrust themselves into a home is ... a grave concern, not only to
the individual but to a society which chooses to dwell in reasonable security
and freedom from surveillance. When the right of privacy must reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial
officer, not by a policeman or government enforcement agent." Id., at
13-14 (footnote omitted).
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Amendment, absent probable cause and exigent circumstances. I d., at 583-590. At the same time, the Court declined to consider the scope of any exception for exigent circumstances that might justify warrantless home arrests, id.,
at 583, thereby leaving to the lower courts the initial application of the exigent-circumstances exception. 11 Prior decisions of this Court, however, have emphasized that exceptions to the warrant requirement are "few in number and
carefully delineated," United States v. United States District
Court, 407 U. S., at 318, and that the police bear a heavy
burden when attempting to demonstrate an urgent need that
might justify warrantless searches or arrests. Indeed, the
Court has recognized only a few such emergency conditions,
see, e. g., United States v. Santana, 427 U. S. 38, 42-43
(1976) (hot pursuit of a fleeing felon); Warden v. Hayden, 387
U. S. 294, 298-299 (1967) (same); Schmerber v. California,
384 U. S. 757, 770-771 (1966) (destruction of evidence); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U. S. 499, 509 (1978) (ongoing fire), and
has actually applied only the "hot pursuit" doctrine to arrests
in the home, see Santana, supra.
Our hesitation in finding exigent circumstances, especially
when warrantless arrests in the home are at issue, is especially appropriate when the underlying offense for which
there is probable cause to arrest is relatively minor. Before
agents of the government may invade the sanctity of the
home, the government is r8'P.Jired to demonstrate a compelling need that overcomes the presumption of unreasonableness that attaches to all warrantless home entries. See
Payton v. New York, supra, at 586. When the governOur decision in Payton, allowing warrantless home arrests upon a
showing of probable cause and exigent circumstances, was also expressly
limited to felony arrests. See, e. g., 445 U. S., at 574, 602. Because we
conclude that, in the circumstances presented by this case, there were no
exigent circumstances sufficient to justify a warrantless home entry, we
have no occasion to consider whether the Fourth Amendment may impose
an absolute ban on warrantless home arrests for certain minor offenses.
11

I

7
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ment's interest is only to arrest for a minor offense, 12 that
presumption of unreasonableness is difficult to rebut, and the
government usually should be allowed to make such arrests
only with a warrant issued upon probable cause by a neutral
and detached magistrate.
This is not a novel idea. Writing in concurrence in M cDonald v. United States, 335 U. S. 451 (1948), Justice Jackson explained why a finding of exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless home entry should be severely restricted
when only a minor offense has been committed:
"Even if one were to conclude that urgent circumstances might justify a forced entry without a warrant,
no such emergency was present in this case. This
method of law enforcement displays a shocking lack of all
sense of proportion. Whether there is reasonable necessity for a search without waiting to obtain a warrant
certainly depends somewhat upon the gravity of the offense thought to be in progress as well as the hazards of
the method of attempting to reach it. . . . It is to me a
shocking proposition that private homes, even quarters
in a tenement, may be indiscriminately invaded at the
discretion of any suspicious police officer engaged in following up offenses that involve no violence or threats of
it. While I should be human enough to apply the letter
of the law with some indulgence to officers acting to deal
with threats or crimes of violence which endanger life or
security, it is notable that few of the searches found by
this Court to be unlawful dealt with that category of
crime. . . . While the enterprise of parting fools from
their money by the 'numbers' lottery is one that ought to
12
Even the dissenters in Payton, although believing that warrantless
home arrests are not prohibited by the Fourth Amendment, recognized the
importance of the felony limitation on such arrests. See 445 U. S., at 603,
616-617 (WHITE, J., dissenting) ("The felony requirement guards against
abusive or arbitrary enforcement and ensures that invasions of the home
occur only in case of the most serious crimes.").
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be suppressed, I do not think that its suppression is
more important to society than the security of the people
against unreasonable searches and seizures. When an
officer undertakes to act as his own magistrate, he ought
to be in a position to justify it by pointing to some real
immediate and serious consequences if he postponed action to get a warrant." I d., at 459-460 (Jackson, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
Consistently with this approach, the lower courts have
looked to the nature of the underlying offense as an important factor to be considered in the exigent-circumstances calculus. In a leading federal case defining exigent circumstances, for example, the en bane United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia recognized that the
gravity of the underlying offense was a principal factor to be
weighed. Dorman v. United States, 140 U. S. App. D. C.
313, 320, 435 F. 2d 385, 392 (1970). 13 Without approving all
of the factors included in the standard adopted by that court,
it is sufficient to note that many other lower courts have also
considered the gravity of the offense an important part of
their constitutional analysis.
For example, courts have permitted warrantless home arrests for major felonies if identifiable exigencies, independent
ofthe gravity of the offense, existed at the time of the arrest.
Compare United States v. Campbell, 581 F. 2d 22 (CA2 1978)
(allowing warrantless home arrest for armed robbery when
exigent circumstances existed), with Commonwealth v. Williams, 483 Pa. 293, 396 A. 2d 1177 (1978) (disallowing warrantless home arrest for murder due to absence of exigent
circumstances). But of those courts addressing the issue,
most have refused to permit warrantless home arrests for
See generally Donnino & Girese, Exigent Circumstances for a Warrantless Home Arrest, 45 Alb. L. Rev. 90 (1980); Harbaugh & Faust,
"Knock on Any Door"-Home Arrests After Payton and Steagald, 86
Dick. L. Rev. 191, 220-233 (1982); Note, Exigent Circumstances for Warrantless Home Arrests, 23 Ariz. L. Rev. 1171 (1981).
13
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nonfelonious crimes. See, e. g., State v. Guertin, 190 Conn.
440, 453, 461 A. 2d 963, 970 (1983) ("The [exigent circumstances] exception is narrowly drawn to cover cases of real
and not contrived emergencies. The exception is limited to
the investigation of serious crimes; misdemeanors are excluded."); People v. Strelow, 96 Mich. App. 182, 190-193, 292
N. W. 2d 517, 521-522 (1980). See also People v. Sanders,
59 Ill. App. 3d 6, 374 N. E. 2d 139 (1978) (burglary without
weapons not grave offense of violence for this purpose); State
v. Bennett, 295 N. W. 2d 5 (S. D. 1980) (distribution of controlled substances not a grave offense for these purposes).
But cf. State v. Penas, 200 Neb. 387, 263 N. W. 2d 835 (1978)
(allowing warrantless home arrest upon hot pursuit from
commission of misdemeanor in the officer's presence; decided
before Payton); State v. Niedermeyer, 48 Or. App. 665, 617
P. 2d 911 (1980) (allowing warrantless home arrest upon hot
pursuit from commission of misdemeanor in the officer's presence). The approach taken in these cases should not be surprising. Indeed, without necessarily approving any of these
particular holdings or considering every possible factual situation, we note that it is difficult to conceive of a warrantless
home arrest that would not be unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment when the underlying offense is extremely minor.
We therefore conclude that the commonsense approach utilized by most lower courts is required by the Fourth Amendment prohibition on "unreasonable searches and seizures,"
and hold that an important factor to be considered when
determining whether any exigency exists is the gravity of the
underlying offense for which the arrest is being made.
Moreover, although no exigency is created simply because ~
there is probable cause to believe that a serious crime has
(
been committed, see Payton, supra, [application of the exigent-circumstances exception in the context of a home entry
should rarely be sanctioned when there is probable cause to
believe that only a minor offense has been committed.
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Application of this principle to the facts of the present case
is relatively straightforward. The petitioner was arrested in
the privacy of his own bedroom for a noncriminal, traffic offense. The State attempts to justify the arrest by relying on
the hot-pursuit doctrine, on the threat to public safety, and
on the need to preserve evidence of the petitioner's blood-alcohollevel. On the facts of this case, however, the claim of
hot pursuit is unconvincing because there was no immediate
or continuous pursuit of the petitioner from the scene of a
crime. Moreover, because the petitioner had already arrived home, and had abandoned his car at the scene of the accident, there was little remaining threat to the public safety.
Hence, the only potential emergency claimed by the State
was the need to ascertain the petitioner's blood-alcohol level.
Even assuming, however, that the underlying facts would
support a finding of this exigent circumstance, mere similarity to other cases involving the imminent destruction of evidence is not sufficient. The State of Wisconsin has chosen to
classify the first offense for driving while intoxicated as a
noncriminal, civil forfeiture offense for which no imprisonment is possible. See Wis. Stat. § 346. 65(2) (1975); id.,
§ 346.65(2)(a) (1981-82); supra, a t - . This is the best indication of the state's interest in precipitating an arrest, and is
one that can be easily identified both by the courts and by officers faced with a decision to arrest. See n. 6, supra.
Given this expression of the state's interest, a warrantless
home arrest cannot be upheld simply because evidence of the
petitioner's blood-alcohol level might have dissipated while
the police obtained a warrant. 14 To allow a warrantless home
14
Nor do we mean to suggest that the prevention of drunk driving is not
properly of major concern to the States. The State of Wisconsin, however, along with several other States, see, e. g., Minn. Stat. § 169.121
subd. 4 (1982); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 39-669.07(1) (Supp. 1982); S. D. Codified
Laws § 32-23-2 (Supp. 1983), has chosen to limit severely the penalties
that may be imposed after a first conviction for driving while intoxicated.
Given that the classification of state crimes differs widely among the
States, the penalty that may attach to any particular offense seems to pro-
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entry on these facts would be to approve unreasonable police
behavior that the principles of the Fourth Amendment will
not sanction.
III
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin let stand a warrantless,
nighttime entry into the petitioner's home to arrest him for
violation of a civil traffic offense. Such an arrest, however,
is clearly prohibited by the special protection afforded the individual in his home by the Fourth Amendment. The petitioner's arrest was therefore invalid, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin is vacated, and the case is
remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this
opinion. 15
It is so ordered.

vide the clearest and most consistent indication of the state's interest in
arresting individuals suspected of committing that offense.
5
' On remand, the state courts may consider whether the petitioner's arrest was justified because the police had validly obtained consent to enter
his home. Seen. 1, supra.
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BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573 (1980), held that, absent probable cause and exigent circumstances, warrantless
arrests in the home are prohibited by the Fourth Amendment. But the Court in that case explicitly refused "to consider the sort of emergency or dangerous situation, described
in our cases as 'exigent circumstances,' that would justify a
warrantless entry into a home for the purpose of either arrest
or search." !d., at 583. Certiorari was granted in this case
to decide at least one aspect of the unresolved question:
whether, and if so under what circumstances, the Fourth
Amendment prohibits the police from making a warrantless
night entry of a person's home in order to arrest him for violation of a nonjailable traffic offense.
I
A

Shortly before 9:00 p. m. on the rainy night of April 24,
1978, a lone witness, Randy Jablonic, observed a car being
driven erratically. After changing speeds and veering from
side to side, the car eventually swerved off the road and came
to a stop in an open field. No damage to any person or property occurred. Concerned about the driver and fearing that
the car would get back on the highway, Jablonic drove his
truck up behind the car so as to block it from returning to the
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road. Another passerby also stopped at the scene, and
J ablonic asked her to call the police. Before the police arrived, however, the driver of the car emerged from his vehicle, approached Jablonic's truck, and asked Jablonic for a ride
home. J ablonic instead suggested that they wait for assistance in removing or repairing the car. Ignoring Jablonic's
suggestion, the driver walked away from the scene.
A few minutes later, the police arrived and questioned
J ablonic. He told one officer what he had seen, specifically
noting that the driver was either very inebriated or very
sick. The officer checked the motor vehicle registration of
the abandoned car and learned that it was registered to the
petitioner, Edward G. Welsh. In addition, the officer noted
that the petitioner's residence was a short distance from the
scene, and therefore easily within walking distance.
Without securing any type of warrant, the police proceeded to the petitioner's home, arriving about 9:00 p. m.
When the petitioner's stepdaughter answered the door, the
police gained entry into the house. 1 Proceeding upstairs to
the petitioner's bedroom, they found him lying naked in bed.
At this point, the petitioner was placed under arrest for driving or operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of
an intoxicant, in violation of Wis. Stat. § 346. 63(1) (1977). 2
1
The state trial court never decided whether there was consent to the
entry because it deemed decision of that issue unnecessary in light of its
finding that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless arrest. After
reversing the lower coUrt's finding of exigent circumstances, the Wisconsin
Court of Appeals remanded for full consideration of the consent issue. See
State v. Welsh, No. 80-1686, App. 114-125. That remand never occurred,
however, because the Supreme Court of Wisconsin reversed its court of
appeals and reinstated the trial court's judgment. See State v. Welsh, 108
Wis. 2d 319, 321 N. W. 2d 245 (1982). For purposes of this decision,
therefore , we assume that there was no valid consent to enter the petitioner's home.
2
Since the petitioner's arrest, § 346.63 has been amended to provide
that it is a code violation to drive or operate a motor vehicle while under
the influence of an intoxicant or while evidencing certain blood- or breath-
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The petitioner was taken to the police station, where he refused to submit to a breathalyzer test.
B
As a result of these events, the petitioner was subjected to
two separate but related proceedings: one concerning his refusal to submit to a breath test and the other involving the
alleged code violation for driving while intoxicated. Under
the Wisconsin vehicle code in effect in April 1978, one arrested for driving while intoxicated under§ 346.63(1) could be
requested by a law enforcement officer to provide breath,
blood, or urine samples for the purpose of determining the
presence or quantity of alcohol. Wis. Stat. § 343.305(1)
(1975). If such a request was made, the arrestee was required to submit to the appropriate testing or risk a revocation of operating privileges. Cf. South Dakota v. Neville,
459 U. S. - - (1983) (admission into evidence of a defendant's refusal to submit to a blood-alcohol test does not offend
constitutional right against self-incrimination). The arrestee
could challenge the officer's request, however, by refusing to
undergo testing and then asking for a hearing to determine
whether the refusal was,justified. If, after the hearing, it
was determined that the refusal was not justified, the arrestee's operating privileges would be revoked for 60 days. 3
The statute also set forth specific criteria to be applied by a
court when determining whether an arrestee's refusal to take
alcohol levels. See Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(a)-(b) (1981-82). This amendment, however, has no bearing on the issues raised by the present case.
3
Since the petitioner's arrest, this statute also has been amended, with
the current version found at Wis. Stat. § 343.305 (1981-82). Although the
procedures to be followed by the law enforcement officer and the arrestee
have remained essentially unchanged, § 343.305(3), (8), the potential length
of any revocation of operating privileges has been increased, depending on
the arrestee's prior driving record, § 343.305(9)(a)-(b). An arrestee who
improperly refuses to submit to a required test may also be required to
comply with an assessment order and a driver safety plan.
§ 343.305(9)(c)-(e). These amendments, however, also have no direct
bearing on the issues raised by the present case .

...
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a breath test was justified. Included among these criteria
was a requirement that, before revoking the arrestee's operating privileges, the court determine that "the refusal ...
to submit to a test was unreasonable." § 343.305(2)(b)(5)
(1975). It is not disputed by the parties that an arrestee's
refusal to take a breath test would be reasonable, and therefore operating privileges could not be revoked, if the underlying arrest was not lawful. Indeed, state law has consistently
provided that a valid arrest is a necessary prerequisite to the
imposition of a breath test. See Scales v. State, 64 Wis. 2d
485, 494, 219 N. W. 2d 286, 292 (1974). 4 Although the stat' "The implied consent law does not limit the right to take a blood sample as an incident to a lawful arrest. It should be emphasized, however,
that the arrest, and therefore probable cause for making it, must precede
the taking of the blood sample. We conclude that the sample was constitutionally taken incident to the lawful arrest." 64 Wis. 2d, at 494, 219
N. W. 2d, at 292 (emphasis added).
Nor is there any doubt that the Supreme Court of Wisconsin applies federal constitutional standards when determining whether an arrest, even
for a nonjailable traffic offense, is lawful. The court, for example, explained the basis for its holding in this case as follows:
' "The trial court revoked the defendant's motor vehicle operator's license
for sixty days pursuant to his unreasonable refusal to submit to a breathalyzer test, as required by [state statute].
"The defendant challenges the officer's warrantless arrest in his residence as violating the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution. The [trial
court] upheld this warrantless arrest concluding that probable cause to believe that the defendant had been operating a motor vehicle while under
the influence of an intoxicant, coupled with the existence of exigent circumstances, justified the officers' entry into the defendant's residence. . . .
[T]he court of appeals reversed the trial court, holding that, although the
officers' warrantless arrest was unreasonable, thereby violating the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, the absence of a finding regarding
the consensual entry necessitated remanding the case on that issue. We
affirm the findings of the [trial court], holding that the co-existence of probable cause and exigent circumstances in this case justifies the warrantless
arrest ....
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ute in effect in April1978 referred to reasonableness, the current version of§ 343.305 explicitly recognizes that one of the
issues that an arrestee may raise at a refusal hearing is
"whether [he] was lawfully placed under arrest for violation
of s.346.63(1)." § 343.305(3)(b)(5)(a), (8)(b) (1981-82). See
also 67 Op. Wis. Atty. Gen. 93-78 (Dec. 27, 1978) ("statutory
scheme ... contemplates that a lawful arrest be made prior
to a request for submission to a test"). 5
Separate statutory provisions control the penalty that
might be imposed for the substantive offense of driving while
intoxicated. At the time in question, the vehicle code provided that a first offense for driving while intoxicated was a
noncriminal violation subject to a civil forfeiture proceeding
for a maximum fine of $200; a second or subsequent offense in
the previous five years was a potential misdemeanor that
could be punished by imprisonment for up to one year and a
maximum fine of $500. Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2) (1975). Since
that time, the State has made only minor amendments to
these penalty provisions. Indeed, the statute continues to
categorize a first offense as a civil v~olation that allows for
only a monetary forfeiture of no more than $300.
§ 346.65(2)(a) (1981-82). See State v. Albright, 98 Wis. 2d
663, 672-673, 298 N. W. 2d 196, 202 (App. 1980).
"To prevail in this case, the state must prove the co-existence of probable
cause and exigent circumstances, justifying the officer's conduct at the defendant's residence. We hold that there was ample evidence supporting
the trial court's ruling that the officer's entry was justified on the basis of
both probable cause and exigent circumstances. Entry to effect a warrantless arrest in a residence is subject to the limitations imposed by both
the United States and the Wisconsin Constitutions. U. S . Canst. amend.
IV; Wis. Canst. art. I, sec. 11." 108 Wis. 2d, at 320-321, 32~27, 321
N. W. 2d, at 246-247, 249--250 (emphasis added) (citations and footnotes
omitted).
5
Because state law provides that evidence of the petitioner's refusal to
submit to a breath test is inadmissible if the underlying arrest was unlawful, this case does not implicate the exclusionary rule under the Federal
Constitution.
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c
As noted, in this case the petitioner refused to submit to a
breath test; he subsequently filed a timely request for a refusal hearing. Before that hearing was held, however, the
State filed a criminal complaint against the petitioner for
driving while intoxicated. 6 The petitioner responded by filing a motion to dismiss the complaint, relying on his contention that the underlying arrest was invalid. After receiving
evidence at a hearing on this motion in July 1980, the trial
court concluded that the criminal complaint would not be dismissed because the existence of both probable cause and exigent circumstances justified the warrantless arrest. The decision at the refusal hearing, which was not held until
September 1980, was therefore preordained. In fact, the
primary issue at the refusal hearing-whether the petitioner
acted reasonably in refusing to submit to a breath test because he was, unlawfully placed under arrest, ·.see supra, at
3-5--had already been determined two months earlier by the
same trial court.
As expected, after the refusal hearing, the trial court concluded that .the arrest of the petitioner was lawful and that
the petitioner's refusal to take the breath test was therefore
unreasonable. 7 Accordingly, the court issued an order susThe petitioner was charged with a criminal misdemeanor because this
was his second such citation in the previous five years. See § 346. 65(2)
(1975). Although the petitioner was subject to a criminal charge, the police conducting the warrantless entry of his home did not know that the
petitioner had ever been charged with, or much less convicted of, a prior
violation for driving while intoxicated. It must be assumed, therefore,
that at the time of the arrest the police were acting as if they were investigating and eventually arresting for a nonjailable traffic offense that constituted only a civil violation under the applicable state law. See Beck v.
Ohio, 379 U. S. 89, 91, 96 (1964).
7
When ruling from the bench after the refusal hearing, the trial judge
specifically indicated:
"[T]he Court is bound by its earlier ruling that that was a valid arrest.
And, I think [counsel for the petitioner] certainly will have the right to
6
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pending the petitioner's operating license for 60 days. On
appeal, the suspension order was vacated by the Wisconsin
Court of Appeals. See State v. Welsh, No. 80-1686, App.
114-125. Contrary to the trial court, the appellate court
concluded that the warrantless arrest of the petitioner in his
home violated the Fourth Amendment because the State, although demonstrating probable cause to arrest, had not established the existence of exigent circumstances. The petitioner's refusal to submit to a breath test was therefore
reasonable. 8 The Supreme Court of Wisconsin in turn reversed the Court of Appeals, relying on the existence of
three factors that it believed constituted exigent circumstances: the need for "hot pursuit" of a suspect, the need to
prevent physical harm to the offender and the public, and the
need to prevent destruction of evidence. See State v.
Welsh, 108 Wis. 2d 319, 336-338, 321 N. W. 2d 245, 254-255
(1982). Because of the important Fourth Amendment implications of the decision below, we granted certiorari. 459
u.s.- (1983). 9
II
It is axiomatic that "the physical entry of the home is the
chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendchallenge that on appeal if he appeals this matter, as well as the previous
ruling should there be a conviction on the underlying charge." App. 111.
See also App. 112-113.
8
The court remanded the case for further findings as to whether the
police had entered the petitioner's home with consent. Seen. 1, supra.
9
Although the state courts differed in their respective conclusions concerning exigent circumstances, they each found that the facts known to the
police at the time of the warrantless home entry were sufficient to establish
probable cause to arrest. The petitioner has not challenged that finding
before this Court.
The parallel criminal proceedings against the petitioner, see supra, at 6,
and n. 6, resulted in a misdemeanor conviction for driving while intoxicated. During the jury trial, held in early 1982, the State introduced evidence of the petitioner's refusal to submit to a breath test. His appeal
from that conviction, now before the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, has been
stayed pending our decision in this case. See Brief for Petitioner 17, n. 5.
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ment is directed." United States v. United States District
Court, 407 U. S. 297, 313 (1972). And a principal protection
against unnecessary intrusions into private dwellings is the
warrant requirement imposed by the Fourth Amendment on
agents of the government who seek to enter the home for
purposes of search or arrest. See Johnson v. United States,
333 U. S. 10, 13-14 (1948). 10 It is not surprising, therefore,
that the Court has recognized, as "a 'basic principle of Fourth
Amendment law[,]' that searches and seizures inside a home
without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable."
Payton v. New York, 445 U. S., at 586. See Coolidge v.
New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 474-475 (1971) ("a search or
seizure carried out on a suspect's premises without a warrant
is per se unreasonable, unless the police can show . . . the
presence of 'exigent circumstances'"). See also Michigan v.
Clifford, - - U. S. - , (1984) (plurality opinion);
Steagald v. United States, 451 U. S. 204, 211-212 (1981); McDonald v. United States, 335 U. S. 451, 456 (1948); Johnson
v. United States, supra, at 13-15; Boyd v. United States, 116
u. s. 616, 630 (1886).
Consistently with these long-recognized principles, the
Court decided in Payton v. New York, supra, that warrantless felony arrests in the home are prohibited by the Fourth
0
' In Johnson, Justice Jackson eloquently explained the warrant requirement in the context of a home search:
"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by
zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the
usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and
detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the
often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime .... The right of officers to thrust themselves into a home is ... a grave concern, not only to
the individual but to a society which chooses to dwell in reasonable security
and freedom from surveillance. When the right of privacy must reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial
officer, not by a policeman or government enforcement agent." !d., at
13-14 (footnote omitted).
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Amendment, absent probable cause and exigent circumstances. ld., at 583-590. At the same time, the Court declined to consider the scope of any exception for exigent circumstances that might justify warrantless home arrests, id.,
at 583, thereby leaving to the lower courts the initial application of the exigent-circumstances exception. 11 Prior decisions of this Court, however, have emphasized that exceptions to the warrant requirement are "few in number and
carefully delineated," United States v. United States District
Court, 407 U. S., at 318, and that the police bear a heavy
burden when attempting to demonstrate an urgent need that
might justify warrantless searches or arrests. Indeed, the
Court has recognized only a few such emergency conditions,
see, e. g., United States v. Santana, 427 U. S. 38, 42-43
(1976) (hot pursuit of a fleeing felon); Warden v. Hayden, 387
U. S. 294, 298-299 (1967) (same); Schmerber v. California,
384 U. S. 757, 770-771 (1966) (destruction of evidence); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U. S. 499, 509 (1978) (ongoing fire), and
has actually applied only the "hot pursuit" doctrine to arrests
in the home, see Santana, supra.
Our hesitation in finding exigent circumstances, especially
when warrantless arrests in the home are at issue, is especially appropriate when the underlying offense for which
there is probable cause to arrest is relatively minor. Before
agents of the government may invade the sanctity of the
home, the burden is on the government to demonstrate exi- ~
gent circumstances that overcome the presumption of unreasonableness that attaches to all warrantless home entries.
See Payton v. New York, supra, at 586. When the govern11

Our decision in Payton, allowing warrantless home arrests upon a
showing of probable cause and exigent circumstances, was also expressly
limited to felony arrests. See, e. g., 445 U. S., at 574, 602. Because we
conclude that, in the circumstances presented by this case, there were no
exigent circumstances sufficient to justify a warrantless home entry, we
have no occasion to consider whether the Fourth Amendment may impose
an absolute ban on warrantless home arrests for certain minor .offenses.
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ment's interest is only to arrest for a minor offense, 12 that
presumption of unreasonableness is difficult to rebut, and the
government usually should be allowed to make such arrests
only with a warrant issued upon probable cause by a neutral
and detached magistrate.
This is not a novel idea. Writing in concurrence in M cDonald v. United States, 335 U. S. 451 (1948), Justice Jackson explained why a finding of exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless home entry should be severely restricted
when only a minor offense has been committed:
"Even if one were to conclude that urgent circumstances might justify a forced entry without a warrant,
no such emergency was present in this case. This
method of law enforcement displays a shocking lack of all
sense of proportion. Whether there is reasonable necessity for a search without waiting to obtain a warrant
certainly depends somewhat upon the gravity of the offense thought to be in progress as well as the hazards of
the method of attempting to reach it. . . . It is to me a
shocking proposition that private homes, even quarters
in a tenement, may be indiscriminately invaded at the
discretion of any suspicious police officer engaged in following up offenses that involve no violence or threats of
it. While I should be human enough to apply the letter
of the law with some indulgence to officers acting to deal
with threats or crimes of violence which endanger life or
security, it is notable that few of the searches found by
this Court to be unlawful dealt with that category of
crime. . . . While the enterprise of parting fools from
their money by the 'numbers' lottery is one that ought to
Even the dissenters in Payton, although believing that warrantless
home arrests are not prohibited by the Fourth Amendment, recognized the
importance of the felony limitation on such arrests. See 445 U. S., at 603,
61&-617 (WHITE, J. , dissenting) ("The felony requirement guards against
abusive or arbitrary enforcement and ensures that invasions of the home
occur only in case of the most s~rious crimes.").
12
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be suppressed, I do not think that its suppression is
more important to society than the security of the people
against unreasonable searches and seizures. When an
officer undertakes to act as his own magistrate, he ought
to be in a position to justify it by pointing to some real
immediate and serious consequences if he postponed action to get a warrant." I d., at 459-460 (Jackson, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
Consistently with this approach, the lower courts have
looked to the nature of the underlying offense as an important factor to be considered in the exigent-circumstances calculus. In a leading federal case defining exigent circumstances, for example, the en bane United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia recognized that the
gravity of the underlying offense was a principal factor to be
weighed. Dorman v. United States, 140 U. S. App. D. C.
313, 320, 435 F. 2d 385, 392 (1970). 13 Without approving all
of the factors included in the standard adopted by that court,
it is sufficient to note that many other lower courts have also
considered the gravity of the offense an important part of
their constitutional analysis.
For example, courts have permitted warrantless home ar. rests for major felonies if identifiable exigencies, independent
of the gravity of the offense, existed at the time of the arrest.
Compare United States v. Campbell, 581 F. 2d 22 (CA2 1978)
(allowing warrantless home arrest for armed robbery when
exigent circumstances existed), with Commonwealth v. Williams, 483 Pa. 293, 396 A. 2d 1177 (1978) (disallowing warrantless home arrest for murder due to absence of exigent
circumstances). But of those courts addressing the issue,
most have refused to permit warrantless home arrests for
See generally Donnino & Girese, Exigent Circumstances for a Warrantless Home Arrest, 45 Alb. L. Rev. 90 (1980); Harbaugh & Faust,
"Knock on Any Door"-Home Arrests After Payton and Steagald, 86
Dick. L. Rev. 191, 220-233 (1982); Note, Exigent Circumstances for War.rantless Home Arrests, 23 Ariz. L. Rev. 1171 (1981).
13
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nonfelonious crimes. See, e. g., State v. Guertin, 190 Conn.
440, 453, 461 A. 2d 963, 970 (1983) ("The [exigent circumstances] exception is narrowly drawn to cover cases of real
and not contrived emergencies. The exception is limited to
the investigation of serious crimes; misdemeanors are excluded."); People v. Strelow, 96 Mich. App. 182, 190-193, 292
N. W. 2d 517, 521-522 (1980). See also People v. Sanders,
59 Ill. App. 3d 6, 374 N. E. 2d 139 (1978) (burglary without
weapons not grave offense of violence for this purpose); State
v. Bennett, 295 N. W. 2d 5 (S. D. 1980) (distribution of controlled substances not a grave offense for these purposes).
But cf. State v. Penas, 200 Neb. 387, 263 N. W. 2d 835 (1978)
(allowing warrantless home arrest upon hot pursuit from
commission of misdemeanor in the officer's presence; decided
before Payton); State v. Niedermeyer, 48 Or. App. 665, 617
P. 2d 911 (1980) (allowing warrantless home arrest upon hot
pursuit from commission of misdemeanor in the officer's presence). The approach taken in these cases should not be surprising. Indeed, without necessarily approving any of these
particular holdings or considering every possible factual situation, we note that it is difficult to conceive of a warrantless
home arrest that would not be unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment when the underlying offense is extremely minor.
We therefore conclude that the commonsense approach utilized by most lower courts is required by the Fourth Amendment prohibition on "unreasonable searches and seizures,"
and hold that an important factor to be considered when
determining whether any exigency exists is the gravity of the
underlying offense for which the arrest is being made.
Moreover, although no exigency is created simply because
there is probable cause to believe that a serious crime has
been committed, see Payton, supra, application of the exigent-circumstances exception in the context of a home entry
should rarely be sanctioned when there is probable cause to
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believe that only a minor offense, such as the kind at issue in
this case, has been committed.
Application of this principle to the facts of the present case
is relatively straightforward. The petitioner was arrested in
the privacy of his own bedroom for a noncriminal, traffic offense. The State attempts to justify the arrest by relying on
the hot-pursuit doctrine, on the threat to public safety, and
on the need to preserve evidence of the petitioner's blood-alcohol level. On the facts of this case, however, the claim of
hot pursuit is unconvincing because there was no immediate
or continuous pursuit of the petitioner from the scene Qf a
crime. Moreover, because the petitioner had already arrived home, and had abandoned his car at the scene of the accident, there was little remaining threat to the public safety.
Hence, the only potential emergency claimed by the State
was the need to ascertain the petitioner's blood-alcohol level.
Even assuming, however, that the underlying facts would
support a finding of this exigent circumstance, mere similarity to other cases involving the imminent destruction of evidence is not sufficient. The State of Wisconsin has chosen to
classify the first offense for driving while intoxicated as a
noncriminal, civil forfeiture offense for which no imprisonment is possible. See Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2) (1975); id.,
§ 346.65(2)(a) (1981-82); supra, at 5. This is the best indication of the state's interest in precipitating an arrest, and is
one that can be easily identified both by the courts and by officers faced with a decision to arrest. See n. 6, supra.
Given this expression of the state's interest, a warrantless
home arrest cannot be upheld simply because evidence of the
petitioner's blood-alcohol level might have dissipated while
the police obtained a warrant. 14 To allow a warrantless home
14

Nor do we mean to suggest that the prevention of drunk driving is not
properly of major concern to the States. The State of Wisconsin, however, along with several other States, see, e. g., Minn. Stat. § 169.121
subd. 4 (1982); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 39-669.07(1) (Supp. 1982); S. D. Codified
Laws § 32-23-2 (Supp. 1983), has chosen to limit severely the penalties
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entry on these facts would be to approve unreasonable police
behavior that the principles of the Fourth Amendment will
not sanction.
III
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin let stand a warrantless,
nighttime entry into the petitioner's home to arrest him for
violation of ~ civil traffic offense. Such an arrest, however,
is clearly prohibited by the special protection afforded the individual in his home by the Fourth Amendment. The petitioner's arrest was therefore invalid, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin is vacated, and the case is
remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this
opinion. 15
It is so ordered.

that may be imposed after a first conviction for driving while intoxicated.
Given that the classification of state crimes differs widely among the
States, the penalty that may attach to any particular offense seems to provide the clearest and most consistent indication of the state's interest in
arresting individuals suspected of committing that offense.
15
On remand, the state courts may consider whether the petitioner's arrest was justified because the police had validly obtained consent to enter
his home. See n. 1, supra.
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JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573 (1980), held that, absent probable cause and exigent circumstances, warrantless
arrests in the home are prohibited by the Fourth Amendment. But the Court in that case explicitly refused "to consider the sort of emergency or dangerous situation, described
in our cases as 'exigent circumstances,' that would justify a
warrantless entry into a home for the purpose of either arrest
or search." Id., at 583. Certiorari was granted in this case
to decide at least one aspect of the unresolved question:
whether, and if so under what circumstances, the Fourth
Amendment prohibits the police from making a warrantless
night entry of a person's home in order to arrest him for violation of a nonjailable traffic offense.
I
A

Shortly before 9:00 p. m. on the rainy night of April 24,
1978, a lone witness, Randy J ablonic, observed a car being
driven erratically. After changing speeds and veering from
side to side, the car eventually swerved off the road and came
to a stop in an open field. No damage to any person or property occurred. Concerned about the driver and fearing that
the car would get back on the highway, J ablonic drove his
truck up behind the car so as to block it from returning to the
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road. Another passerby also stopped at the scene, and
J ablonic asked her to call the police. Before the police arrived, however, the driver of the car emerged from his vehicle, approached Jablonic's truck, and asked Jablonic for a ride
home. J ablonic instead suggested that they wait for assistance in removing or repairing the car. Ignoring Jablonic's
suggestion, the driver walked away from the scene.
A few minutes later, the police arrived and questioned
J ablonic. He told one officer what he had seen, specifically
noting that the driver was either very inebriated or very
sick. The officer checked the motor vehicle registration of
the abandoned car and learned that it was registered to the
petitioner, Edward G. Welsh. In addition, the officer noted
that the petitioner's residence was a short distance from the
scene, and therefore easily within walking distance.
Without securing any type of warrant, the police proceeded to the petitioner's home, arriving about 9:00 p. m.
When the petitioner's stepdaughter answered the door, the
police gained entry into the house.' Proceeding upstairs to
the petitioner's bedroom, they found him lying naked in bed.
At this point, the petitioner was placed under arrest for driving or operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of
an intoxicant, in violation of Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1) (1977). 2
' The state trial court never decided whether there was consent to the
entry because it deemed decision of that issue unnecessary in light of its
finding that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless arrest. After
reversing the lower court's finding of exigent circumstances, the Wisconsin
Court of Appeals remanded for full consideration of the consent issue. See
State v. Welsh, No. 80-1686, App. 114-125. That remand never occurred,
however, because the Supreme Court of Wisconsin reversed its court of
appeals and reinstated the trial court's judgment. See State v. Welsh, 108
Wis. 2d 319, 321 N. W. 2d 245 (1982). For purposes of this decision,
therefore, we assume that there was no valid consent to enter the petitioner's home.
2
Since the petitioner's arrest, § 346.63 has been amended to provide
that it is a code violation to drive or operate a motor vehicle while under
the influence of an intoxicant or while evidencing certain blood- or breath-
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The petitioner was taken to the police station, where he refused to submit to a breathalyzer test.
B
As a result of these events, the petitioner was subjected to
two separate but related proceedings: one concerning his refusal to submit to a breath test and the other involving the
alleged code violation for driving while intoxicated. Under
the Wisconsin vehicle code in effect in April 1978, one arrested for driving while intoxicated under§ 346.63(1) could be
requested by a law enforcement officer to provide breath,
blood, or urine samples for the purpose of determining the
presence or quantity of alcohol. Wis. Stat. § 343.305(1)
(1975). If such a request was made, the arrestee was required to submit to the appropriate testing or risk a revocation of operating privileges. Cf. South Dakota v. Neville,
459 U. S. - - (1983) (admission into evidence of a defendant's refusal to submit to a blood-alcohol test does not offend
constitutional right against self-incrimination). The arrestee
could challenge the officer's request, however, by refusing to
undergo testing and then asking for a hearing to determine
whether the refusal was justified. If, after the hearing, it
was determined that the refusal was not justified, the arrestee's operating privileges would be revoked for 60 days. 3
The statute also set forth specific criteria to be applied by a
court when determining whether an arrestee's refusal to take
alcohol levels. See Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(a)-(b) (1981-82). This amendment, however, has no bearing on the issues raised by the present case.
8
Since the petitioner's arrest, this statute also has been amended, with
the current version found at Wis. Stat. § 343.305 (1981-82). Although the
procedures to be followed by the law enforcement officer and the arrestee
have remained essentially unchanged, § 343.305(3), (8), the potential length
of any revocation of operating privileges has been increased, depending on
the arrestee's prior driving record , § 343.305(9)(a)-(b). An arrestee who
improperly refuses to submit to a required test may also be required to
comply with an assessment order and a driver safety plan.
§ 343.305(9)(c)-(e). These amendments, however, also have no direct
bearing on the issues raised by the present case.

..
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a breath test was justified. Included among these criteria
was a requirement that, before revoking the arrestee's op... ·
erating privileges, the court determine that "the refusal ...
to submit to a test was unreasonable." § 343.305(2)(b)(5)
(1975). It is not disputed by the parties that an arrestee's
refusal to take a breath test would be reasonable, and therefore operating privileges could not be revoked, if the underlying arrest was not lawful. Indeed, state law has consistently
provided that a valid arrest is a necessary prerequisite to the
imposition of a breath test. See Scales v. State, 64 Wis. 2d
485, 494, 219 N. W. 2d 286, 292 (1974).• Although the stat'"The implied consent law does not limit the right to take a blood sample as an incident to a lawful arrest. It should be emphasized, however,
that the arrest, and therefore probable cause for making it, must precede
the taking of the blood sample. We conclude that the sample was constitutionally taken incident to the lawful arrest." 64 Wts. 2d, at 494, 219
N. W. 2d, at 292 (emphasis added).
Nor is there any doubt that the Supreme Court of Wisconsin applies federal constitutional standards when determining whether an arrest, even
for a nonjailable traffic offense, is lawful. The court, for example, explained the basis for its holding in this case as follows:
"The trial court revoked the defendant's motor vehicle operator's license
for sixty days pursuant to his unreasonable refusal to submit to a breathalyzer test, as required by [state statute].
"The defendant challenges the officer's warrantless arrest in his residence as violating the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution. The [trial
court] upheld this warrantless arrest concluding that probable cause to believe that the defendant had been operating a motor vehicle while under
the influence of an intoxicant, coupled with the existence of exigent circumstances, justified the officers' entry into the defendant's residence ....
[T]he court of appeals reversed the trial court, holding that, although the
officers' warrantless arrest was unreasonable, thereby violating the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, the absence of a finding regarding
the consensual entry necessitated remanding the case on that issue. We
affirm the findings of the [trial court], holding that the co-existence of probable cause and exigent circumstances in this case justifies the warrantless
arrest .. . .
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ute in effect in April1978 referred to reasonableness, the current version of§ 343.305 explicitly "Fecognizes that one of the
issues that an arrestee may raise at a refusal hearing is
"whether [he] was lawfully placed under arrest for violation
of s.346.63(1)." § 343.305(3)(b)(5)(a), (8)(b) (1981-82). See
also 67 Op. Wis. Atty. Gen. 93-78 (Dec. 27, 1978) ("statutory
scheme ... contemplates that a lawful arrest be made prior
to a request for submission to a test"). 5
Separate statutory provisions control the penalty that
might be imposed for the substantive offense of driving while
intoxicated. At the time in question, the vehicle code provided that a first offense for driving while intoxicated was a
noncriminal violation subject to a civil forfeiture proceeding
for a maximum.fine of $200; a second or subsequent offense in
the previous five years was a potential misdemeanor that
could be punished by imprisonment for up to one year and a
maximum fine of $500. Wis. Stat. § 346. 65(2) (1975). Since
that time, the State has made only minor amendments to
these penalty provisions. Indeed, the statute continues to
categorize a first offense as a civil violation that allows for
only a monetary forfeiture of no more than $300.
§ 346.65(2)(a) (1981-82). See State v. Albright, 98 Wis. 2d
663, 672-673, 298 N. W. 2d 196, 202 (App. 1980).
"To prevail in this case, the state must prove the co-existence of probable
cause and exigent circumstances, justifying the officer's conduct at the defendant's residence. We hold that there was ample evidence supporting
the trial court's ruling that the officer's entry was justified on the basis of
both probable cause and exigent circumstances. Entry to effect a warrantless arrest in a residence is subject to the limitations imposed by both
the United States and the Wisconsin Constitutions. U. S. Canst. amend.
N; Wis. Canst. art. I, sec. 11." 108 Wis. 2d, at 320-321, 326-327, 321
N. W. 2d, at 24&-247, 249-250 (emphasis added) (citations and footnotes
omitted).
5
Because state law provides that evidence of the petitioner's refusal to
submit to a breath test is inadmissible if the underlying arrest was unlawful, this case does not implicate the exclusionary rule under the Federal
Constitution.
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c
As noted, in this case the petitioner refused to submit to a
breath test; he subsequently filed a timely request for a refusal hearing. Before that hearing was held, however, the
State filed a criminal complaint against the petitioner for
driving while intoxicated. 6 The petitioner responded by filing a motion to dismiss the complaint, relying on his contention that the underlying arrest was invalid. After receiving
evidence at a hearing on this motion in July 1980, the trial
court concluded that the criminal complaint would not be dismissed because the existence of both probable cause and exigent circumstances justified the warrantless arrest. The decision at the refusal hearing, which was not held until
September 1980, was therefore preordained. In fact, the
primary issue at the refusal hearing-whether the petitioner
acted reasonably in refusing to submit to a breath test because he was unlawfully placed under arrest, see supra, at
3-5--had already been determined two months earlier by the
same trial court.
As expected, after the refusal hearing, the trial court concluded that the arrest of the petitioner was lawful and that
the petitioner's refusal to take the breath test was therefore
unreasonable. Accordingly, the court issued an order sus7

6
The petitioner was charged with a criminal misdemeanor because this
was his second such citation in the previous five years. See § 346.65(2)
(1975). Although the petitioner was subject to a criminal charge, the police conducting the warrantless entry of his home did not know that the
petitioner had ever been charged with, or much less convicted of, a prior
violation for driving while intoxicated. It must be assumed, therefore,
that at the time of the arrest the police were acting as if they were investigating and eventually arresting for a nonjailable traffic offense that constituted only a civil violation under the applicable state law. See Beck v.
Ohio, 379 U. S. 89, 91, 96 (1964).
7
When ruling from the bench after the refusal hearing, the trial judge
specifically indicated:
"[T]he Court is bound by its earlier ruling that that was a valid arrest.
And, I think [counsel for the petitioner] certainly will have the right to
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pending the petitioner's operating license for 60 days. On
appeal, the suspension order was vacated by the Wisconsin
Court of Appeals. See State v. Welsh, No. 80-1686, App.
114-125. Contrary to the trial court, the appellate court
concluded that the warrantless arrest of the petitioner in his
home violated the Fourth Amendment because the State, although demonstrating probable cause to arrest, had not established the existence of exigent circumstances. The petitioner's refusal to submit to a breath test was therefore
reasonable. 8 The Supreme Court of Wisconsin in turn reversed the Court of Appeals, relying on the existence of
three factors that it believed constituted exigent circumstances: the need for "hot pursuit" of a suspect, the need to
prevent physical harm to the offender and the public, and the
need to prevent destruction of evidence. See State v.
Welsh, 108 Wis. 2d 319, 336-338, 321 N. W. 2d 245, 254-255
(1982). Because of the important Fourth Amendment implications of the decision below, we granted certiorari. 459
u. s.- (1983). 9
II

It is axiomatic that "the physical entry of the home is the
chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendchallenge that on appeal if he appeals this matter, as well as the preVious
ruling should there be a conviction on the underlying charge." App. 111.
See also App. 112-113.
8
The court remanded the case for further findings as to whether the
police had entered the petitioner's home with consent. See n. 1, supra.
9
Although the state courts differed in their respective conclusions concerning exigent circumstances, they each found that the facts known to the
police at the time of the warrantless home entry were sufficient to establish
probable cause to arrest. The petitioner has not challenged that finding
before this Court.
The parallel criminal proceedings against the petitioner, see supra, at 6,
and n. 6, resulted in a misdemeanor conviction for driving while intoxicated. During the jury trial, held in early 1982, the State introduced evidence of the petitioner's refusal to submit to a breath test. His appeal
from that conviction, now before the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, has been
stayed pending our decision in this case. See Brief for Petitioner 17, n. 5.
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ment is directed." United States v. United States District
Court, 407 U. S. 297, 313 (1972). And a principal protection
against unnecessary intrusions into private dwellings is the
warrant requirement imposed by the Fourth Amendment on
agents of the government who seek to enter the home for
purposes of search or arrest. See Johnson v. United States,
333 U. S. 10, 13-14 (1948).' 0 It is not surprising, therefore,
that the Court has recognized, as "a 'basic principle of Fourth
Amendment law[,]' that searches and seizures inside a home
without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable."
Payton v. New York, 445 U. S., at 586. See Coolidge v.
New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 474-475 (1971) ("a search or
seizure carried out on a suspect's premises without a warrant
is per se unreasonable, unless the police can show . . . the
presence of 'exigent circumstances'"). See also Michigan v.
Clifford, - - U. S. - - , - - (1984) (plurality opinion);
Steagald v. United States, 451 U. S. 204, 211-212 (1981); McDonald v. United States, 335 U. S. 451, 456 (1948); Johnson
v. United States, supra, at 13-15; Boyd v. United States, 116

u. s. 616, 630 (1886).

Consistently with these long-recognized principles, the
Court decided in Payton v. New York, supra, that warrantless felony arrests in the home are prohibited by the Fourth
10
In Johnson, Justice Jackson eloquently explained the warrant requirement in the context of a home search:
"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by
zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the
usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and
detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the
often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime .... The right of officers to thrust themselves into a home is ... a grave concern, not only to
the individual but to a society which chooses to dwell in reasonable security
and freedom from surveillance. When the right of privacy must reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial
officer, not by a policeman or government enforcement agent." Id., at
1~14 (footnote omitted).
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Amendment, absent probable cause and exigent circumstances. I d., at 58~90. At the same time, the Court declined to consider the scope of any exception for exigent circumstances that might justify warrantless home arrests, id.,
at 583, thereby leaving tothe lower courts the initial application of the exigent-circumstances exception. 11 Prior decisions of this Court, however, have emphasized that exceptions to the warrant requirement are "few in number and
carefully delineated," United States v. United States District
Court, 407 U. S., at 318, and that the police bear a heavy
burden when attempting to demonstrate an urgent need that
might justify warrantless searches or arrests. Indeed, the
Court has recognized only a few such emergency conditions,
see, e. g., United States v. Santana, 427 U. S. 38, 42-43
(1976) (hot pursuit of a fleeing felon); Warden v. Hayden, 387
U. S. 294, 298-299 (1967) (same); Schmerber v. California,
384 U. S. 757, 770-771 (1966) (destruction of evidence); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U. S. 499, 509 (1978) (ongoing fire), and
has actually applied only the "hot pursuit" doctrine to arrests
in the home, see Santana 1 supra.·
Our hesitation in finding exigent circumstances, especially
when warrantless arrests in the home are at issue, is especially appropriate when the underlying offense for which
there is probable cause to arrest is relatively minor. Before
agents of the government may invade the sanctity of the
home, the burden is on the government to demonstrate exigent circumstances that overcome the presumption of unreasonableness that attaches to all warrantless home entries.
See Payton v. New York, supra, at 586. When the govern11
Our decision in Payton, allowing warrantless home arrests upon a
showing of probable cause and exigent circumstances, was also expressly
limited to felony arrests. See, e. g., 445 U. S. , at 574, 602. Because we
conclude that, in the circumstances presented by this case, there were no
exigent circumstances sufficient to justify a warrantless home entry, we
have no occasion to consider whether the Fourth Amendment may impose
an absolute ban on warrantless home arrests for certain minor offenses.
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ment's interest is only to arrest for a minor offense, 12 that
presumption of unreasonableness is difficult to rebut, and the
government usually should be allowed to make such arrests
only with a warrant issued upon probable cause by a neutral
and detached magistrate.
· This is not a novel idea. Writing in concurrence in M cDonald v. United States, 335 U. S. 451 (1948), Justice Jackson explained why a finding of exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless home entry should be severely restricted
when only a minor offense has been committed:
"Even if one were to conclude that urgent circumstances might justify a forced entry without a warrant,
no such emergency was present in this case. This
method of law enforcement displays a shocking lack of all
sense of proportion. Whether there is reasonable necessity for a search without waiting to obtain a warrant
certainly depends somewhat upon the gravity of the offense thought to be in progress as well as the hazards of
the method of attempting to reach it. . . . It is to me a
sho£king proposition that private homes, even quarters
in a tenement, may be indiscriminately invaded at the
discretion of any suspicious police officer engaged in following up offenses that involve no violence or threats of
it. While I should be human enough to apply the letter
of the law with some indulgence to officers acting to deal
with threats or crimes of violence which endanger life or
security, it is notable that few of the searches found by
this Court to be unlawful dealt with that category of
crime. . . . While the enterprise of parting fools from
their money by the 'numbers' lottery is one that ought to
Even the dissenters in Payton, although believing that warrantless
home arrests are not prohibited by the Fourth Amendment, recognized the
importance of the felony limitation on such arrests. See 445 U. S., at 603,
616--617 (WHITE, J., dissenting) ("The felony requirement guards against
abusive or arbitrary enforcement and ensures that invasions of the home
occur only in case of the most serious crimes.").
12
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be suppressed, I do not think that its suppression is
more important to society than the security of the people
against unreasonable searches and seizures. When an
officer undertakes to act as his own magistrate, he ought
to be in a position to justify it by pointing to some real
immediate and serious consequences if he postponed action to get a warrant." I d., at 459-460 (Jackson, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
Consistently with this approach, the lower courts have
looked to the nature of the underlying offense as an important factor to be considered in the exigent-circumstances calculus. In a leading federal case defining exigent circumstances, for example, the en bane United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia recognized that the
gravity of the underlying offense was a principal factor to be
weighed. Dorman v. United States, 140 U. S. App. D. C.
313, 320, 435 F. 2d 385, 392 (1970).'3 Without approving all
of the factors included in the standard adopted by that court,
it is sufficient to note that many other lower courts have also
considered the gravity of the offense an important part of
their constitutional analysis.
For example, courts have permitted warrantless home arrests for major felonies if identifiable exigencies, independent
of the gravity of the offense, existed at the time of the arrest.
Compare United States v. Campbell, 581 F. 2d 22 (CA2 1978)
(allowing warrantless home arrest for armed robbery when
exigent circumstances existed), with Commonwealth v. Williams, 483 Pa. 293, 396 A. 2d 1177 (1978) (disallowing warrantless home arrest for murder due to absence of exigent
circumstances). But of those courts addressing the issue,
most have refused to permit warrantless home arrests for
18
See generally Donnino & Girese, Exigent Circumstances for a Warrantless Home Arrest, 45 Alb. L. Rev. 90 (1980); Harbaugh & Faust,
"Knock on Any Door"-Home Arrests After Payton and Steagald, 86
Dick. L. Rev. 191, 220-233 (1982); Note, Exigent Circumstances for Warrantless Home Arrests, 23 Ariz. L. Rev. 1171 (1981).
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nonfelonious crimes. See, e. g., State v. Guertin, 190 Conn.
440, 453, 461 A. 2d 963, 970 (1983) ("The [exigent circumstances] exception is narrowly drawn to cover cases of real
and not contrived emergencies. The exception is limited to
the investigation of serious crimes; misdemeanors are excluded."); People v. Strelow, 96 Mich. App. 182, 190-193, 292
N. W. 2d 517, 521-522 (1980). See also People v. Sanders,
59 Ill. App. 3d 6, 374 N. E. 2d 139 (1978) (burglary without
weapons not grave offense of violence for this purpose); State
v. Bennett, 295 N. W. 2d 5 (S. D. 1980) (distribution of controlled substances not a grave offense for these purposes).
But cf. State v. Penas, 200 Neb. 387, 263 N. ·W. 2d 835 (1978)
(allowing warrantless home arrest upon hot pursuit from
commission of misdemeanor in the officer's presence; decided
before Payton); State v. Niedermeyer, 48 Or. App. 665, 617
P. 2d 911 (1980) (allowing warrantless home arrest upon hot
pursuit from .commission of misdemeanor in the officer's presence). The approach taken in these cases should not be surprising. Indeed, without necessarily approving any of these
particular holdings or considering every possible factual situation, we note that it is difficult to conceive of a warrantless
home arrest that would not be unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment when the underlying offense is extremely minor.
We therefore conclude that the commonsense approach utilized by most lower courts is required by the Fourth Amendment prohibition on "unreasonable searches and seizures,"
and hold that an important factor to be considered when
determining whether any exigency exists is the gravity of the
underlying offense for which the arrest is being made.
Moreover, although no exigency is created simply because
there is probable cause to believe that a serious crime has
been committed, see Payton, supra, application of the exigent-circumstances exception in the context of a home entry
should rarely be sanctioned when there is probable cause to
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believe that only a minor offense, such as the kind at issue in
this case, has been committed.
Application of this principle to the facts of the present case
is relatively straightforward. The petitioner was arrested in
the privacy of his own bedroom for a noncriminal, traffic offense. The State attempts to justify the arrest by relying on
the hot-pursuit doctrine, on the threat to public safety, and
on the need to preserve evidence of the petitioner's blood-alcohol level. On the facts of this case, however, the claim of
hot pursuit is unconvincing because there was no immediate
or continuous pursuit of the petitioner from the scene of a
crime. Moreover, because the petitioner had already arrived home, and had abandoned his car at the scene of the accident, there was little remaining threat to the public safety.
Hence, the only potential emergency claimed by the State
was the need to ascertain the petitioner's blood-alcohol level.
Even assuming, however, that the underlying facts would
support a finding of this exigent circumstance, mere similarity to other cases involving the imminent destruction of evidence is not sufficient. The State of Wisconsin has chosen to
classify the first offense for driving while intoxicated as a
noncriminal, civil forfeiture offense for which no imprisonment is possible. See Wis. Stat. § 346. 65(2) (1975); id.,
§ 346.65(2)(a) (1981-82); supra, at 5. This is the best indication of the state's interest in precipitating an arrest, and is
one that can be easily identified both by the courts and by officers faced with a decision to arrest. See n. 6, supra.
Given this expression of the state's interest, a warrantless
home arrest cannot be upheld simply because evidence of the
petitioner's blood-alcohol level might have dissipated while
the police obtained a warrant. •• To allow a warrantless home
"Nor do we mean to suggest that the prevention of drunk driving is not
properly of major concern to the States. The State of Wisconsin, however, along with several other States, see, e. g., Minn. Stat. § 169.121
subd. 4 (1982); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 39-669.07(1) (Supp. 1982); S. D. Codified
Laws § 32-23-2 (Supp. 1983), has chosen to limit severely the penalties
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entry on these facts would be to approve unreasonable police
behavior that the principles of the Fourth Amendment will
not sanction.
III
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin let stand a warrantless,
nighttime entry into the petitioner's home to arrest him for
violation of a civil traffic offense. Such an arrest, however,
is clearly prohibited by the special protection afforded the individual in his home by the Fourth Amendment. The petitioner's arrest was therefore invalid, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin is vacated, and the case is
remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this
opinion.' 5
It is so ordered.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE would dismiss the writ as having been
improvidently granted and defer resolution of the question
presented to a more appropriate case.

that may be imposed after a first conviction for driving while intoxicated.
Given that the classification of state crimes differs widely among the
States, the penalty that may attach to any particular offense seems to provide the clearest and most consistent indication of the state's interest in
arresting individuals suspected of committing that offense.
" On remand, the state courts may consider whether the petitioner's arrest was justified because the police had validly obtained consent to enter
his home. See n. 1, supra.
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JUSTICE WHITE, dissenting.
At common law, "a peace officer was permitted to arrest
without a warrant for a misdemeanor or felony committed in
his presence as well as for a felony not committed in his presence if there was reasonable ground for making the arrest."
United States v. Watson, 423 U. S. 411, 418 (1976). But the
requirement that a misdemeanor must have occurred in the
officer's presence to justify a warrantless arrest is not
grounded in the Fourth Amendment, see Street v. Surdyka,
492 F. 2d 368, 371-372 (CA4 1974); 2 W. LaFave, Search and
Seizure § 5.1 (1978), and we have never held that a warrant is
constitutionally required to arrest for nonfelony offenses occurring out of the officer's presence. Thus, "it is generally
recognized today that the common law authority to arrest
without a warrant in misdemeanor cases may be enlarged by
statute, and this has been done in many of the states."
E. Fisher, Laws of Arrest 130 (1967); see ALI, A Model
Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure, App. X (1975); 1 C. Alexander, The Law of Arrest 445-447 (1949); Wilgas, Arrest
Without a Warrant, 22 Mich. L. Rev. 541, 673, 706 (1924).
Wisconsin is one of the states that have expanded the common-law authority to arrest for nonfelony offenses. Section
345.22 of the Wisconsin Statutes provides that "[a] person
may be arrested without a warrant for the violation of a traffic regulation if the traffic officer has reasonable grounds to
believe that the person is violating or has violated a traffic
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regulation." Relying on this statutory authority, officers of
the Madison Police Department arrested Edward Welsh in a
bedroom in his home for violating Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)
(1977), which proscribes the operation of a motor vehicle
while intoxicated. Welsh refused to submit to a breath or
blood test, and his operator's ·license was eventually revoked
for 60 days for this reason pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 343.305
(1975).
In the civil license revocation proceeding, Welsh argued
that his arrest in his house without a warrant was unconstitutional under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
Federal Constitution and that his refusal to submit to the test
could not be used against him. This contention was not
based on the proposition that using the refusal in the revocation proceeding would contravene federal law, but rather
rested on the fact that Wis. Stat. § 343.305(2)(b)(5) (1975) had
been interpreted to require that an arrest be legal if a refusal
to be tested is to be the basis for a license revocation.
On review of the license revocation, the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin appears to have recognized that, under the Wisconsin statute, Welsh's license was wrongfully revoked if the
officers who arrested him had violated the Federal Constitution. 108 Wis. 2d 319, 321 N. W. 2d 245 (1982). See Scales
v. State, 64 Wis. 2d 485, 494, 219 N. W. 2d 286, 292 (1974).
The court acknowledged that "the individual's right to privacy in the home is a fundamental freeedom" and made clear
that the state bore the burden of establishing exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless in-home arrest. 108 Wis.
2d, at 327, 321 N. W. 2d, at 250. But it discerned a strong
state interest in combating driving under the influence of alcohol, id., at 334-335, 321 N. W. 2d, at 253-254, and held
that the warrantless arrest was proper because (1) the officers were in hot pursuit of a defendant seeking to avoid a
chemical sobriety test; (2) Welsh posed a potential threat to
public safety; and (3) "without an immediate blood alcohol
test, highly reliable and persuasive evidence facilitating the
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state's proof of [Welsh's] alleged violation ... would be destroyed." !d., at 338, 321 N. W. 2d, at 255. For two reasons, I would not overturn the judgment of the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin.
First, it is not at all clear to me that the important constitutional question decided today should be resolved in a
case such as this. Although Welsh argues vigorously that
the State violated his federal constitutional rights, he at no
point relied on the exclusionary rule, and he does not contend
that the Federal Constitution or federal law provides the
remedy he seeks. As a general rule, this Court "reviews
judgments, not statements in opinions." Black v. Cutter
Laboratories, 351 U. S. 292, 297 (1956). Because the Court
does not purport to hold that federal law requires the conclusion that Welsh's refusal to submit to a sobriety test was reasonable, it is not clear to me how the judgment of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin offends federal law.
It is true that under the Wisconsin statutory scheme, an
arrestee's refusal to take a breath or blood test would be reasonable and would not justify revocation of operating privileges if the underlying arrest violated the Fourth Amendment or was otherwise unlawful. What the State has done,
' I however, is to attach consequences to an arrest found unlaw( ful under the Federal Constitution that we have never de• cided federal law itself would attach. The Court has occasionally taken jurisdiction over cases in which the States
have provided remedies for violations of federally defined obligations. E. g., Moore v. Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co., 291
U. S. 205 (1934). But it has done so in contexts where state
remedies are employed to further federal policies. See
Greene, Hybrid State Law in the Federal Courts, 83 Harv.
L. Rev. 289, 300 (1969). The Fourth Amendment of course
applies to the police conduct at issue here. In providing that
a driver may reasonably refuse to submit to a sobriety test if
he was unlawfully arrested, Wisconsin's Legislature and
courts are pursuing a course that they apparently hope will
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reduce police illegality and safeguard their citizens' rights.
Although the State is entitled to draw this conclusion and to
implement it as a matter of state law, I am very doubtful that
the policies underlying the Fourth Amendment would require exclusion of the fruits of an illegal arrest in a civil
proceeding to remove from the highways a person who insists
on driving while under the influence of alcohol. Cf. INS v. -- :Jt~;<A
Lopez-Mendoza, U.S. (1984). If that is the
case-if it would violate no federal policy to revoke Welsh's
license even if his arrest was illegal-there is no satisfactory
reason for us to review the Supreme Court of Wisconsin's
judgment affirming the revocation, even if that court mistakenly applied the Fourth Amendment. For me, this is amp~
e
~
reason not to disturb the judgment of the Supreme Court of
,l
Wisconsin.
In any event, I believe that the state court properly construed the Fourth Amendment. It follows from Payton v.
New York, 445 U. S. 573 (1980), that warrantless nonfelony
arrests in the home are prohibited by the Fourth Amendment absent probable cause and exigent circumstances. Although I continue to believe that the Court erred in Payton
in requiring exigent circumstances to justify warrantless inhome felony arrests, id., at 603 (WHITE, J., dissenting), I do
not reject the obvious logical implication of the Court's decision. But I see little to commend an approach that looks to
"the nature of the underlying offense as an important factor
to be considered in the exigent-circumstances calculus."
Ante, at 11.
The gravity of the underlying offense is, I concede, a factor
to be considered in determining whether the delay that attends the warrant-issuance process will endanger officers or
other persons. The seriousness of the offense with which a
suspect may be charged also bears on the likelihood that he
will flee and escape apprehension if not arrested immediately. But if, under all the circumstances of a particular
case, an officer has probable cause to believe that the delay
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involved in procuring an arrest warrant will gravely endanger the officer or other persons or will result in the suspect's
escape, I perceive no reason to disregard those exigencies on
the ground that the offense for which the suspect is sought is
a "minor" one.
As a practical matter, I sUspect, the Court's holding is
likely to have a greater impact in cases where the officer
acted without a warrant to prevent the imminent destruction
or removal of evidence. If the evidence the destruction or
removal of which is threatened documents only the suspect's
participation in a "minor" crime, the Court apparently would
preclude a finding that exigent circumstances justified the
warrantless arrest. I do not understand why this should be
so.
A warrantless home entry to arrest is no more intrusive
when the crime in "minor" than when the suspect is sought in
connection with a serious felony. The variable factor, if
there is one, is the governmental interest that will be served
by the warrantless entry. Wisconsin's Legislature and its
Supreme Court have both concluded that warrantless inhome arrests under circumstances like those present here
promote valid and substantial state interests. In determining whether the challenged governmental conduct was reasonable, we are not bound by these determinations. But
nothing in our previous decisions suggests that the fact that a
State has defined an offense as a misdemeanor for a variety of
social, cultural, and political reasons necessarily requires the
conclusion that warrantless in-home arrests designed to prevent the imminent destruction or removal of evidence of that
offense are always impermissible. If anything, the Court's
prior decisions support the opposite conclusion.
See
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523, 539-540 (1967);
McDonald v. United States, 335 U. S. 451, 454-455 (1948).
See also State v. Penas, 200 Neb. 387, 263 N. W. 2d 835
(1978); State v. Niedermeyer, 48 Or. App. 665, 617 P. 2d 911
(1980), cert. denied, 450 U. S. 1042 (1981).
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A test under which the existence of exigent circumstances
turns on the perceived gravity of the crime would significantly hamper law enforcement and burden courts with
pointless litigation concerning the nature and gradation of
various crimes. The Court relies heavily on Justice Jackson's concurring opinion in · McDonald v. United States,
supra, which, in minimizing the gravity of the felony at issue
there, illustrates that the need for an evaluation of the seriousness of particular crimes could not be confined to offenses
defined by statute as misdemeanors. To the extent that the
Court implies that the seriousness of a particular felony is a
factor to be considered in deciding whether the need to preserve evidence of that felony constitutes an exigent circumstance justifying a warrantless in-home arrest, I think that
its approach is misguided. The decision to arrest without a
warrant typically is made in the field under less-than-optimal
circumstances; officers have neither the time nor the competence to determine whether a particular offense for which
warrantless arrests have been authorized by statute is serious enough to justify a warrantless home entry to prevent
the imminent destruction or removal of evidence.
This problem could be lessened by creating a bright-line
distinction between felonies and other crimes, but the
Court-wisely in my view-does not adopt such an approach.
There may have been a time when the line between misdemeanors and felonies marked off those offenses involving a
sufficiently serious threat to society to justify warrantless inhome arrests under exigent circumstances. But the category of misdemeanors today includes enough serious offenses
to call into question the desirability of such line drawing.
See ALI, Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedures
131-132 (Prelim. Draft No. 1, 1965) (discussing ultimately rejected provision abandoning "in-presence" requirement for
misdemeanor arrests). If I am correct in asserting that a
bright-line distinction between felonies and misdemeanors is
untenable and that the need to prevent the imminent de-
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struction or removal of evidence of some nonfelony crimes
can constitute an exigency justifying warrantless in-home arrests under certain circumstances, the Court's approach will
necessitate a case-by-case evaluation of the seriousness of
particular crimes, a difficult task for which officers and courts
are poorly equipped.
Even if the Court were correct in concluding that the gravity of the offense is an important factor to consider in determining whether a warrantless in-home arrest is justified by
exigent circumstances, it has erred in assessing the seriousness of the civil-forfeiture offense for which the officers
thought they were arresting Welsh. As the Court observes,
the statutory scheme in force at the time of Welsh's arrest
provided that the first offense for driving under the influence
of alcohol involved no potential incarceration. Wis. Stat.
§ 346.65(2) (1975). Nevertheless, this Court has long recognized the compelling state interest in highway safety, South
Dakota v. Neville,-- U.S.--,-- (1983), the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin identified a number of factors suggesting
a substantial and growing governmental interest in apprehending and convicting intoxicated drivers and in deterring
alcohol-related offenses, 108 Wis. 2d, at 334-335, 321 N. W.
2d, at 253-254, and recent actions of the Wisconsin Legislature evince its "belief that significant benefits, in the reduction of the costs attributable to drunk driving, may be
achieved by the increased apprehension and conviction of
even first time ... offenders." Note, 1983 Wis. L. Rev.
1023, 1053.
The Court ignores these factors and looks solely to the penalties imposed on first offenders in determining whether the
State's interest is sufficient to justify warrantless in-home arrests under exigent circumstances. Ante, at 13-14. Although the seriousness of the prescribed sanctions is a valuable objective indication of the general normative judgment
of the seriousness of the offense, Baldwin v. New York, 399
U. S. 66, 68 (1970) (plurality opinion), other evidence is avail-

,
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able and should not be ignored. United States v. Craner,
652 F. 2d 23, 24-27 (CA9 1981); United States v. Woods, 450
F. Supp. 1335, 1340 (Md. 1978); Brady v. Blair, 427 F. Supp.
5, 9 (SD Ohio 1976). Although first offenders are subjected
only to civil forfeiture under the Wisconsin statute, the seriousness with which the State regards the crime for which
Welsh was arrested is evinced by (1) the fact that defendants
charged with driving under the influence are guaranteed the
right to a jury trial, Wis. Stat. § 345.43 (1981-82); (2) the legislative authorization of warrantless arrests for traffic offenses occurring outside the officer's presence, Wis. Stat.
345.22 (1981-82); and (3) the collateral consequence of mandatory license revocation that attaches to all convictions for
driving under the influence, Wis. Stat. § 343,30 (1q)
(1981-82). See also District of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U. S.
63 (1930); United States v. Craner, supra. It is possible,
moreover, that the Legislature consciously chose to limit the
penalties imposed on first offenders in order to increase the
ease of conviction and the overall deterrent effect of the enforcement effort. See Note, 35 Me. L. Rev. 385, 395, n. 35,
399--400, 403 (1983).
In short, the fact that Wisconsin has chosen to punish the
first offense for driving under the influence with a fine rather
than a prison term does not demand the conclusion that the
State's interest in punishing first offenders is insufficiently
substantial to justify warrantless in-home arrests under exigent circumstances. As the Supreme Court of Wisconsin observed, "[t]his is a model case demonstrating the urgency
involved in arresting the suspect in order to preserve evidence of the statutory violation." 108 Wis. 2d, at 338, 321
N. W. 2d, at 255. We have previously recognized that "the
percentage of alcohol in the blood begins to diminish shortly
after drinking stops, as the body functions to eliminate it
from the -system." Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S. 757,
770 (1966). Moreover, a suspect could cast substantial doubt
on the validity of a blood or breath test by consuming addi-
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tional alcohol upon arriving at his home. In light of the
promptness with which the officers reached Welsh's house,
therefore, I would hold that the need to prevent the imminent and ongoing destruction of evidence of a serious violation of Wisconsin's traffic laws provided an exigent circumstance justifying the warrantless in-home arrest. See also,
e. g., People v. Ritchie, 181 Cal. Rptr. 773, 130 Cal. App. 3d
455 (1982); People v. Smith, 175 Colo. 212, 486 P. 2d 8 (1971);
State v. Findlay, 259 Iowa 733, 145 N. W. 2d 650 (1966);
State v. Amaniera, 132 N.J. Super. 597, 334 A. 2d 398
(1974); State v. Osburn, 13 Or. App. 92, 508 P. 2d 837 (1973).
I respectfully dissent.
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JUSTICE WHITE, with whom JUSTICE REHNQUIST joins, {
dissenting.
At common law, "a peace officer was permitted to arrest
without a warrant for a misdemeanor or felony committed in
his presence as well as for a felony not committed in his presence if there was reasonable ground for making the arrest."
United States v. Watson, 423 U. S. 411, 418 (1976). But the
requirement that a misdemeanor must have occurred in the
officer's presence to justify a warrantless arrest is not
grounded in the Fourth Amendment, see Street v. Surdyka,
492 F. 2d 368, 371-372 (CA4 1974); 2 W. LaFave, Search and
Seizure § 5.1 (1978), and we have never held that a warrant is
constitutionally required to arrest for nonfelony offenses occurring out of the officer's presence. Thus, "it is generally
recognized today that the common law authority to arrest
without a warrant in misdemeanor cases may be enlarged by
statute, and this has been done in many of the states."
E. Fisher, Laws of Arrest 130 (1967); see ALI, A Model
Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure, App. X (1975); 1 C. Alexander, The Law of Arrest 445-447 (1949); Wilgas, Arrest
Without a Warrant, 22 Mich. L. Rev. 541, 673, 706 (1924).
Wisconsin is one of the states that have expanded the common-law authority to arrest for nonfelony offenses. Section
345.22 of the Wisconsin Statutes provides that "[a] person
may be arrested without a warrant for the violation of a traffic regulation if the traffic officer has reasonable grounds to
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believe that the person is violating or has violated a traffic
regulation." Relying on this statutory authority, officers of
the Madison Police Department arrested Edward Welsh in a
bedroom in his home for violating Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)
(1977) which proscribes the operation of a motor vehicle while
intoxicated. Welsh refused to submit to a breath or blood
test, and his operator's license was eventually revoked for 60
days for this reason pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 343.305 (1975).
In the civil license revocation proceeding, Welsh argued
that his arrest in his house without a warrant was unconstitutional under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
Federal Constitution and that his refusal to submit to the test
could not be used against him. This contention was not
based on the proposition that using the refusal in the revocation proceeding would contravene federal law, but rather
rested on the fact that Wis. Stat. § 343.305(2)(b)(5) (1975) had
been interpreted to require that an arrest be legal if a refusal
to be tested is to be the basis for a license revocation.
On review of the license revocation, the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin appears to have recognized that, under the Wisconsin statute, Welsh's license was wrongfully revoked if the
officers who arrested him had violated the Federal Constitution. 108 Wis. 2d 319, 321 N. W. 2d 245 (1982). See Scales
v. State, 64 Wis. 2d 485, 494, 219 N. W. 2d 286, 292 (1974).
The court acknowledged that "the individual's right to privacy in the home is a fundamental freeedom" and made clear
that the state bore the burden of establishing exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless in-home arrest. 108 Wis.
2d, at 327, 321 N. W. 2d, at 250. But it discerned a strong
state interest in combating driving under the influence of alcohol, id., at 334-335, 321 N. W. 2d, at 253-254, and held
that the warrantless arrest was proper because (1) the officers were in hot pursuit of a defendant seeking to avoid a
chemical sobriety test; (2) Welsh posed a potential threat to
public safety; and (3) "without an immediate blood alcohol
test, highly reliable and persuasive evidence facilitating the
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state's proof of [Welsh's] alleged violation . .. . would be destroyed." !d., at 338, 321 N. W. 2d, at 255. For two reasons, I would not overturn the judgment of the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin.
First, it is not at all clear to me that the important constitutional question decided today should be resolved in a
case such as this. Although Welsh argues vigorously that
the State violated his federal constitutional rights, he at no
point relied on the exclusionary rule, and he does not contend
that the Federal Constitution or federal law provides the
remedy he seeks. As a general rule, this Court "reviews
judgments, not statements in opinions." Black v. Cutter
Laboratories, 351 U. S. 292, 297 (1956). Because the Court
does not purport to hold that federal law requires the conclusion that Welsh's refusal to submit to a sobriety test was reasonable, it is not clear to me how the judgment of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin offends federal law.
It is true that under the Wisconsin statutory scheme, an
arrestee's refusal to take a breath or blood test would be reasonable and would not justify revocation of operating privileges if the underlying arrest violated the Fourth Amendment or was otherwise unlawful. What the State has done,
however, is to attach consequences to an arrest found unlawful under the Federal Constitution that we have never decided federal law itself would attach. The Court has occasionally taken jurisdiction over cases in which the States
have provided remedies for violations of federally defined obligations. E. g. , Moore v. Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co., 291
U. S. 205 (1934). But it has done so in contexts where state
remedies are employed to further federal policies. See
Greene, Hybrid State Law in the Federal Courts, 83 Harv.
L. Rev. 289, 300 (1969). The Fourth Amendment of course
applies to the police conduct at issue here. In providing that
a driver may reasonably refuse to submit to a sobriety test if
he was unlawfully arrested, Wisconsin's Legislature and
courts are pursuing a course that they apparently hope will
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reduce police illegality and safeguard their citizens' rights.
Although the State. is entitled to draw this conclusion and to
implement it as a matter of state law, I am very doubtful that
the policies underlying the Fourth Amendment would require exclusion of the fruits of an illegal arrest in a civil
proceeding to remove from the highways a person who insists
on driving while under the influence of alcohol. Cf. INS v.
Lopez-Mendoza, - - U. S. - - (1984). If that is the
case-if it would violate no federal policy to revoke Welsh's
license even if his arrest was illegal-there is no satisfactory
reason for us to review the Supreme Court of Wisconsin's
judgment affirming the revocation, even if that court mistakenly applied the Fourth Amendment. For me, this is ample
reason not to disturb the judgment.
In any event, I believe that the state court properly construed the Fourth Amendment. It follows from Payton v.
New York, 445 U. S. 573 (1980), that warrantless nonfelony
arrests in the home are prohibited by the Fourth Amendment absent probable cause and exigent circumstances. Although I continue to believe that the Court erred in Payton
in requiring exigent circumstances to justify warrantless inhome felony arrests, id., at 603 (WHITE, J., dissenting), I do
not reject the obvious logical implication of the Court's decision. But I see little to commend an approach that looks to
"the nature of the underlying offense as an important factor
to be considered in the exigent-circumstances calculus."
Ante, at 11.
The gravity of the underlying offense is, I concede, a factor
to be considered in determining whether the delay that attends the warrant-issuance process will endanger officers or
other persons. The seriousness of the offense with which a
suspect may be charged also bears on the likelihood that he
will flee and escape apprehension if not arrested immediately. But if, under all the circumstances of a particular
case, an officer has probable cause to believe that the delay
involved in procuring an arrest warrant will gravely endan-
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ger the officer or other persons or will result in the suspect's
escape, I perceive no reason to disregard those exigencies on
the ground that the offense for which the suspect is sought is
a "minor" one.
As a practical matter, I suspect, the Court's holding is
likely to have a greater impact in cases where the officer
acted without a warrant to prevent the imminent destruction
or removal of evidence. If the evidence the destruction or
removal of which is threatened documents only the suspect's
participation in a "minor" crime, the Court apparently would
preclude a finding that exigent circumstances justified the
warrantless arrest. I do not understand why this should be
so.
A warrantless home entry to arrest is no more intrusive
when the crime in "minor" than when the suspect is sought in
connection with a serious felony. The variable factor, if
there is one, is the governmental interest that will be served
by the warrantless entry. Wisconsin's Legislature and its
Supreme Court have both concluded that warrantless inhome arrests under circumstances like those present here
promote valid and substantial state interests. In determining whether the challenged governmental conduct was reasonable, we are not bound by these determinations. But
nothing in our previous decisions suggests that the fact that a
State has defined an offense as a misdemeanor for a variety of
social, cultural, and political reasons necessarily requires the
conclusion that warrantless in-home arrests designed to prevent the imminent destruction or removal of evidence of that
offense are always impermissible. If anything, the Court's
prior decisions support the opposite conclusion.
See
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523, 539-540 (1967);
McDonald v. United States, 335 U. S. 451, 454-455 (1948).
See also State v. Penas, 200 Neb. 387, 263 N. W. 2d 835
(1978); State v. Niedermeyer, 48 Or. App. 665, 617 P. 2d 911
(1980), cert. denied, 450 U. S. 1042 (1981).
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A test under which the existence of exigent circumstances
turns on the perceived gravity of the crime would significantly hamper law enforcement and burden courts with
pointless litigation concerning the nature and gradation of
various crimes. The Court relies heavily on Justice Jackson's concurring opinion in McDonald v. United States,
supra, which, in minimizing the gravity of the felony at issue
there, illustrates that the need for an evaluation of the seriousness of particular crimes could not be confined to offenses
defined by statute as misdemeanors. To the extent that the
Court implies that the seriousness of a particular felony is a
factor to be considered in deciding whether the need to preserve evidence of that felony constitutes an exigent circumstance justifying a warrantless in-home arrest, I think that
its approach is misguided. The decision to arrest without a
warrant typically is made in the field under less-than-optimal
circumstances; officers have neither the time nor the competence to determine whether a particular offense for which
warrantless arrests have been authorized by statute is serious enough to justify a warrantless home entry to prevent
the imminent destruction or removal of evidence.
This problem could be lessened by creating a bright-line
distinction between felonies and other crimes, but the
Court-wisely in my view--does not adopt such an approach.
There may have been a time when the line between misdemeanors and felonies marked off those offenses involving a
sufficiently serious threat to society to justify warrantless inhome arrests under exigent circumstances. But the category of misdemeanors today includes enough serious offenses
to call into question the desirability of such line drawing.
See ALI, Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedures
131-132 (Prelim. Draft No. 1, 1965) (discussing ultimately rejected provision abandoning "in-presence" requirement for
misdemeanor arrests). If I am correct in asserting that a
bright-line distinction between felonies and misdemeanors is
untenable and that the need to prevent the imminent de-
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struction or removal of evidence of some nonfelony crimes
can constitute an exigency justifying warrantless in-home arrests under certain circumstances, the Court's approach will
necessitate a case-by-case evaluation of the seriousness of
particular crimes, a difficult task for which officers and courts
are poorly equipped.
Even if the Court were correct in concluding that the gravity of the offense is an important factor to consider in determining whether a warrantless in-home arrest is justified by
exigent circumstances, it has erred in assessing the seriousness of the civil-forfeiture offense for which the officers
thought they were arresting Welsh. As the Court observes,
the statutory scheme in force at the time of Welsh's arrest
provided that the first offense for driving under the influence
of alcohol involved no potential incarceration. Wis. Stat.
§ 346.65(2) (1975). Nevertheless, this Court has long recognized the compelling state interest in highway safety, South
Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S.--,-- (1983), the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin identified a number of factors suggesting
a substantial and growing governmental interest in apprehending and convicting intoxicated drivers and in deterring
alcohol-related offenses, 108 Wis. 2d, at 334-335, 321 N. W.
2d, at 253--254, and recent actions of the Wisconsin Legislature evince its "belief that significant benefits, in the reduction of the costs attributable to drunk driving, may be
achieved by the increased apprehension and conviction of
even first time . . . offenders." Note, 1983 Wis. L. Rev.
1023, 1053.
The Court ignores these factors and looks solely to the penalties imposed on first offenders in determining whether the
State's interest is sufficient to justify warrantless in-home arrests under exigent circumstances. Ante, at 13--14. Although the seriousness of the prescribed sanctions is a valuable objective indication of the general normative judgment
of the seriousness of the offense, Baldwin v. New York, 399
U. S. 66, 68 (1970) (plurality opinion), other evidence is avail-
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able and should not be ignored. United States v. Craner,
652 F. 2d 23, 24-27 (CA9 1981); United States v. Woods, 450
F. Supp. 1335, 1340 (Md. 1978); Brady v. Blair, 427 F. Supp.
5, 9 (SD Ohio 1976). Although first offenders are subjected
only to civil forfeiture under the Wisconsin statute, the seriousness with which the State regards the crime for which
Welsh was arrested is evinced by (1) the fact that defendants
charged with driving under the influence are guaranteed the
right to a jury trial, Wis. Stat. § 345.43 (1981--82); (2) the legislative authorization of warrantless arrests for traffic offenses occurring outside the officer's presence, Wis. Stat.
345.22 (1981--82); and (3) the collateral consequence of mandatory license revocation that attaches to all convictions for
driving under the influence, Wis. Stat. § 343.30(1q)
(1981--82). See also District of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U. S.
63 (1930); United States v. Craner, supra. It is possible,
moreover, that the Legislature consciously chose to limit the
penalties imposed on first offenders in order to increase the
ease of conviction and the overall deterrent effect of the enforcement effort. See Note, 35 Me. L. Rev. 385, 395, n. 35,
399-400, 403 (1983).
In short, the fact that Wisconsin has chosen to punish the
first offense for driving under the influence with a fine rather
than a prison term does not demand the conclusion that the
State's interest in punishing first offenders is insufficiently
substantial to justify warrantless in-home arrests under exigent circumstances. As the Supreme Court of Wisconsin observed, "[t]his is a model case demonstrating the urgency
involved in arresting the suspect in order to preserve evidence of the statutory violation." 108 Wis. 2d, at 338, 321
N. W. 2d, at 255. We have previously recognized that "the
percentage of alcohol in the blood begins to diminish shortly
after drinking stops, as the body functions to eliminate it
from the system." Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S. 757,
770 (1966). Moreover, a suspect could cast substantial doubt
on the validity of a blood or breath test by consuming addi-
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tional alcohol upon arriving at his home. In light of the
promptness with which the officers reached Welsh's house,
therefore, I would hold that the need to prevent the imminent and ongoing destruction of evidence of a serious violation of Wisconsin's traffic laws provided an exigent circumstance justifying the warrantless in-home arrest. See also,
e. g., People v. Ritchie, 181 Cal. Rptr. 773, 130 Cal. App. 3d
455 (1982); People v. Smith, 175 Colo. 212, 486 P. 2d 8 (1971);
State v. Findlay, 259 Iowa 733, 145 N. W. 2d 650 (1966);
State v. Amaniera, 132 N.J. Super. 597, 334 A. 2d 398
(1974); State v. Osburn, 13 Or. App. 92, 508 P. 2d 837 (1973).
I respectfully dissent.
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JusTICE WHITE, with whom JUSTICE REHNQUIST joins, /
dissenting.
At common law, "a peace officer was permitted to arrest
without a warrant for a misdemeanor or felony committed in
his presence as well as for a felony not committed in his presence if there was reasonable ground for making the arrest."
United States v. Watson, 423 U. S. 411, 418 (1976). But the
requirement that a misdemeanor must have occurred in the
officer's presence to justify a warrantless arrest is not
grounded in the Fourth Amendment, see Street v. Surdyka,
492 F. 2d 368, 371-372 (CA4 1974); 2 W. LaFave, Search and
Seizure § 5.1 (1978), and we have never held that a warrant is
constitutionally required to arrest for nonfelony offenses occurring out of the officer's presence. Thus, "it is generally
recognized today that the common law authority to arrest
without a warrant in misdemeanor cases may be enlarged by
statute, and this has been done in many of the states."
E. Fisher, Laws of Arrest 130 (1967); see ALI, A Model
Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure, App. X (1975); 1 C. Alexander, The Law of Arrest 445-447 (1949); Wilgas, Arrest
Without a Warrant, 22 Mich. L. Rev. 541, 673, 706 (1924).
Wisconsin is one of the states that have expanded the common-law authority to arrest for nonfelony offenses. Section
345.22 of the Wisconsin Statutes provides that "[a] person
may be arrested without a warrant for the violation of a traffic regulation if the traffic officer has reasonable grounds to

/
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believe that the person is violating or has violated a traffic
regulation." Relying on this statutory authority, officers of
the Madison Police Department arrested Edward Welsh in a
bedroom in his home for violating Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)
(1977) which proscribes the operation of a motor vehicle while
intoxicated. Welsh refused to submit to a breath or blood
test, and his operator's license was eventually revoked for 60
days for this reason pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 343.305 (1975).
In the civil license revocation proceeding, Welsh argued
that his arrest in his house without a warrant was unconstitutional under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
Federal Constitution and that his refusal to submit to the test
could not be used against him. This contention was not
based on the proposition that using the refusal in the revocation proceeding would contravene federal law, but rather
rested on the fact that Wis. Stat. § 343.305(2)(b)(5) (1975) had
been interpreted to require that an arrest be legal if a refusal
to be tested is to be the basis for a license revocation.
On review of the license revocation, the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin appears to have recognized that, under the Wisconsin statute, Welsh's license was wrongfully revoked if the
officers who arrested him had violated the Federal Constitution. 108 Wis. 2d 319, 321 N. W. 2d 245 (1982). See Scales
v. State, 64 Wis. 2d 485, 494, 219 N. W. 2d 286, 292 (1974).
The court acknowledged that "the individual's right to privacy in the home is a fundamental freeedom" and made clear
that the state bore the burden of establishing exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless in-home arrest. 108 Wis.
2d, at 327, 321 N. W. 2d, at 250. But it discerned a strong
state interest in combating driving under the influence of alcohol, id., at 334--335, 321 N. W. 2d, at 253-254, and held
that the warrantless arrest was proper because (1) the officers were in hot pursuit of a defendant seeking to avoid a
chemical sobriety test; (2) Welsh posed a potential threat to
public safety; and (3) "without an immediate blood alcohol
test, highly reliable and persuasive evidence facilitating the
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state's proof of [Welsh's] alleged violation ... would be destroyed." ld., at 338, 321 N. W. 2d, at 255. For two reasons, I would not overturn the judgment of the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin.
First, it is not at all clear to me that the important constitutional question decided today should be resolved in a
case such as this. Although Welsh argues vigorously that
the State violated his federal constitutional rights, he at no
point relied on the exclusionary rule, and he does not contend
that the Federal Constitution or federal law provides the
remedy he seeks. As a general rule, this Court "reviews
judgments, not statements in opinions." Black v. Cutter
Laboratories, 351 U. S. 292, 297 (1956). Because the Court
does not purport to hold that federal law requires the conclusion that Welsh's refusal to submit to a sobriety test was reasonable, it is not clear to me how the judgment of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin offends federal law.
It is true that under the Wisconsin statutory scheme, an
arrestee's refusal to take a breath or blood test would be reasonable and would not justify revocation of operating privileges if the underlying arrest violated the Fourth Amendment or was otherwise unlawful. What the State has done,
however, is to attach consequences to an arrest found unlawful under the Federal Constitution that we have never decided federal law itself would attach. The Court has occasionally taken jurisdiction over cases in which the States
have provided remedies for violations of federally defined obligations. E. g., Moore v. Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co., 291
U. S. 205 (1934). But it has done so in contexts where state
remedies are employed to further federal policies. See
Greene, Hybrid State Law in the Federal Courts, 83 Harv.
L. Rev. 289, 300 (1969). The Fourth Amendment of course
applies to the police conduct at issue here. In providing that
a driver may reasonably refuse to submit to a sobriety test if
he was unlawfully arrested, Wisconsin's Legislature and
courts are pursuing a course that they apparently hope will
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reduce police illegality and safeguard their citizens' rights.
Although the State is entitled to draw this conclusion and to
implement it as a matter of state law, I am very doubtful that
the policies underlying the Fourth Amendment would require exclusion of the fruits of an illegal arrest in a civil
proceeding to remove from the highways a person who insists
on driving while under the influence of alcohol. Cf. INS v.
Lopez-Mendoza, - - U. S. - - (1984). If that is the
c~se-if it would violate no federal policy to revoke Welsh's
license even if his arrest was illegal-there is no satisfactory
reason for us to review the Supreme Court of Wisconsin's
judgment affirming the revocation, even if that court mistakenly applied the Fourth Amendment. For me, this is ample
reason not to disturb the judgment.
In any event, I believe that the state court properly construed the Fourth Amendment. It follows from Payton v.
New York, 445 U. S. 573 (1980), that warrantless nonfelony
arrests in the home are prohibited by the Fourth Amendment absent probable cause and exigent circumstances. Although I continue to believe that the Court erred in Payton
in requiring exigent circumstances to justify warrantless inhome felony arrests, id., at 603 (WHITE, J., dissenting), I do
not reject the obvious logical implication of the Court's decision. But I see little to commend an approach that looks to
"the nature of the underlying offense as an important factor
to be considered in the exigent-circumstances calculus."
Ante, at 11.
The gravity of the underlying offense is, I concede, a factor
to be considered in determining whether the delay that attends the warrant-issuance process will endanger officers or
other persons. The seriousness of the offense with which a
suspect may be charged also bears on the likelihood that he
will flee and escape apprehension if not arrested immediately. But if, under all the circumstances of a particular
case, an officer has probable cause to believe that the delay
involved in procuring an arrest warrant will gravely endan-
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ger the officer or other persons or will result in the suspect's
escape, I perceive no reason to disregard those exigencies on
the ground that the offense for which the suspect is sought is
a "minor" one.
As a practical matter, I suspect, the Court's holding is
likely to have a greater impact in cases where the officer
acted without a warrant to prevent the imminent destruction
or removal of evidence. If the evidence the destruction or
removal of which is threatened documents only the suspect's
participation in a "minor" crime, the Court apparently would
preclude a finding that exigent circumstances justified the
warrantless arrest. I do not understand why this should be
so.
A warrantless home entry to arrest is no more intrusive
when the crime in "minor" than when the suspect is sought in
connection with a serious felony. The variable factor, if
there is one, is the governmental interest that will be served
by the warrantless entry. Wisconsin's Legislature and its
Supreme Court have both concluded that warrantless inhome arrests under circumstances like those present here
promote valid and substantial state interests. In determining whether the challenged governmental conduct was reasonable, we are not bound by these determinations. But
nothing in our previous decisions suggests that the fact that a
State has defined an offense as a misdemeanor for a variety of
social, cultural, and political reasons necessarily requires the
conclusion that warrantless in-home arrests designed to prevent the imminent destruction or removal of evidence of that
offense are always impermissible. If anything, the Court's
prior decisions support the opposite conclusion.
See
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523, 539-540 (1967);
McDonald v. United States, 335 U. S. 451, 454-455 (1948).
See also State v. Penas, 200 Neb. 387, 263 N. W. 2d 835
(1978); State v. Niedermeyer, 48 Or. App. 665, 617 P. 2d 911
(1980), cert. denied, 450 U. S. 1042 (1981).
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A test under which the existence of exigent circumstances
turns on the perceived gravity of the crime would significantly hamper law enforcement and burden courts with
pointless litigation concerning the nature and gradation of
various crimes. The Court relies heavily on Justice Jackson's concurring opinion in McDonald v. United States,
supra, which, in minimizing the gravity of the felony at issue
there, illustrates that the need for an evaluation of the seriousness of particular crimes could not be confined to offenses
defined by statute as misdemeanors. To the extent that the
Court implies that the seriousness of a particular felony is a
factor to be considered in deciding whether the need to preserve evidence of that felony constitutes an exigent circumstance justifying a warrantless in-home arrest, I think that
its approach is misguided. The decision to arrest without a
warrant typically is made in the field under less-than-optimal
circumstances; officers have neither the time nor the competence to determine whether a particular offense for which
warrantless arrests have been authorized by statute is serious enough to justify a warrantless home entry to prevent
the imminent destruction or removal of evidence.
This problem could be lessened by creating a bright-line
distinction between felonies and other crimes, but the
Court-wisely in my view-does not adopt such an approach.
There may have been a time when the line between misdemeanors and felonies marked off those offenses involving a
sufficiently serious threat to society to justify warrantless inhome arrests under exigent circumstances. But the category of misdemeanors today includes enough serious offenses
to call into question the desirability of such line drawing.
See ALI, Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedures
131-132 (Prelim. Draft No. 1, 1965) (discussing ultimately rejected provision abandoning "in-presence" requirement for
misdemeanor arrests). If I am correct in asserting that a
bright-line distinction between felonies and misdemeanors is
untenable and that the need to prevent the imminent de-
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struction or removal of evidence of some nonfelony crimes
can constitute an exigency justifying warrantless in-home arrests under certain circumstances, the Court's approach will
necessitate a case-by-case evaluation of the seriousness of
particular crimes, a difficult task for which officers and courts
are poorly equipped.
Even if the Court were correct in concluding that the gravity of the offense is an important factor to consider in determining whether a warrantless in-home arrest is justified by
exigent circumstances, it has erred in assessing the seriousness of the civil-forfeiture offense for which the officers
thought they were arresting Welsh. As the Court observes,
the statutory scheme in force at the time of Welsh's arrest
provided that the first offense for driving under the influence
of alcohol involved no potential incarceration. Wis. Stat.
§ 346.65(2) (1975). Nevertheless, this Court has long recognized the compelling state interest in highway safety, South .
Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S.--,-- (1983), the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin identified a number of factors suggesting
a substantial and growing governmental interest in apprehending and convicting intoxicated drivers and in deterring
alcohol-related offenses, 108 Wis. 2d, at 334-335, 321 N. W.
2d, at 253-254, and recent actions of the Wisconsin Legislature evince its "belief that significant benefits, in the reduction of the costs attributable to drunk driving, may be
achieved by the increased apprehension and conviction of
even first time ... offenders." Note, 1983 Wis. L. Rev.
1023, 1053.
The Court ignores these factors and looks solely to the penalties imposed on first offenders in determining whether the
State's interest is sufficient to justify warrantless in-home arrests under exigent circumstances. Ante, at 13-14. Although the seriousness of the prescribed sanctions is a valuable objective indication of the general normative judgment
of the seriousness of the offense, Baldwin v. New York, 399
U. S. 66, 68 (1970) (plurality opinion), other evidence is avail-
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able and should not be ignored. United States v. Craner, .
652 F. 2d 23, 24-27 (CA9 1981); United States v. Woods, 450
F. Supp. 1335, 1340 (Md. 1978); Brady v. Blair, 427 F. Supp.
5, 9 (SD Ohio 1976). Although first offenders are subjected
only to civil forfeiture under the Wisconsin statute, the seriousness with which the State regards the crime for which
Welsh was arrested is evinced by (1) the fact that defendants
charged with driving under the influence are guaranteed the
right to a jury trial, Wis. Stat. § 345.43 (1981--82); (2) the legislative authorization of warrantless arrests for traffic offenses occurring outside the officer's presence, Wis. Stat.
345.22 (1981--82); and (3) the collateral consequence of mandatory license revocation that attaches to all convictions for
driving under the influence, Wis. Stat. § 343.30(1q)
(1981--82). See also District of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U. S.
63 (1930); United States v. Craner, supra. It is possible,
moreover, that the Legislature consciously chose to limit the
penalties imposed on first offenders in order to increase the
ease of conviction and the overall deterrent effect of the enforcement effort. See Note, 35 Me. L. Rev. 385, 395, n. 35,
399-400, 403 (1983).
In short, the fact that Wisconsin has chosen to punish the
first offense for driving under the influence with a fine rather
than a prison term does not demand the conclusion that the
State's interest in punishing first offenders is insufficiently
substantial to justify warrantless in-home arrests under exigent circumstances. As the Supreme Court of Wisconsin observed, "[t]his is a model case demonstrating the urgency
involved in arresting the suspect in order to preserve evidence of the statutory violation." 108 Wis. 2d, at 338, 321
N. W. 2d, at 255. We have previously recognized that "the
percentage of alcohol in the blood begins to diminish shortly
after drinking stops, as the body functions to eliminate it
from the system." Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S. 757,
770 (1966). Moreover, a suspect could cast substantial doubt
on the validity of a blood or breath test by consuming addi-
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tiona! alcohol upon arriving at his home. In light of the
promptness with which the officers reached Welsh's house,
therefore, I would hold that the need to prevent the imminent and ongoing destruction of evidence of a serious violation of Wisconsin's traffic laws provided an exigent circumstance justifying the warrantless in-home arrest. See also,
e. g., People v. Ritchie, 181 Cal. Rptr. 773, 130 Cal. App. 3d
455 (1982); People v. Smith, 175 Colo. 212, 486 P. 2d 8 (1971);
State v. Findlay, 259 Iowa 733, 145 N. W. 2d 650 (1966);
State v. Amaniera, 132 N.J. Super. 597, 334 A. 2d 398
(1974); State v. Osburn, 13 Or. App. 92, 508 P. 2d 837 (1973).
I respectfully dissent.
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dissenting.
I yield to no one in my profound personal concern about the
unwillingness of our national consciousness to face up t(}-and
to do something about-the continuing slaughter upon our
Nation's highways, a good percentage of which is due to drivers who are drunk or semi-incapacitated because of alcohol or
drug ingestion. I have spoken in these Reports to this point
before. Perez v. Campbell, 402 U. S. 637, 657 and 672
(1971) (BLACKMUN, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); Tate v. Short, 401 U. S. 395, 401 (1971) (BLACKMUN,
J., concurring). See also South Dakota v. Neville, - U . S . - , - (1983) (slip op. 5).
And it is amazing to me that one of our great States-one
which, by its highway signs, proclaims to be diligent and emphatic in its prosecution of the drunk driver-still classifies
Driving While Intoxicated as a civil violation that allows only
a money forfeiture of not more than $300 so long as it is a first
offense. Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2)(a) (Supp. 1983-1984). The
State, like the indulgent parent, hesitates to spank the
spoiled child, even though he is engaging in an act that is dangerous to others who are law abiding and helpless in the face
of the child's act. See BRENNAN, J., dissenting, ante, at 12,
n. 12 (citing other statutes). Our personal convenience still
weighs heavily in the balance and the highway deaths and injuries continue. But if Wisconsin and other States choose by
legislation thus to regulate their penalty structure, there is
JusTICE BLACKMUN,
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nothing in the United States Constitution that says they may
not do so.
The Fourth Amendment, however, does stand as the protector, particularly of the home. I find myself in agreement
with much that is said in JUSTICE BRENNAN's dissent, other
than Part IIA thereof, as to which I reserve judgment. Like
JUSTICE STEVENS, therefore, I join all but Part IIA of JusTICE BRENNAN's opinion and dissent from the Court's dismissal of the case.

To: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Powell
Justice Rehnquist
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor
From:

Justice Blackmun
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JUSTICE BLACKMUN, concurring.
I join the Court's opinion but add a personal observation.
I yield to no one in my profound personal concern about the
unwillingness of our national consciousness to face up to-and
to do something about-the continuing slaughter upon our
Nation's highways, a good percentage of which is due to drivers who are drunk or semi-incapacitated because of alcohol or
drug ingestion. I have spoken in these Reports to this point
before. Perez v. Campbell, 402 U. S. 637, 657 and 672
(1971) (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part);
Tate v. Short, 401 U. S. 395, 401 (1971) (concurring opinion).
See also South Dakota v. Neville, - - U.S. - - , - (1983) (slip op. 5).
And it is amazing to me that one of our great States-one
which, by its highway signs, proclaims to be diligent and emphatic in its prosecution of the drunk driver-still classifies
Driving While Intoxicated as a civil violation that allows only
a money forfeiture of not more than $300 so long as it is a .first
offense. Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2)(a) (Supp. 1983-1984). The
State, like the indulgent parent, hesitates to discipline the
spoiled child very much, even though the child is engaging in
an act that is dangerous to others who are law abiding and
helpless in the face of the child's act. See ante, at 13, n. 13
(citing other statutes). Our personal convenience still
weighs heavily in the balance and the highway deaths and injuries continue. But if Wisconsin and other States choose by
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legislation thus to regulate their penalty structure, there is,
unfortunately, nothing in the United States Constitution that
says they may not do so.

---
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Justice Brennan
Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Powell
Justice Rehnquist
Justice Stevens
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JUSTICE BLACKMUN, dissenting.
I yield to no one in my profound personal concern about the
unwillingness of our national consciousness to face up to-and
to do something about-the continuing slaughter upon our
Nation's highways, a good percentage of which is due to drivers who are drunk or semi-incapacitated because of alcohol or
drug ingestion. I have spoken in these Reports to this point
before. Perez v. Campbell, 402 U. S. 637, 657 and 672
(1971) (BLACKMUN, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); Tate v. Short, 401 U. S. 395, 401 (1971) (BLACKMUN,
J., concurring). See also South Dakota v. Neville, - U . S . - , - (1983) (slip op. 5).
And it is amazing to me that one of our great States-one
which, by its highway signs, proclaims to be diligent and emphatic in its prosecution of the drunk driver-still classifies
Driving While Intoxicated as a civil violation that allows only
a money forfeiture of not more than $300 so long as it is a first
offense. Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2)(a) (Supp. 1983-1984). The
State, like the indulgent parent, hesitates to spank the
spoiled child, even though he is engaging in an act that is dangerous to others who are law abiding and helpless in the face
of the child's act. See BRENNAN, J. , dissenting, ante, at 13,
n. 13 (citing other statutes). Our personal convenience still
weighs heavily in the balance and the highway deaths and injuries continue. But if Wisconsin and other States choose by
legislation thus to regulate their penalty structure, there is
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nothing in the United States Constitution that says they may
not do so.
The Fourth Amendment, however, does stand as the protector, particularly of the home. I find myself in agreement
with much that is said in JusTICE BRENNAN's dissent, other
than Part IIA thereof, as to which I reserve judgment. Like
JusTICE STEVENS, therefore, I join all but Part IIA of JusTICE BRENNAN's opinion and dissent from the Court's dismissal of the case.

To: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Powell
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor
From:

Justice Rehnquist
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PER CURIAM.

We granted certiorari to the Supreme Court of Wisconsin
to decide whether a warrantless home arrest for drunk driv- ~
ing, based on probable cause and giv~ al~ed~ir- ,
cumstances, violates the Fourth '"Amenamenf. After full
briefing and oral argument, however, it appears that while
the question may technically be presented by the record, it is
presented, at best, in a highly atypical and totally abstract
way. We therefore dismiss the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted. Resolution of this admittedly important
question, see Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573, 583 (1980),
"can await a day when the issue is posed less abstractly."
The Monrosa v. Carbon Black E xport, Inc., 359 U. S. 180,
184 (1959).
On the night of April 24, 1978, petitioner Welsh drove his
car off the road, narrowly averting an accident. He
emerged from the car in an obviously inebriated state and
asked another motorist for a ride home. Told that he should
wait for assistance, petitioner left the scene on foot. The police arrived almost immediately and, after running a license
check and taking the other driver's statement, proceeded to
~~
Welsh's home a short distance away. The police were admitted by petitioner's stepdaugther who told them that peti. v)
tioner "just stumbled in" and was upstairs. ~ \1\./'-"1~
_;.
led th
up to his room, where they found him in bed.
~
Welsh was a ested an
arged with operating a motor ve-

d'
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hicle while under the influence of an intoxicant, in violation of
Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1) (1977). He was taken to the police station where he refused to submit to a breathalyzer test.
Two separate proceedings, one criminal and one civil, resulted from these events. Petitioner was charged with a
criminal violation of § 346.63(1). Because it was his second
such offense within five years, he faced mandatory imprisonment from five days to one year and a fine of not more than
$500. 1 Petitioner moved to dismiss the criminal charge on
the ground that his warrantless arrest violated the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. The State
contended in response that the arrest was legal because the
police had probable cause to believe Welsh committed the offense and his wife and stepdaughter consented to the warrantless entry. Alternatively, the State argued that the
warrantless entry to arrest Welsh, even absent consent, was
justified by exigent circumstances. See Payton v. New
York, 445 U. S. 573, 583 (1980). The Wisconsin trial court,
without passing on the consent issue, 1oun01or the State.
The court ruled that the police had probable cause to arrest
Welsh and that the doctrine of hot pursuit, see Warden v.
Hayden, 387 U. S. 294 (1967), and the need to take a breath
sample before Welsh continued drinking or the effects of the
already consumed alcohol wore off, justified the arrest.
J. A., at 78-80. 2
Petition wa also faced with the suspension of his license
in the civil proceeding hich is the subject of the petition for
certiorari in
Under isconsin law m effect at the
' Wise. Stat. § 346.65(2) (1975) provided: "Any person violating
s. 346.63(1) may be required to forfeit not more than $200 for the first offense and, upon the 2nd or subsequent conviction within 5 years, shall be
imprisoned not less than 5 days nor more than one year and in addition may
be fined not more than $500."
2
Following a jury trial in 1982, petitioner was convicted of the misdemeanor of driving while intoxicated. His appeal from that conviction has
been stayed pending our decision in this case. See Brief for Petitioner, at
17, n. 5.
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time of petitioner's offense, anyone who operated a motor vehicle upon the public highways thereby consented to submit
to a sobriety test upon being arrested for drunk driving.
Wise. Stat. § 343.305(1) (1975). Refusal to submit to such a
test resulted in automatic suspension of the driver's license
for 60 days, unless the driver could "establish the reasonableness of his refusal." !d., at§ 343.305(7)(c). Petitioner contended that his refusal to take the sobriet test was "reasonable' ecause 1s un er n arrest violated the Fourt and
F ourteent Amen ments of the mte States Constitution.
The trial court, having already ruled that the arrest was legal
in the criminal pretrial hearing, rejected this contentiQ,!l and
suspepded petitioner's license for 60 days.
The Wisconsin Court 6f Appears?eversed the license suspension, concluding that although there was probable cause
to arrest Welsh, the State had not established the existence
of exigent circumstances. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin
in turn reversed the appellate court, finding "ample evidence
supporting the trial court's ruling that the officer's entry was
justified on the basis of both probable cause and exigent circumstances." State v. Welsh, 108 Wis. 2d 319, 326-327, 321
N. W. 2d 245, 249-250
2 We anted certiorari to decide whether the xigent circumstances rehe U.£9n 1?)r the
Supreme o
1sconsm were sufficient to support a
warrantress arrest ill tnehome for the offense with which petitioner was charged. 459 U. S. - - (1983).
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin undoubtedly decided the
question which is presented by the petition for certiorari, but
its opinion leaves us at a loss to understand the relevance of
the federal constitutional issue to its ultimate conclusion that
petitioner's license should be suspended. Fourth Amendment issues in state proceedings normally arise because a defendant seeks to exclude evidence that he claims was improperly gathered. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961).
But the Supreme Court of Wisconsin does not discuss any evidence which Welsh sought to exclude. And if petitoner did

-
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seek to invoke the exclusionary rule, we would, before confronting the constitutionality of the arrest, have to decide
whether the Fourth Amendment requires that unconstitutionally seized evidence be excluded in a state civil proceeding. As we said in United States v. Janis, 428 U. S. 433, 447
(1976), "[i]n the complex and turbulent history of the rule,
.
the Court has never applied it to exclude evidence from a civib ~ ~..M-~~ ~~~
proceeding, Ieaeral or state." 3 The latter issue has been ./'-"'r AI'~:- u
0
neither argued nor briefed by the parties, and it would not be ~L, ~ cJappropriate for us to reach it.
J vv~ ~ .
An alternative possible basis for finding the constitutional~
ity of petitioner's arrest relevant to the license suspension,
-~
--p.u. ~ ~ ~ dwhich the dissent states with considerable assurance must
()......
-\t- tJ- -fh...- -=rc~ ~ have been the basis for the ruling of the Supreme Court of
'J) ~
f~q_ +o Mc-Ju. C.U.c.JL. Wisconsin, see infra, at 4, is that "an arrestee's refusal t~~~:}~~~
-t1t c..
c..M.o/\ Ww..t.L1-1 take breat te would be unreasonable, and therefore o - ~....v'!::>
~ ~ _
cL
erating privi
could no
revoked i e underlying ar- J_.~ ol
CY\~V\'
cl.(J\o....{ ~~ · r~l."
e believe, however, that t 1s conclu~ l
~
~ ..__..--,-·. -~ - ~ ·.Jsion is by no means free from doubt. The Supreme Court of
~ ~
f4i:.Jr- --ft......... pr~ Wisconsin's opinion never adverts to a connection between
____.
· +t.....J ·L) 1J ""'-.:1- U.u .c.A the reasonableness inquiry and the federal constitutional
: ~,:-- ~d..LJ.L._.
question. Nor is such a connection evident from the lan~L- a)
guage of the statute .
..j-f~o--vJ )~
At the time of the events in question, whenever a driver
+o f c.J.-t. C<.. ~ -I~ was arrested for drunk driving in Wisconsin and refused to
~
~c...z.x;:;
submit to a sobriety test, the arresting officer was required
1.4 ~
~
to file a report stating that the driver was placed "under ar~ ~· 5
rest"; that he refused to take a sobriety test after being in~~~~ formed of his rights and of the consequences of his refusal;

l

h

t
4's
.

e~

3
In Janis, the Court held that evidence seized by a state criminal law
enforcement officer in good faith , but nonetheless unconstitutionally, may ·
be admitted in a federal civil proceeding. The Court specifically declined
t o pass on the question of whether "intrasover eign" violations, in which evidence improperly seized by the State in a criminal investigation is subsequently introduced in a state civil proceeding, ar e forbidden by the F ourth
Amendment . 428 U. S., at 456.
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and that the driver's refusal was unreasonable. Wise. Stat.
§ 343.305(2)(b) (1975). 4 The driver's license was then automatically suspended 60 days after the report was filed, unless
he requested a reasonableness hearing. The issues that the
driver could raise at the hearing were specifically limited by
the statute to those facts required to be stated in the report.
Id., at §343.305(7)(c). Thus, the driver could claim that he
was not placed under arrest or that he was not advised of his
rights. But there was no provision for challenging the constitutionality of the arrest. 5
'Section 343.305(2)(b) (1975) provided in relevant part:
"The report shall contain the following infonnation:
"1. That the person at the time he was requested to submit to a test was
under arrest for driving or operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant;
"2. That the person refused to submit to a test;
"3. That such person was infonned of the consequences of his refusal to
submit to the test; and
"4. That such person was infonned of his rights [as to the nature and
type of test perfonned] under subs. (4) and (5)(a).
>-Th_at the refusal of the person to submit to a test was unreasonable."
' The dissent would have us read the phrase "under arrest" to mean
"lawfully under arrest" or "legally under arrest." But we decline to rewrite a state statute, and we have no authoritative construction from a
state court upon which to rely for such an interpretation. Counsel for petitioner at the reasonableness hearing made just such an argument, and it
was rejected by the trial court. When counsel claimed that the hearing
was predicated on lawful arrest, the court responded: "It doesn't say 'lawful arrest.' The statute just says, ' ... under arrest.'" J. A., at 92. At
that point, petitioner's counsel changed tacks. First, he argued that petitioner had a Fourth Amendment right to refuse to take the test and to prevent the refusal from being used against him. ld., at 105. And, second,
he argued that the legality of the arrest was relevant to the reasonableness
of petitioner's refusal to take the test. Counsel for the State strenuously
disputed the latter contention.
"When you get a driver's license you have agreed to consent to take the
breathalyzer test and you have to have a reason or reasons for not taking
that. My understanding of the law ... is that the only reasonable reason
for not taking the test is a physical reason why you can't take it.
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The Wisconsin law was amended in 1977 specifically to permit a licensee to contest "whether the officer made a lawful arrest prior to requesting a test . . . " Wise. Stat.
§ 343.305(8)(b)1(a) (1977); but that provision did not become
effective until July 1, 1978, after the events in question here.
While the import of the amendment is not crystal clear, it
certainly supports an inference that the prior language relating only to the "unreasonable" character of the refusal did not
include the right to challenge the constitutionality of the arrest. See State v. Neitzel, 95 Wis. 2d 191, 202, 289 N. W. 2d
828, 834 (1980) (holding that physical inability to take the test
"was the only reasonable ground for exonerating a refusal
under the statutes as they appeared in 1975") (emphasis
added).
In sum, we conclude that the relevance of the constitution- (
ality of petitioner's arrest to the suspension of his license is
too uncertain to justify our reaching the merits of the issue.
The dissent insists that our dismissal of the writ in this case
violates the "Rule of Four" as expounded in our earlier cases.
But, as the Court stated in The Monrosa v. Carbon Black
Export, Inc., 359 U. S. 180, 184 (1959): "Examination of a
case on the merits, on oral argument, may bring into 'proper
focus' a conslc1eration which, though present in the reco~ at
th~ writ, only later indicates th_}t the
grant was 1m roVlcfent." See also Ferguson v. MooreMc ormack Lines, 352 U. S. 521, 559 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting) (dismissal appropriate where considerations arise "which were not manifest or fully apprehended
at the time certiorari was granted").

1

"The fact that a person is operating under the influence of, or charged
with that, in. their minds thinks that either the police don't have probable
cause or that the police didn't see them operating a car, or the fact that
they had some alcohol to drink-that's irrelevant. That's not an issue in a
reasonableness hearing." J . A., at 109-110.
The trial court failed to settle the dispute, relying upon its earlier decision
in the criminal suppression hearing that the arrest was legal. !d. , at 111.
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Here, the question is presented in an extraordinarily abstract manner, The Monrosa v. Carbon Black Export, Inc.,
supra, and there have been changes in the Wisconsin statutory scheme which throw further doubt on the relation of the
constitutional question to the suspension of petitioner's driver's license, Triangle Improvement Council v. Richie, 402
U. S. 497, 502 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring). If Monrosa,
supra, and Triangle Improvement Council, supra,-in each
of which cases the writ of certiorari was dismissed as improvidently granted over the dissents of four members of the
Court-did not violate the "Rule of Four," assuredly our dismissal of the writ in this case does not violate that rule.

Writ of certiorari dismissed.

To: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Powell
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor
From:

Justice Rehnquist
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 82-5466

EDWARD G. WELSH, PETITIONER v. WISCONSIN
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT
OF WISCONSIN
[February - , 1984]
PER CURIAM.

We granted certiorari to the Supreme Court of Wisconsin
to decide whether a warrantless home arrest for drunk driving, based on probable cause and given allegedly exigent circumstances, violates the Fourth Amendment. After full
briefing and oral argument, however, it appears that _while
the question may technically be presented by the record, it is
presented, at best, in a highly atypical and totally abstract
way. We therefore dismiss the writ of certiorari as improviaently granted. Resolution of this admittedly important
question, see Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573, 583 (1980),
"can await a day when the issue is posed less abstractly."
The Monrosa v. Carbon Black Export, Inc., 359 U. S. 180,
184 (1959).
On the night of April 24, 1978, petitioner Welsh drove his
car off the road, narrowly averting an accident. He
emerged from the car in an obviously inebriated state and
asked another motorist for a ride home. Told that he should
wait for assistance, petitioner left the scene on foot. The police arrived almost immediately and, after running a license
check and taking the other driver's statement, proceeded to
Welsh's home a short distance away. The police were admitted by petitioner's stepdaugther who told them that petitioner "just stumbled in" and was upstairs. Petitioner's wife
led them up to his room, where they found him in bed.
Welsh was arrested and charged with operating a motor ve-
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hicle while under the influence of an intoxicant, in violation of
Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1) (1977). He was taken to the police station where he refused to submit to a breathalyzer test.
Two separate proceedings, one criminal and one civil, resulted from these events. Petitioner was charged with a
criminal violation of§ 346.63(1). Because it was his second
such offense within five years, he faced mandatory imprisonment from five days to one year and a fine of not more than
$500. 1 Petitioner moved to dismiss the criminal charge on
the ground that his warrantless arrest violated the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. The State
contended in response that the arrest was legal because the
police had probable cause to believe Welsh committed the offense and his wife and stepdaughter consented to the warrantless entry. Alternatively, the State argued that the
warrantless entry to arrest Welsh, even absent consent, was
justified by exigent circumstances. See Payton v. New
York, 445 U. S. 573, 583 (1980). The Wisconsin trial court,
without passing on the consent issue, found for the State.
The court ruled that the police had probable cause to arrest
Welsh and that the doctrine of hot pursuit, see Warden v.
Hayden, 387 U. S. 294 (1967), and the need to take a breath
sample before Welsh continued drinking or the effects of the
already consumed alcohol wore off, justified the arrest.
J. A., at 78-80. 2
Petitioner was also faced with the suspension of his license
in the civil proceeding which is the subject of the petition for
certiorari in this case. Under Wisconsin law in effect at the
' Wise. Stat. § 346.65(2) (1975) provided: "Any person violating
s. 346.63(1) may be required to forfeit not more than $200 for the first offense and, upon the 2nd or subsequent conviction within 5 years, shall be
imprisoned not less than 5 days nor more than one year and in addition may
be fined not more than $500."
2
_Following a jury trial in 1982, petitioner was convicted of the misdemeanor of driving while intoxicated. His appeal from that conviction has
been stayed pending our decision in this case. See Brief for Petitioner, at
17, n. 5.
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time of petitioner's offense, anyone who operated a motor vehicle upon the public highways thereby consented to submit
to a sobriety test upon being arrested for drunk driving.
Wise. Stat. § 343.305(1) (1975). Refusal to submit to such a
test resulted in automatic suspension of the driver's license
for 60 days, unless the'driver could "establish the reasonableness of his refusal." I d., at § 343.305(7)(c). Petitioner contended that his refusal to take the sobriety test was "reasonable" because his underlying arrest violated the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendmentsofthe United States Constitution.
Th~g already ruled that the arrest was legal
in the criminal pretrial hearing, rejected this contention and
suspended petitioner's license for 60 days.
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed the license suspension, concluding that although there was probable cause
to arrest Welsh, the State had not established the existence
of exigent circumstances. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin
in turn reversed the appellate court, finding "ample evidence
supporting the trial court's ruling that the officer's entry was
justified on the basis of both probable cause and exigent circumstances." State v. Welsh, 108 Wis. 2d 319, 326-327, 321
N. W. 2d 245, 249-250 (1982). We granted certiorari to de- }
cide whether the exigent circumstances relied upon by the
"KL~ ;..,.._.
Supreme Court of Wisconsin were sufficient to support a a..;...&.+t. L ~.
~~rrantless arrest in the home for the offense with which pet1t10ner was charged. 459 U. S. - - (1983).
·
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin undoubtedly decided the
question which is presented by the petition for certiorari, but
its opinion leaves us at a loss to understand the relevance of
the federalc_o_n_s-:-;ti"'tu
"__,t,-;-io-ii'aiTsSti'e to its ultim-;te conclusion that
petitioners 1cense s ou d be suspendea . F ourth AmendmentlSsues in stat e proceedings norffially arise because a defendant seeks to exclude evidence that he claims was improperly gathered. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961).
But the Supreme Court of Wisconsin does not discuss any evidence which Welsh sought to exclude. And if petitoner did
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seek to invoke the exclusionary rule, we would, before confronting the constitutionality of the arrest, have to decide
whether the Fourth Amendment requires that unconstitutionally seized evidence be excluded in a state civil proceeding. As we said in United States v. Janis, 428 U. S. 433, 447
(1976), "[i]n the complex and turbulent history of the rule,
the Court has never applied it to exclude evidence from a civil
proceeding, federal or state." 3 The latter issue has been
neither argued nor briefed by the parties, and it would not be
appropriate for us to reach it.
An alternative possible basis for finding the constitutionality of petitioner's arrest relevant to the license suspension,
which the dissent states with considerable assurance must
have been the basis for the ruling of the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin, see infra, at 4, is that "an arrestee's refusal to
take a breath test would be unreasonable, and therefore
operatiniPrlvileges coufcl not be revoked, if the underlying
arrest was not lawful." We believe, however, that this
conclusion is by no means free from doubt. The Supreme
Court of Wisconsin's opinion never adverts to a connectiOn
between the re~ess mquTry and The federal constltutiona ues ion.
or 1s sue a connection evident from the
language of the statute.
At the time of the events in question, whenever a driver
was arrested for drunk driving in Wisconsin and refused to
submit to a sobriety test, the arresting officer was required
to file a ~rt stating that the driver was placed "under arrest"; that he refuse o ta e a sobnety test a ter being mf'Ori'ned of his rights and of the consequences of his refusal;
a In Janis, the Court held that evidence seized by a state criminal law
enforcement officer in good faith, but nonetheless unconstitutionally, may
be admitted in a federal civil proceeding. The Court specifically declined
to pass on the question of whether "intrasovereign" violations, in which evidence improperly seized by the State in a criminal investigation is subsequently introduced in a state civil proceeding, are forbidden by the Fourth
Amendment. 428 U. S., at 456.
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and that the driver's refusal was unreasonable. Wise. Stat.
§ 343.305(2)(b) (1975). 4 The driver's license was then automatically suspended 60 days after the report was filed, unless
he requested a reasonableness hearing. The issues that the
driver could raise at the hearing were specifically limited by
the statute to those facts required to be stated in the report.
/d., at § 343.305(7)(c). Thus, the driver could claim that he
was not placed under arrest or that he was not advised ofnis
rovision for challenging the conrights. ~ere was
stitutionality of the arrest. 5

no

~

'Section 343.305(2)(b) (1975) provided in relevant part:
"The report shall contain the following information:
"1. That the person at the time he was requested to submit to a test was
under arrest for driving or operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant;
"2. That the person refused to submit to a test;
"3. That such person was informed of the consequences of his refusal to
submit to the test; and
"4. That such person was informed of his rights [as to the nature and
type of test performed] under subs. (4) and (5)(a).
"5. That the refusal of the person to submit to a test was unreasonable."
5
The dissent would have us read the phrase "under arrest" to mean
"lawfully under arrest" or "legally under arrest." But we decline to rewrite a state statute, and we have no authoritative construction from a
state court upon which to rely for such an interpretation. Counsel for petitioner at the reasonableness hearing made just such an argument, and it
was rejected by the trial court. When counsel claimed that the hearing
was predicated on lawful arrest, the court responded: "It doesn't say 'lawful arrest.' The statute just says, ' ... under arrest.'" J. A., at 92. At
that point, petitioner's counsel changed tacks. First, he argued that petitioner had a Fourth Amendment right to refuse to take the test and to prevent the refusal from being used against him. I d., at 105. And, second,
he argued that the legality of the arrest was relevant to the reasonableness
of petitioner's refusal to take the test. Counsel for the State strenuously
disputed the latter contention.
"When you get a driver's license you have agreed to consent to take the
breathalyzer test and you have to have a reason or reasons for not taking
that. My understanding of the law ... is that the only reasonable reason
for not taking the test is a physical reason why you can't take it.

~~
~~
~~
~U4~.h~
~
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The Wisconsin law was amended in 1977 specifically to permit a licensee to contest "whether the officer made a lawful
arrest prior to requesting a test . . ." Wise. Stat.
§ 343.305(8)(b)1(a) (1977); but that provision did not become
effective until July 1, 1978, after the events in question here.
While the import of the amendment is not crystal clear, it
certainly supports an inference that the prior language relating ~e" character of the refusal did not
include the right to challenge the constitutionality of the arrest. See State v. Neitzel, 95 Wis. 2d 191, 202, 289 N. W. 2d
828, 834 (1980) (holding that physical inability to take the test
"was the only reasonable ground for exonerating a refusal
under the statutes as they appeared in 1975") (emphasis
added). 6
"The fact that a person is operating under the influence of, or charged
with that, in their minds thinks that either the police don't have probable
cause or that the police didn't see them operating a car, or the fact that
they had some alcohol to drink-that's irrelevant. That's not an issue in a
reasonableness hearing." J. A., at 109--110.
The trial court failed to settle the dispute, relying upon its earlier decision
in the criminal suppression hearing that the arrest was legal. I d., at 111.
6
Scales v. State, 64 Wis. 2d 485, 219 N. W. 2d 286 (1974), upon which
the dissent relies, infra, at 6, n. 5, is not to the contrary. First of all, in
Scales the defendant was appealing his criminal conviction for homicide by
the intoxicated use of a vehicle. No one disputes that in most circumstances the fruits of an illegal arrest cannot constitutionally be introduced
in a criminal proceeding against the arrestee. But that is irrelevent to
whether Wisconsin law requires the suppression of such evidence in a civil
proceeding. Second, the court in Scales specifically rejected the defendant's claim that the implied consent law, Wise. Stat. § 343.305, gives an
arrestee asked to take a sobriety test any greater rights than the constitution compels.
"It is not our understanding ... that the implied consent law was intended
to give greater rights to an alleged drunken driver than were constitutionally afforded theretofore. Rather, its purpose was to impose a condition
on the right to obtain a license to drive on a Wisconsin highway. . . . It
was intended to facilitate the taking of tests for intoxication and not to inhibit the ability of the state to remove drunken drivers from the highway.
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In sum, we conclude that the relevance of the constitutionality of petitioner's arrest to the suspension of his license is
too uncertain to justify our reaching the merits of the issue.
The dissent insists that our dismissal of the writ in this case
violates the "Rule of Four" as expounded in our earlier cases.
But, as the Court stated in The Monrosa v. Carbon Black
Export, Inc., 359 U. S. 180, 184 (1959): "Examination of a
case on the merits, on oral argument, may bring into 'proper
focus' a consideration which, though present in the record at
the time of granting the writ, only later indicates that the
grant was improvident." See also Ferguson v. MooreMcCormack Lines, 352 U. S. 521, 559 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting) (dismissal appropriate where considerations arise "which were not manifest or fully apprehended
at the time certiorari was granted").
Here, the question is presented in an extraordinarily abstract manner, The Monrosa v. Carbon Black Export, In .,
supra, and there have been changes in the Wisconsin statutory scheme which throw further doubt on the relation of the
constitutional question to the suspension of petitioner's driver's license, Triangle Improvement Council v. Richie, 402
U. S. 497, 502 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring). If Monrosa,
supra, and Triangle Improvement Council, supra,-in each
of which cases the writ of certiorari was dismissed as improvidently granted over the dissents of four members of the
Court-did not violate the "Rule of Four," assuredly our dismissal of the writ in this case does not violate that rule.
L-.. ,

Writ of certiorari dismissed.

In light of that purpose, it must be liberally construed to effectuate its policies." Id., at 493-494, 219 N. W. 2d, at 291-292.

.s
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JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in the judgment.

~1-r

This is a case the Court should not have taken.

I/~ I

The

Wisconsin statutes with respect to driving "under the influence
of an intoxicant" may be unique.
unusual degree of tolerance.

At least, they suggest an

Driving under the influence is

classified as a civil offense - in effect only a traffic offense
- requiring a "forfeiture of not more than

$20 ~

Section

346.65{2) Wise. Stat. 1975.1
Under Wisconsin law, one who drives on the public roads
"shall be deemed to have given consent to a chemical test .
for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of his blood
if arrested and issued a citation for driving • • • while under
the influence of an intoxicant •••• "

~ This

constructive consent

does not allow a chemical test to be given without the actual

1 A second offense within five years is a misde eanor, carrying
a penalty of imprisonment for not less than f" days nor more
than a year and a potential fine of not more t an $500. Section
346.65{2) Wise. Stat. 1975.

,''

2

consent of the person arrested.

If, however, refusal to take the

test is found to be unreasonable, the State automatically
suspends the driver's license for 60 days.

Sections 343.305(1)

and 343.305(2) Wise. Stat. 1975.
In this case, respondent ran his car off the road and

~t

before the police arrived.

Some thirty minutes

later, the police arrived at respondent's home and made a
warrantless entry and arrest on the reasonable belief that
respondent had been driving under the influence at the time of
the accident.

Respondent refused to submit to the required

chemical test on the ground that his warrantless home arrest was
unconstitutional under

~yton v.

New York, 445

u.s.

573 (1980).

The Wisconsin Supreme Court, reversing the state Court of
Appeals, found that exigent circumstances justified the
warrantless entry and arrest.

It did not address the State's

further contention that respondent's wife and daughters had
consented to the entry by the police.

Because it found that the

arrest was lawful, the Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded that

3

respondent's refusal to submit to the chemical test was
unreasonable as a matter of state law and that a 60-day
suspension of respondent's driving license was warranted.
There are three reasons why this Court should not have
granted certiorari:

(i) the Wisconsin laws with respect to

driving while intoxicated may be unique 2 , (ii) the only
constitutional question in the case - the warrantless entry - was
resolved essentially by Payton, and (iii) the factual issue
whether consent was given to the entry was not addressed by the
Wisconsin Supreme Court.

Even absent exigent circumstances,

therefore, the case therefore should be remanded as there was a
conflict of evidence on

ilu..~
~ issue.
1

Nevertheless, there were four votes to grant the case.
Following argument and consideration at Conference, there were
five votes to dismiss the case as improvidently granted, a result

2 In view of the current focus of public attention on the
shocking number of deaths and serious injuries occasioned by
intoxicated drivers, one reasonably may assume that Wisconsin
like other states -- will be reexamining its curiously tolerant
laws.

4

that I joined for the reasons above stated.

As Justice Brennan's

opinion states, the four Justices who voted to grant the case
"remain persuaded that the merits of the case should be decided".
Ante, at 16.

After further consideration, I have concluded that

in these circumstances it would be inappropriate to dismiss this
case against the views of the Justices who granted it.

~separate opinion

in

Ferg~on v.

In his

u.s.

Moore-McCormick Lines, 352

521, 559 (1957) Justice Harlan explained why the Rule of Four
normally requires decision on the merits in this situation.

See,

ante, at 17.
I find the reasoning of Justice Harlan persuasive and in
the best interest of the Court institutionally.
also address the merits.
warrantless

~

nonconsen ~ual

Accordingly, I

Under our decision in Payton, a
entry into the home to make a felony

arrest is unconstitutional absent exigent circumstances.

The

privacy of the home deserves at least as much protection under
the Fourth Amendment in the case of a warrantless entry to arres
for a civil traffic offense.

In my view the Supreme Court of

5

Wisconsin erred in finding that the entry was justified by
exigent circumstances. 3

There was, however, conflicting evidence

as to whether the entry had been consent ual, and it is agreed
there was probable cause to arrest.

The issue of consent remains

to be decided by the Wisconsin courts. 4

Accordingly, I also

would vacate the judgment of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin and
remand the case for further proceedings.

3 I agree with the finding of the Wisconsin Court of Appeals
that in this case there was neither "hot pursuit" nor other
circumstances that required this night time entry into
respondent's home. Preservation of evidence, for example, does
not in every case create an exigency sufficient to justify
(
warrantless entry into the home. In this case, the State's
interest in the evidence was relatively slight. Under Wisconsin
law, only a traffic offense had been committed. Nor had there
been a showing that a warrant could not have been obtained
promptly.
4 I do not join the reasoning of the plurality opinion, and
particularly do not concur in the establishment of a "bright
line" principle. See, Part II, A, ante, at 8. It is settled
that exigent circumstances may justify a warrantless entry where
a felony reasonably is believed to have been committed. I see no
reason in this case to foreclose the possibility that some
circumstances may justify a warrantless entry where the offense
is less serious than a felony.
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JUSTICE POWELL, concurring.
I voted to deny certiorari in this case, and the
opinions of my Brothers filed today reinfore my view that
it was a mistake for this Court to review this case.

The

Wisconsin laws with respect to driving while intoxicated,
in

effect

suggest

at

an

the

time,

may be

extraordinary

unique.

degree

of

At

least,

tolerance.

they

Driving

under the influence was classified as a civil offense effect

only

"forfeiture
Stat.

1975.

a
of

traffic
not

more

Moreover,

offense
than

the

three Wisconsin courts and,

and

$200".

case

had

requiring

§346.65(2)

a

Wise.

been cons ide red

in the end,

in

by

could have been

2.

decided -

on factual grounds. 1

at least arguably -

The

decision of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin therefore has
little

or

no

precedential

importance

outside

of

that

state.
Remaining

convinced

that

this

is

a

case

the

Court should not have taken, I agree that the case should
be

dismissed

accord,

as

however,

opinions.

improvidently

granted.

I

am

not

in

with either the plurality or dissenting

Justice

Rehnquist

would

not

reach

the

constitutional question because the Wisconsin statute, at
the

time

of

petitioner's

arrest,

did

not

expressly

say

1 The Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed the
trial court, concluding that the warrantless entry and
arrest of petitioner violated the Fourth Amendment. That
court remanded the case, however, for further findings as
to whether the police had entered petitioner's home with
consent - an issue the state trial court had not decided.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed the intermediate
appellate court, concluding that exigent circumstances
justified the warrantless entry and arrest.

3.

~

that the required arrest must be "lawful".

This argument

is advanced despite the fact that both the Wisconsin Court
of Appeals

and

reqyuiring

a

Supreme Court
lawful

arrest.

construction

by

the

unreasonable

to

assume

statutory

intent.

read

courts
that

When

an

the

Quite
of

state statute as
apart

from

Wisconsin,

any doubt
"arrest"

I

exists
is

this

find
as

a

it

to the

statutory

prerequisite to imposition of a penalty, it can only mean
a lawful rather than an unlawful arrest.
I therefore agree with Justice Brennan's view as
to

the

construction

of

the

Wisconsin

statute.

If

I

thought it were appropriate for this Court to decide the
constitutional issue,
this

case

constituted

Fourteenth Amendments.

..

•

'I

I have no doubt that the arrest in
a

violation

of

the

Payton v. New York,

Fourth

and

u.s.

573

445

4.

(1980)
home

held that a warrantless nonconsentual entry into a
to make a

felony arrest

existent circumstances.

is unconstitutional absent

The privacy of the home deserves

at least as much protection under the Fourth Amendment in
the

case of

a

warrantless

entry

to

arrest

for

a

civil

traffic offense. 2
Although

it had

not occurred to me that there

would be disagreement - least of all a 4-4 disagreement as to the possible meaning of the state statute, this is a
further

reason for

dismissing this case as improvidently

granted.

2 (Copy of footnote 6 in my first
the prior opinion that I am now junking).

draft

of
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JUSTICE POWELL, concurring.
I voted to deny certiorari in this case, and the
opinions of my Brothers filed today reinfore my view that
it was a mistake for this Court to review this case.

The

Wisconsin laws with respect to driving while intoxicated,
in effect at the time,
suggest

an

may be unique.

extraordinary

degree

of

At

least,

tolerance.

they

Driving

under the influence was classified as a civil offense - in
effect

only

"forfeiture
Stat.

1975.

a
of

traffic
not

more

Moreover,

offense
than

$200".

the case

~
~

requiring
§ 346 • 6 5

wi sc .

been considered by
<!

three Wisconsin courts and,

(2 )

a

14&lcl-e. G?

I

in the end, '\ e<>1:1ld Aave · beefii'O

2.

t +l_~

~ ~Ct.

~-cf' f

htt

"L

L

at: lea-st arguab.l~ on fa c tual ground)\ 1

decided -

The

decision of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin therefore has
little

or

no

precedential

importance

outside

of

that

state.
Remaining

convinced

that

this

is

a

case

the

Court should not have taken, I agree that the case should
be

dismissed

accord,

as

however,

opinions.

improvidently

granted.

am

I

not

in

with either the plurality or dissenting

Justice

Rehnquist

would

reach

not

the

constitutional question because the Wisconsin statute, at
the

1 B.t..:,tf'._ ~ ~

c_

-

C:..~ c:t.. ~~

4--ktJ--~~(.,\..L.)

_____--.~

time

of

petitioner's

arrest,

did

not

expressly

say

1 The Wisconsin Cour
Appeals reversed the
trial court, concluding that
warrantless entry and
arrest of petitioner violated the Fourth Amendment. That
court remanded the case, however, for further findings as
to whether the police had entered petitioner's home with
consent - an issue the state trial court had not decided.
\ Jfhe Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed the intermediate
K~ppellate co u r t, concluding that exigent circ ums t ances
jus tif i e d the war rantless entrv and a r re s t .
~ .:.....:/
'•'
\
I
Ia
..(
)

~tuy

[.....

"':":~

kuJ.., WAM

~t

..

~J~JF ~ ~d
~t -<"
~ ~d_ ~~' ~k4-t....~ ~ c,.;.c.....;,.. u
t

I

I

I

~
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3.

that the required arrest must be "lawful".

This argument

is advanced despite the fact that both the Wisconsin Court
of Appeals

and

req~ing

a

Supreme Court
lawful

by

the

unreasonable

to assume

intent.

courts

the

Quite

arrest.

construction

statutory

read

of

state statute as
apart

from

Wisconsin,

I

find

it

to

the

that any doubt exists as

When

an

"arrest"

is

a

this

statutory

~~· ~
prerequisite to imposition of a penalty,

~

an only

me~

~~\ :f!L'j~j

1

a lawful ra ther than an unlawful arrest .
I therefore agree with Justice Brennan's view as
to

the

construction

of

the

Wisconsin

statute.

thought it were appropriate for this Court to decide the

l~ ~trlt·.

,

this

case

constituted

Fourteenth Amendments.

···.

I

have no doubt that Athe arrest
a

violation

of

the

Payton v. New York,

inL~·~~

Fourth

and

u.s.

573

445

/)

4.
¥ •

(1980 ~ held

home

s

that a warrantless nonconsenJ ual entry into a

to make a

felony arrest

is unconstitutional absent

.P-4~~~

~ ~ t circumstances.

The privacy of the home deserves

at least as much protection under the Fourth Amendment in
warrantless entry to arrest for
v
,
_
_
__.:;;.._J In my view the Su...
preme Court of Wisconsin errea in finding that the entry was
traffic offense./\
justified by exigent circumstances.' l.. There was, however,
conflicting evidence as to whether the entry had been consenAl though ~sual, and it is agreed there was probable cause to arrest.
sent remained to be derided.blLthe Wisconsin
The i~ue of
courts.(
disagreement
- least of all a 4-4 disagreement would be

the

case of

a

as to the possible meaning of the state statute, this is a
further

reason for

dismissing this case as improvidently

granted.

t.

J

/I agree with the finding of the Wisconsin Court of Appeals that in this
case there was neither "hot pursuit" nor other circumstances that required
this night time entry into respondent's home. Preservation of evidence,
for example, does not in every case create an exigency sufficient to justify
warrantless entry into the home. In this case, the State's interest in the
evidence was relatively slight. Under Wisconsin law, only a traffic offense had been committed. Nor had there been a showing that a warrant
could not have been obtained promptly.
/ I do not think it is necessary in this case to consider a "bright line" rule
as to less serious offenses. See, JUSTICE BRENNAN's opinion, Part II, A,
ante, at 8. It is settled that exigent circumstances may justify a warrantless entry where a felony reasonably is believed to have been committed.
I see no reason in this case to foreclose the possibility that some circumstances may justify a warrantless entry where the offense is less serious
than a felony.
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JUSTICE POWELL, concurring.

\(1Jt;~ 4"~

I j v t ed t

f

deny certiorari in this case, and the

opinions of my Brothers filed today reinfore my view that
it was a mistake for this Court to review this case.

The

Wisconsin laws with respect to driving while intoxicated,
in

effect

suggest

an

at

the

time,

may

extraordinary

be

degree

unique.
of

At

least,

tolerance.

they

Driving

under the influence was classified as a civil offense - in
effect only a traffic offense - requiring a "forfeiture of
not

more

than

$200".

§346.65(2)

Wise.

Stat.

1975.

}~~J~~~--~

Moreover, ~ase has been considered by three Wisconsin
~

courts

I

-4..'6 .,
~ in t !

,I

end [ cd uld

be

decided

on

factual

I

2.

v

grounds

that

the

state court has yet

to

consj er • 1

.)+-~

~

~ u,.;.~.o~
deeil; ioz:l

--lkJ ~ ~ ~J... ~ ~ +o
{;£ ;-B-e Su~~reme C01ut of Wi &;cons in therefor~ ha ~
0

~~~r~o ~:: ~rt~n~o~s~~~
<tS"t ~ ~Y-d
4.skcL..f.L_
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-lo ~"Lu- ~.L o..rl.d':L

/;~d. Rem 1n1ng

this

is

a

case

the

Court should not have taken, I agree that the case should
be

dismissed

as

improvidently

g~

am

not

in

~eew"

constitutional question because the Wisconsin statute, at

1 The Wisconsin Court of Appeals

reversed the
trial
court,
concluding
that
absent
consent
the
warrantless entry and arrest of petitioner violated the
Fourth Amendment.
That court remanded the case, however,
for further findings as to whether the police had entered
petitioner's horne with consent - an 'ssue the state trial
court had not decided. Before the
could consider that
issue,
the
Wisconsin
Supreme
Cou t
reversed
the
intermediate appellate court, conclud'ng that exigent
circumstances justified the warrantless entry and arrest.
Thus ~ t may be that the warrantless e
ry and arrest are
justified even in the absence of exige t circumstances.

)

3.

the

time

of

petitioner's

arrest,

did

not

expressly

that the required arrest must be "lawful".

say

This argument

is advanced despite the fact that both the Wisconsin Court
of Appeals
requiring

and Supreme Court
a

lawful
by

the

unreasonable

to assume

intent.

courts

the state statute as

Quite

arrest.

construction

statutory

read

of

an

from

Wisconsin,

that any doubt

When

apart
I

find

exists as

"arrest"

is

a

this
it

to the

statutory

prerequisite to imposition of a penalty, this Court should
assume

the

statute

requires

a

lawful

rather

than

an

unlawful arrest.
I therefore agree with Justice Brennan's view as

MO'\.J..~J

to the construction of the Wisconsin statute.
(\

~~

doubt that abser t epmsemt the warrantless entry and arrest
in

•••

this

case

constituted a

violation of

the Fourth and

4.

Fourteenth Amendments.
(1980~held

)

u.s.

Payton v. New York, 445

573

that a warrantless nonconsensual entry into a

horne to make a felony arrest is unconstitutional absent
exigent circumstances.

The privacy of the horne deserves

at least as much protection under the Fourth Amendment in
the case of a warrantless entry to arrest for
traffic offense.,
~

bJ bCP t:Lc~

QJ ~'

a civil

my view the Supreme Court of Wisconsin

arl,.6

eli':.~litHii in finding that the entry was justified by exigent

circurnstances.2

- -------------------

the entry had been consensual,

and it is

---.....__

with the finding of the
Appeals that in this case there was neither "ho
pursuit" nor other circumstances that required this night
time entry into respondent's horne.
Preservation of
evidence, for example, does not in every case create an
exigency sufficient to justify warrantless entry into the
horne. In this case, the State's interest in the evidence
was relatively slight.
Under Wisconsin law, only a
traffic offense had been committed. Nor had there been a
showing that a warrant could not have been obtain
promptly.

5.

a~ere

was probable cause to arrest.

The

remained to be decided by the Wisconsin courts. 3

Although

it had

not occurred to me that there

would be disagreement - least of all a 4-4 disagreement as to the possible meaning of the state statute, this is a
further

reason for dismissing this case as improvidently

granted.

'.
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/ I do
not join the reasoning of ehe pl u r ~-:-r "~
drJ.V1)p 1nion,
and
particularly
do
not
concur
in
the
establishment of a "bright line" principle. See, Part II,
A, ante, at 8.
It is settled that exigent circumstances
may justify a warrantless entry where a felony reasonably
is believed to have been committed.
I see no reason in
this
case
to
foreclose
the
possibility
that
some
circumstances may justify a warrantless entry where the
offense is less serious than a felony.

...A,M J..
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JUSTICE POWELL, concurring.
I voted to deny certiorari in this case, and the
opinions of my Brothers filed today reinfore my view that
it was a mistake for this Court to review this case.

The

Wisconsin laws with respect to driving while intoxicated,
in effect at the time,
suggest

an

may be unique.

extraordinary degree

of

At least,

tolerance.
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Driving

under the influence was classified as a civil offense - in
effect only a traffic offense - requiring a "forfeiture of
not

more

than
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Wise.

Stat.

1975.

Moreover, the case has been considered by three Wisconsin
courts

and,

in

the

end,

could

be

decided

on

factual

2.

grounds

that

the

state court has yet

to consder • 1

The

decision of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin therefore has
little

or

no

precedential

importance

outside

of

that

state.
Remaining

convinced

that

this

is

a

case

the

Court should not have taken, I agree that the case should
be

dismissed

accord,

as

however,

opinions.

improvidently

granted.

I

am

not

in

with either the plurality or dissenting

Justice

Rehnquist

would

not

reach

the

constitutional question because the Wisconsin statute, at

1 The Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed the
trial
court,
concluding
that
absent
consent
the
warrantless entry and arrest of petitioner violated the
Fourth Amendment.
That court remanded the case, however,
for further findings as to whether the police had entered
petitioner's home with consent - an issue the state trial
court had not decided. Before the TC could consider that
issue,
the
Wisconsin
Supreme
Court
reversed
the
intermediate appellate court, concluding that exigent
circumstances justified the warrantless entry and arrest.
Thus it may be that the warrantless entry and arrest are
justified even in the absence of exigent circumstances.
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2 r agree with the finding of the Wisconsin
Court of Appeals that in this case there was neither "hot
pursuit" nor other circumstances that required this night
time entry into respondent's home.
Preservation of
evidence, for example, does not in every case create an
exigency sufficient to justify warrantless entry into the
home.
In this case, the State's interest in the evidence
was relatively slight.
Under Wisconsin law, only a
traffic offense had been committed. Nor had there been a
showing that a warrant could not have been obtained
promptly.
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opinion,
and
particularly
do
not
concur
in
the
establishment of a "bright line" principle. See, Part II,
A, ante, at 8.
It is settled that exigent circumstances
may justify a warrantless entry where a felony reasonably
is believed to have been committed.
I see no reason in
this
case
to
foreclose
the
possibility
that
some
circumstances may justify a warrantless entry where the
offense is less serious than a felony.

WIS SALLY-POW

lfp/ss 02/20/84

82-5466 WELSH v. WISCONSIN

JUSTICE POWELL, concurring.
I

originally voted

to deny certiorari

in

this

.

c.

case, and the opinions of my Brothers filed today re1nfore
1'\

my view that
this

case.

it was a mistake for
The Wisconsin

while intoxicated,
At

tolerance.
a

civil

requiring

laws with

respect

to driving

in effect at the time, may be unique.

they

least,

this Court to review

suggest

an

extraordinary

degree

of

Driving under the influence was classified as

offense
a

-

in

effect

"forfeiture

§346.65(2) Wise. Stat. 1975.

of

only
not

a

traffic
more

offense

than

-

$200".

Moreover, although the case

has been considered by three Wisconsin courts, in the end,

2.

be decided on

factual

court has yet to consider • 1

~~
~··"'-'

4o

~~

M-1Vl..L

lt,Ft

grounds

that the state

It is

~~~~

Court should not rtl; t

bo

of

adEiress the cen-stitut:iGAall

~.J.o

the warrantless entry and arrest challenged here until the

~)~)

state

(!;u_p. ~ ~~

dAy~

$~
court hits had

the opportunity to consider

1\

1\

these

additional factual grounds.
emaining

convince

is

a

case

t

Court should not have taken, I agree that the case should
be

dismissed

as

improvidently

granted.

I

am

~

cj

with

not

i

dissenting

1The Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed the
trial
court,
concluding
that
absent
consent
the
warrantless entry and arrest of petitioner violated the
Fourth Amendment. That court remanded the case, however,
for further findings as to whether the police had entered
petitioner's home with consent - an issue the state trial
court had not decided.
Before the trial court could
consider that issue, the Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed
the intermediate appellate court, concluding that exigent
circumstances justified the warrantless entry and arrest.
Thus it may be that the warrantless entry and arrest are
justified even in the absence of exigent circumstances.

11 LJ.L~L_; ;J

~~4A--

~

~

" '
~19

~~,to~~ ~d?.A
~~.b?C~.?.t~

,,

-~

3.

opinions.

time

of

would

question~se
1\

constitutional
the

plurality

The

petitioner's

not

reach

the

the Wisconsin statute, at

arrest,

did

not

expressly say

that the required arrest must be "lawful".

This argument

is advanced despite the fact that both the Wisconsin Court
of Appeals
requiring

and
a

Supreme Court

lawful
by

the

unreasonable

to assume

intent.

courts

the

Quite

arrest.

construction

statutory

read

of

state statute as
apart

from

Wisconsin,

I

find

that any doubt exists as

When

an

"arrest"

is

a

this
it

to the

statutory

prerequisite to imposition of a penalty, this Court should
assume

the

statute

requires

a

lawful

rather

than

an

unlawful arrest.
I therefore agree with Justice Brennan's view as
to the construction of the Wisconsin statute.

Moreover, I

4.

have
and

no doubt
arrest

that absent consent the warrantless entry

in

this case constituted a

Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.
U.S.
entry

573

held

(1980),

into

a

home

unconstitutional

that
to

absent

a

violation of

the

Payton v. New York, 445

warrantless

make

a

exigent

nonconsensual

felony

arrest

circumstances.

is
The

privacy of the home deserves at least as much protection
under

the Fourth Amendment

in the case of a warrantless

entry to arrest for a civil traffic offense.

In my view

the Supreme Court of Wisconsin erred in finding that the
entry

.

-

\.A~~~

was

justified

by

exigent

circumstances.

I

agree

with the finding of the Wisconsin Court of Appeals that in

y~)·d-~~

~--- +o-'JttL~
\:.t-

this

case

there

was

neither

"hot

pursuit"

nor

other

~ -t-~+

.r~~

-f.o~~)

l~ff'-1-S"~
~~U)

circumstances

that

respondent's home.

required

this

night-time

entry

into

Preservation of evidence, for example,

s.

does not in every case create an exigency sufficient to
justify warrantless entry into the home.
the

State's

slight.
been

interest

in

the

evidence

In this case,
was

relatively

Under Wisconsin law, only a traffic offense had

committed.

Nor

had

there

been

a

showing

that

a

warrant could not have been obtained promptly. 2
In sum, I agree only with the conclusion of the
plurality

that

this

case

should

be

dismissed

as

improvidently granted.

been finally determined by the state cou

'i.,~~
2I
not JOln ~ r easoning= =tff - Justice
enting opinion, ~ particularly do 1'\et
~-E!'&J~~-TH--eff'e-::-te-&6-a.c...u'.$.1=Haen-t of a " b r i g h t 1 in e" p r inc i p 1 e •
A, ante, at 8. It is settled that exigent
circumstances may JUStify a warrantless entry where a
felony reasonably is believed to have been committed.
I
see no reason in this case to foreclose the possibili tv
that some circumstances may justify a warrantless entry
where the offense is less serious than a felony.

r

6.

least of all a 4-4
statute,

this is a further

lfp/ss 02/20/84

WIS SALLY-POW
82-5466 WELSH v. WISCONSIN

JUSTICE POWELL, concurring.
I
case,

and

originally voted
the

opinions

to deny certiorari

of

my

Brothers

filed

in

this
today

reinforce my view that it was a mistake for this Court to
agree to review the case.

The Wisconsin laws with respect

to driving while intoxicated,
be unique.

At least, they suggest an extraordinary degree

of tolerance.

Driving under the influence was classified

as a civil offense requiring

in effect at the time, may

a

in effect only a traffic offense -

"forfeiture

§346.65(2) Wise. Stat. 1975.

of

not

more

than

$200".

Moreover, although the case

has been considered by three Wisconsin courts, in the end,

2.

it

could

be

decided

on

factual

court has yet to consider. 1

It

grounds

that

the

state

is my opinion that this

Court should not have. taken this case to consider either
the meaning of the Wisconsin statute or the validity of
the warrantless entry and arrest challenged here until the
state courts have had

the opportunity to consider these

additional factual grounds.
Although

I

would

dismiss

the

case

as

improvidently granted, I write briefly to record my views
on

the

positions

taken

by

the

plurality

and

dissenting

1 The Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed the
trial
court,
concluding
that
absent
consent
the
warrantless entry and arrest of petitioner violated the
Fourth Amendment.
That court remanded the case, however,
for further findings as to whether the police had entered
petitioner's home with consent - an issue the state trial
court had not decided.
Before the trial court could
consider that issue, the Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed
the intermediate appellate court, concluding that exigent
circumstances justified the warrantless entry and arrest.
Thus it may be that the warrantless entry and arrest are
justified even in the absence of exigent circumstances.

3.

opinions.

constitutional
statute,

plurality

The

at

question

the

time

of

would

only

reach

not

because

petitioner's

the

the

Wisconsin

arrest,

did

not

expressly say that the required arrest must be "lawful".
This argument is advanced despite the fact that both the
Wisconsin

Court

of

Appeals

and

Supreme

Court

state statute as requiring a lawful arrest.

read

the

Quite apart

from this construction by the courts of Wisconsin, I find
it unreasonable to assume that any doubt exists as to the
statutory

intent.

When

an

"arrest"

is

a

statutory

prerequisite to imposition of a penalty, this Court should
assume

the

statute

requires

a

lawful

rather

than

an

unlawful arrest.
I therefore agree with Justice Brennan's view as
to the construction of the Wisconsin statute.

Moreover, I

4.

have no doubt

that

and

this case constituted

arrest

in

absent consent the warrantless entry

Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.

u.s.
entry

573

held

(1980),

into

a

home

unconstitutional

that
to

absent

a

a

violation of

the

Payton v. New York, 445

warrantless

a

make
exigent

nonconsensual

felony

arrest

circumstances.

is
The

privacy of the home deserves at least as much protection
under

the Fourth Amendment in the case of a warrantless
In my view

entry to arrest for a civil traffic offense.

the Supreme Court of Wisconsin erred in finding that the
entry

was

justified

by

exigent

circumstances.

I

agree

with the finding of the Wisconsin Court of Appeals that in
this

case

there

circumstances

that

respondent's home.

was

neither

required

"hot

this

pursuit"

night-time

nor
entry

other
into

Preservation of evidence, for example,

5.

does not

in every case create an exigency sufficient to

justify warrantless entry
the

State's

slight.
been

interest

in

into the home.
the

evidence

In this case,
was

relatively

Under Wisconsin law, only a traffic offense had

committed.

Nor

had

there

been

a

showing

that

a

warrant could not have been obtained promptly. 2
In sum, I agree only with the conclusion of the
plurality

that

this

case

should

be

dismissed

as

improvidently granted.

2I do
not join Justice Brennan's dissenting
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1st CHAMBERS DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 82-5466
EDWARD G. WELSH, PETITIONER v. WISCONSIN
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT
OF WISCONSIN
[January - , 1984]

JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in the judgment.
This is a case the Court should not have taken. The Wisconsin statutes with respect to driving "under the influence
of an intoxicant" may be unique. At least, they suggest an
unusual degree of tolerance. Driving under the influence is
classified as a civil offense-in effect only a traffic offenserequiring a "forfeiture of not more than $200." Section
346.65(2) Wise. Stat. 1975. 1
Under Wisconsin law, one who drives on the public roads
"shall be deemed to have given consent to a chemical test ...
for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of his
blood if arrested and issued a citation for driving ... while
under the influence of an intoxicant. . . ." This constructive
consent does not allow a chemical test to be given without the
actual consent of th,e person arrested. If, however, refusal
to take the test is found to be unreasonable, the State automatically suspends the driver's license for 60 days. Sections
343.305(1) and 343.305(2) Wise. Stat. 1975.
In this case, respondent ran his car off the road and deserted it before the police arrived. Some thirty minutes
later, the police arrived at respondent's home and made a
warrantless entry and arrest on the reasonable belief that
'A second offense within five years is a misdemeanor, carrying a penalty
of imprisonment for not less than five days nor more than a year and a potential fine of not more than $500. Section 346.65(2) Wise. Stat. 1975.

82-5466---CONCUR
WELSH v. WISCONSIN

2

respondent had been driving under the influence at the time
of the accident. Respondent refused to submit to the
required chemical test on the ground that his warrantless
home arrest was unconstitutional under Payton v. New York,
445 U. S. 573 (1980). The Wisconsin Supreme Court,
reversing the state Court of Appeals, found that exigent
circumstances justified the warrantless entry and arrest. It
did not address the State's further contention that
respondent's wife and daughters had consented to the entry
by the police. Because it found that the arrest was lawful,
the Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded that respondent's
refusal to submit to the chemical test was unreasonable as a
matter of state law and that a 60-day suspension of
respondent's driving license was warranted.
There are three reasons why this Court should not have
granted certiorari: (i) the Wisconsin laws with respect to
driving while intoxicated may be unique, 2 (ii) the only
constitutional question in the case--the warrantless entrywas resolved essentially by Payton, and (iii) the factual issue
whether consent was given to the entry was not addressed by
the Wisconsin Supreme Court.
Even absent exigent
circumstances, therefore, the case therefore should be
remanded as there was a conflict of evidence on the consent
issue.
Nevertheless, there were four votes to grant the case.
Following argument and consideration at Conference, there
were five votes to dismiss the case as improvidently granted,
a result that I joined for the reasons above stated. As
JusTICE BRENNAN'S opinion states, the four Justices who
voted to grant the case "remain persuaded that the merits of
the case should be decided." Ante, at 16. After further
consideration, I have concluded that in these circumstances it
2

In view of the current focus of public attention on the shocking number
of deaths and serious injuries occasioned by intoxicated drivers, one reasonably may assume that Wisconsin-like other states-will be reexamining its curiously tolerant laws.

J
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3

would be inappropriate to dismiss this case against the views
of the Justices who granted it. In his separate opinion in
Ferguson v. Moore-McCormick Lines, 352 U. S. 521, 559
(1957) Justice Harlan explained why the Rule of Four
normally requires decision on the merits in this situation.
See, ante, at 17.
I find the reasoning of Justice Harlan persuasive and in the
best interest of the Court institutionally. Accordingly, I
also address the merits. Under our decision in Payton, a
warrantless nonconsensual entry into the home to make a
felony arrest is unconstitutional absent exigent
circumstances. The privacy of the home deserves at least as
much protection under the Fourth Amendment in the case of
a warrantless entry to arrest for a civil traffic offense. In
my view the Supreme Court of Wisconsin erred in finding
that the entry was justified by exigent circumstances. 3
There was, however, conflicting evidence as to whether the
entry had been consensual, and it is agreed there was
probable cause to arrest. The issue of consent remains to be
decided by the Wisconsin courts. 4 Accordingly, I also would
vacate the judgment of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin and
remand the case for further proceedings.
I agree with the finding of the Wisconsin Court of Appeals that in this
case there was neither "hot pursuit" nor other circumstances that required
this night time entry into respondent's home. Preservation of evidence,
for example, does not in every case create an exigency sufficient to justify
warrantless entry into the home. In this case, the State's interest in the
evidence was relatively slight. Under Wisconsin law, only a traffic offense had been committed. Nor had there been a showing that a warrant
could not have been obtained promptly.
'I do not join the reasoning of the plurality opinion, and particularly
do not concur in the establishment of a "bright line" principle. See, Part
II, A, ante, at 8. It is settled that exigent circumstances may justify a
warrantless entry where a felony reasonably is believed to have been committed. I see no reason in this case to foreclose the possibility that some
circumstances may justify a warrantless entry where the offense is less serious than a felony.
3
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JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in the judgment.
This is a case the Court should not have taken. The Wisconsin statutes with respect to driving "under the influence
of an intoxicant" may be unique. At least, they suggest an
unusual degree of tolerance. Driving under the influence is
classified as a civil offense-in effect only a traffic offenserequiring a "forfeiture of not more than $200." Section
346. 65(2) Wise. Stat. 1975. 1
Under Wisconsin law, one who drives on the public roads
"shall be deemed to have given consent to a chemical test . . .
for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of his
blood if arrested and issued a citation for driving ... while
under the influence of an intoxicant. . . ." This constructive
consent does not allow a chemical test to be given without the
actual consent of the person arrested. If, however, refusal
to take the test is found to be unreasonable, the State automatically suspends the driver's license for 60 days. Sections
343.305(1) and 343.305(2) Wise. Stat. 1975.
In this case, respondent ran his car off the road and deserted it before the police arrived. Some thirty minutes
later, the police arrived at respondent's home and made a
warrantless entry and arrest on the reasonable belief that
'A second offense within five years is a misdemeanor, carrying a penalty
of imprisonment for not less than five days nor more than a year and a potential fine of not more than $500. Section 346.65(2) Wise. Stat. 1975.
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respondent had been driving under the influence at the time
of the accident. Respondent refused to submit to the
required chemical test on the ground that his warrantless
home arrest was unconstitutional under Payton v. New York,
445 U. S. 573 (1980). The Wisconsin Supreme Court,
reversing the state Court of Appeals, found that exigent
circumstances justified the warrantless entry and arrest. It
did not address the State's further contention that
respondent's wife and daughters had consented to the entry
by the police. Because it found that the arrest was lawful,
the Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded that respondent's
refusal to submit to the chemical test was unreasonable as a
matter of state law and that a 60-day suspension of
respondent's driving license was warranted.
There are three reasons why this Court should not have
granted certiorari: (i) the Wisconsin laws with respect to
driving while intoxicated may be unique, 2 (ii) the only
constitutional question in the case-the warrantless entrywas resolved essentially by Payton, and (iii) the factual issue
whether consent was given to the entry was not addressed by
the Wisconsin Supreme Court.
Even absent exigent
circumstances, therefore, the case therefore should be
remanded as there was a conflict of evidence on the consent
issue.
Nevertheless, there were four votes to grant the case.
Following argument and consideration at Conference, there
were five votes to dismiss the case as improvidently granted,
a result that I joined for the reasons above stated. As
JUSTICE BRENNAN's opinion states, the four Justices who
voted to grant the case "remain persuaded that the merits of
the case should be decided." Ante, at 16. After further
consideration, I have concluded that in these circumstances it
' In view of the current focus of public attention on the shocking number
of deaths and serious injuries occasioned by intoxicated drivers, one reasonably may assume that Wisconsin-like other states-will be reexamining its curiously tolerant laws.
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would be inappropriate to dismiss this case against the views
of the Justices who granted it. In his separate opinion in
Ferguson v. Moore-McCormick Lines, 352 U. S. 521, 559
(1957) Justice Harlan explained why the Rule of Four
normally requires decision on the merits in this situation.
See, ante, at 17.
I find the reasoning of Justice Harlan persuasive and in the
best interest of the Court institutionally. Accordingly, I
also address the merits. Under our decision in Payton, a
warrantless nonconsensual entry into the home to make a
felony arrest is unconstitutional absent exigent
circumstances. The privacy of the home deserves at least as
much protection under the Fourth Amendment in the case of
a warrantless entry to arrest for a civil traffic offense. In
my view the Supreme Court of Wisconsin erred in finding
that the entry was justified by exigent circumstances. 3
There was, however, conflicting evidence as to whether the
entry had been consensual, and it is agreed there was
probable cause to arrest. The issue of consent remains to be
decided by the Wisconsin courts. 4 Accordingly, I also would
vacate the judgment of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin and
remand the case for further proceedings.
3
I agree with the finding of the Wisconsin Court of Appeals that in this
case there was neither "hot pursuit" nor other circumstances that required
this night time entry into respondent's home. Preservation of evidence,
for example, does not in every case create an exigency sufficient to justify
warrantless entry into the home. In this case, the State's interest in the
evidence was relatively slight. Under Wisconsin law, only a traffic offense had been committed. Nor had there been a showing that a warrant
could not have been obtained promptly.
' I do not join the reasoning of the plurality opinion, and particularly
do not concur in the establishment of a "bright line" principle. See, Part
II, A, ante, at 8. It is settled that exigent circumstances may justify a
warrantless entry where a felony reasonably is believed to have been committed. I see no reason in this case to foreclose the possibility that some
circumstances may justify a warrantless entry where the offense is less serious than a felony.
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of an intoxicant" may be unique. At least, they suggest an
unusual degree of tolerance. Driving under the influence is
classified as a civil offense-in effect only a traffic offenserequiring a "forfeiture of not more than $200." Section
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Under Wisconsin law, one who drives on the public roads
"shall be deemed to have given consent to a chemical test ...
for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of his
blood if arrested and issued a citation for driving . . . while
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consent does not allow a chemical test to be given without the
actual consent of the person arrested. If, however, refusal
to take the test is found to be unreasonable, the State automatically suspends the driver's license for 60 days. Sections
343.305(1) and 343.305(2) Wise. Stat. 1975.
In this case, respondent ran his car off the road and deserted it before the police arrived. Some thirty minutes
later, the police arrived at respondent's home and made a
warrantless entry and arrest on the reasonable belief that
A second offense within five years is a misdemeanor, carrying a penalty
of imprisonment for not less than five days nor more than a year and a potential fine of not more than $500. Section-346.65(2) Wise. Stat. 1975.
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later, the police arrived at respondent's home and made a
warrantless entry and arrest on the reasonable belief that
A second offense within five years is a misdemeanor, carrying a penalty
of imprisonment for not less than five days nor more than a year and a potential fine of not more than $500. Section-346.65(2) Wise. Stat. 1975.
1
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and (ijlJ the factual issue
whether consent was given to the entry was not addressed by
the Wisconsin Supreme Court.
Even absent exigent
circumstances, therefore, the case therefore should be
remanded as there was a conflict of evidence on the consen

Nevertheless, there were four votes to grant the case.
Following argument and consideration at Conference, there
were five votes to dismiss the case as improvidently granted,
a result that I joined for the reasons above stated. As
JUSTICE BRENNAN'S opinion states, the four Justices who
voted to grant the case "remain persuaded that the merits of
the case should be decided." Ante, at 16. After further
consideration, I have concluded that in these circumstances it
In view of the current focus of public attention on the shocking number
of deaths and serious injuries occasioned by intoxicated drivers, one reasonably may assume that Wisconsin-like other states-will be reexamining its curiously tolerant laws.
2
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JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in the judgment.
This is a case the Court should not have taken. The Wisconsin statutes with respect to driving "under the influence
of an intoxicant" may be unique. At least, they suggest an
unusual degree of tolerance. Driving under the influence is
classified as a civil offense-in effect only a traffic offenserequiring a "forfeiture of not more than $200." Section
346. 65(2) Wise. Stat. 1975. 1
Under Wisconsin law, one who drives on the public roads
"shall be deemed to have given consent to a chemical test ...
for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of his
blood if arrested and issued a citation for driving . . . while
under the influence of an intoxicant .... " This constructive
consent does not allow a chemical test to be given without the
actual consent of the person arrested. If, however, refusal
to take the test is found to be unreasonable, the State automatically suspends the driver's license for 60 days. Sections
343.305(1) and 343.305(2) Wise. Stat. 1975.
In this case, respondent ran his car off the road and deserted it before the police arrived. Some thirty minutes
later, the police arrived at respondent's home and made a
warrantless entry and arrest on the reasonable belief that
A second offense within five years is a misdemeanor, carrying a penalty
of imprisonment for not less than five days nor more than a year and a potential fine of not more than $500. Section 346.65(2) Wise. Stat. 1975.
1
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respondent had been driving under the influence at the time
of the accident. Respondent refused to submit to the required chemical test on the ground that his warrantless home
arrest was unconstitutional under Payton v. New York, 445
U. S. 573 (1980). The Wisconsin Supreme Court, reversing
the state Court of Appeals, found that exigent circumstances
justified the warrantless entry and arrest. It did not address the State's further contention that respondent's wife
and daughters had consented to the entry by the police. Because it found that the arrest was lawful, the Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded that respondent's refusal to submit tothe chemical test was unreasonable as a matter of state law
and that a 60-day suspension of respondent's driving license
was warranted.
There are several reasons why this Court should not have
granted certiorari. The Wisconsin laws with respect to driving while intoxicated may well be unique. The decision of
the Wisconsin Supreme Court therefore would have had little
precedential importance. 2 Moreover, the factual issue
whether consent was given to the entry was not addressed by
the Wisconsin Supreme Court even though there was a conflict of evidence on the issue. 3
Nevertheless, there were four votes to grant the case.
Following argument and consideration at Conference, there
were five votes to dismiss the case as improvidently granted,
a result that I joined for the reasons above stated. As JusTICE BRENNAN's opinion states, the four Justices who voted
to grant the case "remain persuaded that the merits of the
2
In view of the current focus of public attention on the shocking number
of deaths and serious injuries occasioned by intoxicated drivers, one reasonably may assume that Wisconsin-like other states-will be reexamining its curiously tolerant laws.
3
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, concluding
that the warrantless entry and arrest of petitioner violated the Fourth
Amendment. That Court remanded the case, however, for further findings as to whether the police had entered petitioner's home with consentan issue the state trial court had not decided.
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case should be decided." Ante, at 16. After further consideration, I have concluded that in these circumstances it
would be inappropriate to dismiss this case against the views
of the Justices who granted it. In his separate opinion in
Ferguson v. Moore-McCormick Lines, 352 U. S. 521, 559,
560 (1957) Justice Harlan explained why the Rule of Four
normally requires decision on the merits in this situation.
See, ante, at 17.
I find the reasoning of Justice Harlan persuasive and in the
best interest of the Court as an institution in which rules are
followed consistently. 4 Accordingly, I also address the merits. Under our decision in Payton, a warrantless nonconsensual entry into the home to make a felony arrest is unconstitutional absent exigent circumstances. The privacy of
the home deserves at least as much protection under the
Fourth Amendment in the case of a warrantless entry to arrest for a civil traffic offense. In my view the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin erred in finding that the entry was justified by exigent circumstances. 5 There was, however, conflicting evidence as to whether the entry had been consensual, and it is agreed there was probable cause to arrest.
'Justice Harlen did qualify his strict adherence to the rule of four by
saying that it must be respected "in the absence of considerations appearing which were not manifest or fully apprehended at the time certiorari
was granted." ld., at 559. The considerations that prompted me to vote
to deny the petition for certiorari are essentially the same I have identified
above. It was my opinion then, as it is now, that the warrentless entry
and arrest for a civil offense was unlawful, but the case itself falls far short
of being important enough for this Court to review it. The four Justices
who voted to grant simply viewed the case differently.
6
I agree with the finding of the Wisconsin Court of Appeals that in this
case there was neither "hot pursuit" nor other circumstances that required
this night time entry into respondent's home. Preservation of evidence,
for example, does not in every case create an exigency sufficient to justify
warrantless entry into the home. In this case, the State's interest in the
evidence was relatively slight. Under Wisconsin law, only a traffic offense had been committed. Nor had there been a showing that a warrant
could not have been obtained promptly.
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The issue of consent remained to be decided by the Wisconsin
courts. 6 Accordingly, I also would vacate the judgment of
the Supreme Court of Wisconsin and remand the case for further proceedings.

I do not think it is necessary in this case to consider a "bright line" rule
as to less serious offenses. See, JusTICE BRENNAN's opinion, Part II, A,
ante, at 8. It is settled that exigent circumstances may justify a warrantless entry where a felony reasonably is believed to have been committed.
I see no reason in this case to foreclose the possibility that some circumstances may justify a warrantless entry where the offense is less serious
than a felony. I therefore join only in the judgment.
6
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JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting.
This is a case the Court should not have taken. The Wisconsin statutes with respect to driving "under the influence
of an intoxicant" may be unique. At least, they suggest an
unusual degree of tolerance. Driving under the influence is
classified as a civil offense-in effect only a traffic offenserequiring a "forfeiture of not more than $200." Section
346.65(2) Wise. Stat. 1975. 1
Under Wisconsin law, one who drives on the public roads
"shall be deemed to have given consent to a chemical test ...
for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of his
blood if arrested and issued a citation for driving ... while
under the influence of an intoxicant .... " This constructive
consent does not allow a chemical test to be given without the
actual consent of the person arrested. If, however, refusal
to take the test is found to be unreasonable, the State automatically suspends the driver's license for 60 days. Sections
343.305(1) and 343.305(2) Wise. Stat. 1975.
In this case, respondent ran his car off the road and deserted it before the police arrived. Some thirty minutes
later, the police arrived at respondent's home and made a
warrantless entry and arrest on the reasonable belief that
1
A second offense within five years is a misdemeanor, carrying a penalty
of imprisonment for not less than five days nor more than a year and a potential fine of not more than $500. Section 346.65(2) Wise. Stat. 1975.
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respondent had been driving under the influence at the time
of the accident. Respondent refused to submit to the required chemical test on the ground that his warrantless home
arrest was unconstitutional under Payton v. New York, 445
U. S. 573 (1980). The Wisconsin Supreme Court, reversing
the state Court of Appeals, found that exigent circumstances
justified the warrantless entry and arrest. It did not address the State's further contention that respondent's wife
and daughters had consented to the entry by the police. Because it found that the arrest was lawful, the Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded that respondent's refusal to submit to
the chemical test was unreasonable as a matter of state law
and that a 60-day suspension of respondent's driving license
was warranted.
There are several reasons why this Court should not have
granted certiorari. The Wisconsin laws with respect to driving while intoxicated may well be unique. The decision of
the Wisconsin Supreme Court therefore would have had little
precedential importance. 2 Moreover, the factual issue
whether consent was given to the entry was not addressed by
the Wisconsin Supreme Court even though there was a conflict of evidence on the issue. 3
Nevertheless, there were four votes to grant the case.
Following argument and consideration at Conference, there
were five votes to dismiss the case as improvidently granted,
a result that I joined for the reasons above stated. The four
Justices who voted to grant the case remain persuaded that
the merits of the case should be decided. After further con2

In view of the current focus of public attention on the shocking number
of deaths and serious injuries occasioned by intoxicated drivers, one reasonably may assume that Wisconsin-like other states-will be reexamining its ~i8lililly talePSHt laws.
3
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, concluding
that the warrantless entry and arrest of petitioner violated the Fourth
Amendment. That Court remanded the case, however, for further findings as to whether the police had entered petitioner's home with consentan issue the state trial court had not decided.
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sideration, I have concluded that in these circumstances it
would be inappropriate to dismiss this case against the views
of the Justices who granted it. In his separate opinion in
Ferguson v. Moore-McCormick Lines, 352 U.S. 521, 559,
560 (1957) Justice Harlan explained why the Rule of Four
normally requires decision on the merits in this situation.
"I think the Court should not have heard any of these
four cases. Nevertheless, the cases having been taken,
I have conceived it to be my duty to consider them on
their merits, because I cannot reconcile voting to dismiss
the writs as 'improvidently granted' with the Court's
'rule of four.' In my opinion due adherence to that rule
requires that once certiorari has been granted a case
should be disposed of on the premise that it is properly
here, in the absence of considerations appearing which
were not manifest or fully apprehended at the time certiorari was granted." Ferguson v. Moore-McCormack
Lines, 352, U. S. 521, 559 (1957) (separate opinion).
I find the reasoning of Justice Harlan persuasive and in the
best interest of the Court as an institution in which rules are
followed consistently. 4 Accordingly, I reluctantly join JusTICE BRENNAN in dissenting from dismissal of the case and
address the merits. Under our decision in Payton, a warrantless nonconsensual entry into the home to make a felony
arrest is unconstitutional absent exigent circumstances.
The privacy of the home deserves at least as much protection
under the Fourth Amendment in the case of a warrantless
• Justice Harlen did qualify his strict adherence to the rule of four by
saying that it must be respected "in the absence of considerations appearing which were not manifest or fully apprehended at the time certiorari
was granted." Id., at 559. The considerations that prompted me to vote
to deny the petition for certiorari are essentially the same I have identified
above. It was my opinion then, as it is now, that the warrentless entry
and arrest for a civil offense was unlawful, but the case itself falls far short
of being important enough for this Court to review it. The four Justices
who voted to grant simply viewed the case differently.

82-.5466--DISSENT
4

WELSH v. WISCONSIN

entry to arrest for a civil traffic offense. In my view the Supreme Court of Wisconsin erred in finding that the entry was
justified by exigent circumstances. 5 There was, however,
conflicting evidence as to whether the entry had been consensual, and it is agreed there was probable cause to arrest.
The issue of consent remained to be decided by the Wisconsin
courts. 6 Accordingly, I also would vacate the judgment of
the Supreme Court of Wisconsin and remand the case for further proceedings.

5
I agree with the finding of the Wisconsin Court of Appeals that in this
case there was neither "hot pursuit" nor other circumstances that required
this night time entry into respondent's home. Preservation of evidence,
for example, does not in every case create an exigency sufficient to justify
warrantless entry into the home. In this case, the State's interest in the
evidence was relatively slight. Under Wisconsin law, only a traffic offense had been committed. Nor had there been a showing that a warrant
could not have been obtained promptly.
6
I do not think it is necessary in this case to consider a "bright line" rule
as to less serious offenses. See, JUSTICE BRENNAN's opinion, Part II, A,
ante, at 8. It is settled that exigent circumstances may justify a warrantless entry where a felony reasonably is believed to have been committed.
I see no reason in this case to foreclose the possibility that some circumstances may justify a warrantless entry where the offense is less serious
than a felony.

To: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Rehnquist
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor
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JUSTICE POWELL, concurring.
I originally voted to deny certiorari in this case, and the
opinions of my Brothers filed today reinforce my view that it
was a mistake for this Court to agree to review the case.
The Wisconsin laws with respect to driving while intoxicated,
in effect at the time, may be unique. At least, they suggest
an extraordinary degree of tolerance. Driving under the influence was classified as a civil offense-in effect only a traffic
offense-requiring a "forfeiture of not more than $200."
§ 3 . 2) Wise. Stat. 1975. Moreover, although the case
has been c sidered by three Wisconsin courts, in the end, it
could be deci
on factual grounds that the state court has
yet to consider. 1 t ~y opinion~~ this Court sliould not - 1
have taken this case to consider eitller the meaning of the - - - - Wisconsin statute or the validity of the warrantless entry and
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'The Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, concluding
that absent consent the warrantless entry and arrest of petitioner violated
the Fourth Amendment. That court remanded the case, however, for further findings as to whether the police had entered petitioner's home with
consent-an issue the state trial court had not decided. Before the trial
court could consider that issue, the Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed the
intermediate appellate court, concluding that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless entry and arrest. Thus it may be that the warrantless entry and arrest are justified even in the absence of exigent
circumstances.

I

'

f

82-5466-CONCUR
2

WELSH v. WISCONSIN

Although I would dismiss the case as improvidently
granted, I write briefly to record my views on the positions
taken by the plurality and dissenting opinions. The plurality
would not reach the constitutional question only because the
Wisconsin statute, at the time of petitioner's arrest, did not
expressly say that the required arrest must be "lawful."
This argument is advanced despite the fact that both the Wisconsin Court of Appeals and Supreme Court read the state
statute as requiring a lawful arrest. Quite apart from this
construction by the courts of Wisconsin, I find it unreasonable to assume that any doubt exists as to the statutory intent. When an "arrest" is a statutory prerequisite to imposition of a penalty, this Court should assume the statute
requires a lawful rather than an unlawful arrest.
I therefore agree with JUSTICE BRENNAN's view as to the
construction of the Wisconsin statute. Moreover, I have no
doubt that absent consent the warrantless entry and arrest in
this case constituted a violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments. Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573 (1980),
held that a warrantless nonconsensual entry into a home to
make a felony arrest is unconstitutional absent exigent circumstances. The privacy of the home deserves at least as
much protection under the Fourth Amendment in the case of
a warrantless entry to arrest for a civil traffic offense. In
my view the Supreme Court of Wisconsin erred in finding
that the entry was justified by exigent circumstances. I
agree with the finding of the Wisconsin Court of Appeals that
in this case there was neither "hot pursuit" nor other circumstances that required this night-time entry into respondent's
home. Preservation of evidence, for example, does not in
every case create an exigency sufficient to justify warrantless entry into the home. In this case, the State's interest in
the evidence was relatively slight. Under Wisconsin law,
only a traffic offense had been committed. Nor had there

.-
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been a showing that a warrant could not have been obtained
promptly. 2
In sum, I agree only with the conclusion of the plurality
that this case should be dismissed as improvidently granted.

' I do not join JUSTICE BRENNAN's dissenting opinion, particularly its
approval of a "bright line" principle. See, Part II, A, ante, at 8. It is
settled that exigent circumstances may justify a warrantless entry where a
felony reasonably is believed to have been committed. I see no reason in
this case to foreclose the possibility that some circumstances may justify a
warrantless entry where the offense is less serious than a felony.

To: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Rehnquist
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor
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JUSTICE POWELL,

c~b

~voted to deny certiorari in this case, and the
opinions, my Jl:r9taePs filed today reinforce my view that it

was a mistake for this Court to agree to review the case.
The Wisconsin laws with respect to driving while intoxicated,
in effect at the time, may be unique. At least, they suggest
an extraordinary degree of tolerance. Driving under the influence was classified as a civil offense-in effect only a traffic
offense-requiring a "forfeiture of not more than $200."
§ 346.65(2) Wise. Stat. 1975. Moreover, although the ~~
has been considered by three Wisconsin courts, in the en<{bit
..--~~'"t.- _ J
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is case to consider eith
the meaning of the Wisconsin statute or the validity of tH
arrantless entry and arrest of the petitioner.
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' The Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, concluding
that absent consent the warrantless entry and arrest of petitioner violated
the Fourth Amendment. That court remanded the case, however, for further findings as to whether the police had entered petitioner's home with
consent-an issue the state trial court had not decided. Before the trial
court could consider that issue, the Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed the
intermediate appellate court, concluding that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless entry and arrest. Thus it may be that the warrantless entry and arrest are justified even in the absence of exigent
circumstances.
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granted, I write briefly to record my views on the p · ions
taken by the plurality and dissenting opinions. T plurality
would not reach the constitutional question o y because the
Wisconsin statute, at the time of petitio 's arrest, did not
expressly say that the required arr t must be "lawful."
This argument is advanced despite e fact that both the Wisconsin Court of Appeals and
preme Court read the state
statute as requiring a la
arrest. Quite apart from this
construction by the co s of Wisconsin, I find it unreasonable to assume that ny doubt exists as to the statutory intent. When an " rrest" is a statutory prerequisite to imposition of a R alty, this Court should assume the statute
requires awful rather than an unlawful arrest.
It efore agree with JUSTICE BRENNAN's view as to th
c struction of the Wisconsin statute.
oreover, I have no
doubt that absent consent the warrantless entry and arrest in
this case constituted a violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments. Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573 (1980),
held that a warrantless nonconsensual entry into a home to
make a felony arrest is unconstitutional absent exigent circumstances. The privacy of the home deserves at least as
much protection under the Fourth Amendment in the case of
a warrantless entry to arrest for a civil traffic offense. In
my view the Supreme Court of Wisconsin erred in finding
that the entry was justified by exigent circumstances. I
agree with the finding of the Wisconsin Court of Appeals that
in this case there was neither "hot pursuit" nor other circumstances that required this night-time entry into respondent's
home. Preservation of evidence, for example, does not in
every case create an exigency sufficient to justify warrantless entry into the home. In this case, the State's interest in
the evidence was relatively slight. Under Wisconsin law,
only a traffic offense had been committed. Nor had there
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been a showing that a warrant could not have been obtained
promptly. 2
n -sunl,T a ee only with the conclusion of the plurality
that this case should be dismissed as improvidently granted

I do not join JUSTICE BRENNAN's dissenting opinion, particularly its
approval of a "bright line" principle. See, Part II, A, ante, at 8. It is
settled that exigent circumstances may justify a warrantless entry where a
felony reasonably is believed to have been committed. I see no reason in
this case to foreclose the possibility that some circumstances may justify a
warrantless entry where the offense is less serious than a felony.
2

To: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice White
Justice Marshall
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Justice Rehnquist
Justice Stevens
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JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting.
I voted to deny certiorari in this case, and the opinions filed
today reinforce my view that it was a mistake for this Court
to agree to review the case. The Wisconsin laws with respect to driving while intoxicated, in effect at the time, may
be unique. At least, they suggest an extraordinary degree
of tolerance. Driving under the influence was classified as a
civil offense-in effect only a traffic offense-requiring a "forfeiture of not more than $200." § 346.65(2) Wise. Stat. 1975.
Moreover, although the case has been considered by three
Wisconsin courts, in the end it still could be decided on factual grounds that the state trial court has yet to consider. 1
We nevertheless granted certiorari, the case has been
briefed and argued here, and opinions have been written: a
Per Curiam dismissing the case as improvidently granted and
dissenting opinions by JUSTICE BRENNAN, JUSTICE BLACK'The Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, concluding
that absent consent the warrantless entry and arrest of petitioner violated
the Fourth Amendment. That court remanded the case, however, for further findings as to whether the police had entered petitioner's home with
consent-an issue the state trial court had not decided. Before the trial
court could consider that issue, the Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed the
intermediate appellate court, concluding that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless entry and arrest. Thus it may be that the warrantless entry and arrest are justified even in the absence of exigent
circumstances.
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MUN, and JUSTICE STEVENS. The Per Curiam dismisses
the case, concluding that the constitutional question is not
properly here, primarily because the Wisconsin statute-at
the time of petitioner's arrest-did not expressly state that
the required arrest must be "lawful." It is difficult to agree
with this reasoning. Both the Wisconsin Court of Appeals
and Supreme Court read the state statute as requiring a lawful arrest. But quite apart from this construction by the
state courts, I find it unreasonable to think that any doubt
exists as to the statutory intent. When an "arrest" is a statutory prerequisite to the imposition of a penalty, I would assume that the statute requires a lawful rather than an unlawful arrest.
I agree with JUSTICE BRENNAN'S construction of the statute. I therefore think the constitutional question that
prompted the granting of this case now is properly here.
Moreover, I have no doubt that absent consent the warrantless entry and arrest in this case constituted a violation of the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Payton v. New York,
445 U. S. 573 (1980), held that a warrantless nonconsensual
entry into a home to make a felony arrest is unconstitutional
absent exigent circumstances. The privacy of the home deserves at least as much protection under the Fourth Amendment in the case of a warrantless entry to arrest for a civil
traffic offense. In my view the Supreme Court of Wisconsin
erred in finding that the entry was justified by exigent circumstances. I agree with the finding of the Wisconsin Court
of Appeals that in this case there was neither "hot pursuit"
nor other circumstances that required this night-time entry
into respondent's home. Preservation of evidence, for example, does not in every case create an exigency sufficient to
justify warrantless entry into the home. In this case, the
State's interest in the evidence was relatively slight. Under
Wisconsin law, only a traffic offense had been committed.
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Nor had there been a showing that a warrant could not have
been obtained promptly. 2
In sum, I agree with the dissent that the judgment of the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin should be vacated and the case
remanded for further proceedings.

' I do not join JUSTICE BRENNAN's dissenting opinion, particularly its
approval of a "bright line" principle. See, Part II, A, ante, at 8. It is
settled that exigent circumstances may justify a warrantless entry where a
felony reasonably is believed to have been committed. I see no reason in
this case to foreclose the possibility that some circumstances may justify a
warrantless entry where the offense is less serious than a felony.
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JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting.
I ~oted to deny certiorari in this case, and the
opinions filed today reinforce my view that it was a mistake
for this Court to agree to review the case. The Wisconsin
laws with respect to driving while intoxicated, in effect at the
time, may be unique. At least, they suggest an extraordinary degree of tolerance. Driving under the influence was
classified as a civil offense-in effect only a traffic offenserequiring a "forfeiture of not more than $200." § 346.65(2)
Wise. Stat. 1975. Moreover, although the case has been considered by three Wisconsin courts, in the end it still could be
deci~ed o~ f ctual ~ounds th~t the state trial :ourt ~s yet to _ ~
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eless granted certwran, the case has been
briefed and argued here, and opinions have been written: a

1
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, concluding
that absent consent the warrantless entry and arrest of petitioner violated
the Fourth Amendment. That court remanded the case, however, for further findings as to whether the police had entered petitioner's home with
consent-an issue the state trial court had not decided. Before the trial
court could consider that issue, the Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed the
intermediate appellate court, concluding that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless entry and arrest. Thus it may be that the warrantless entry and arrest are justified even in the absence of exigent
circumstances.
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Per Curiam dismissing the case as improvidently granted and
dissenting opinions by JUSTICE BRENNAN, JUSTICE BLACKMUN, and JusTICE STEVENS. The Per Curiam dismisses
the case, concluding that the constitutional question is not
properly here, primarily because the Wisconsin statute-at
the time of petitioner's arrest-did not expressly state that
the required arrest must be "lawful." It is difficult to agree
with this reasoning. Both the Wisconsin Court of Appeals
and Supreme Court read the state statute as requiring a lawful arrest. But quite apart from this construction by the
state courts, I find it unreasonable to think that any doubt
exists as to the statutory intent. When an "arrest" is a statutory prerequisite to the imposition of a penalty, I would assume that the statute requires a lawful rather than an unlawful arrest.
I agree with JUSTICE BRENNAN'S construction of the statute. I therefore think the constitutional question that
prompted the granting of this cas IS roper y ere.
oreover, I have no doubt that absent c sent the warrantless entry and arrest in this case constituted a violation of the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Payton v. New York,
445 U. S. 573 (1980), held that a warrantless nonconsensual
entry into a home to make a felony arrest is unconstitutional
absent exigent circumstances. The privacy of the home deserves at least as much protection under the Fourth Amendment in the case of a warrantless entry to arrest for a civil
traffic offense. In my view the Supreme Court of Wisconsin
erred in finding that the entry was justified by exigent circumstances. I agree with the finding of the Wisconsin Court
of Appeals that in this case there was neither "hot pursuit"
nor other circumstances that required this night-time entry
into respondent's home. Preservation of evidence, for example, does not in every case create an exigency sufficient to
justify warrantless entry into the home. In this case, the
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State's interest in the evidence was relatively slight. Under
Wisconsin law, only a traffic offense had been committed.
Nor had there been a showing that a warrant could not have
been obtained promptly. 2
In sum, I agree with the dissent that the judgment of the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin should be vacated and the case
remanded for further proceedings.

2
I do not join JusTICE BRENNAN's dissenting opinion, particularly its
approval of a "bright line" principle. See, Part II, A, ante, at 8. It is
settled that exigent circumstances may justify a warrantless entry where a
felony reasonably is believed to have been committed. I see no reason in
this case to foreclose the possibility that some circumstances may justify a
warrantless entry where the offense is less serious than a felony.
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JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting.
I voted to deny certiorari in this case, and the opinions filed
today reinforce my view that it was a mistake for this Court
to agree to review the case. The Wisconsin laws with respect to driving while intoxicated, in effect at the time, may
be unique. At least, they suggest an extraordinary degree
of tolerance. Driving under the influence was classified as a
civil offense--in effect only a traffic offense--requiring a "forfeiture of not more than $200." § 346. 65(2) Wise. Stat. 1975.
Moreover, although the case has been considered by three
Wisconsin courts, in the end it still could be decided on factual grounds that the state trial court has yet to consider. 1
We nevertheless granted certiorari, the case has been
briefed and argued here, and opinions have been written: a
Per Curiam dismissing the case as improvidently granted and
dissenting opinions by JUSTICE BRENNAN, JUSTICE BLACK'The Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, concluding
that absent consent the warrantless entry and arrest of petitioner violated
the Fourth Amendment. That court remanded the case, however, for further findings as to whether the police had entered petitioner's home with
consent-an issue the state trial court had not decided. Before the trial
court could consider that issue, the Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed the
intermediate appellate court, concluding that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless entry and arrest. Thus it may be that the warrantless entry and arrest are justified even in the absence of exigent
circumstances.

82-5466--DISSENT
2

WELSH v. WISCONSIN

MUN, and JUSTICE STEVENS. The Per Curiam dismisses
the case, concluding that the constitutional question is not
properly here, primarily because the Wisconsin statute-at
the time of petitioner's arrest-did not expressly state that
the required arrest must be "lawful." It is difficult to agree
with this reasoning. Both the Wisconsin Court of Appeals
and Supreme Court read the state statute as requiring a lawful arrest. But quite apart from this construction by the
state courts, I find it unreasonable to think that any doubt
exists as to the statutory intent. When an "arrest" is a statutory prerequisite to the imposition of a penalty, I would assume that the statute requires a lawful rather than an unlawful arrest.
I agree with JUSTICE BRENNAN's construction of the statute. I therefore think the constitutional question that
prompted the granting of this case now is properly here.
Moreover, I have no doubt that absent consent the warrantless entry and arrest in this case constituted a violation of the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Payton v. New York,
445 U. S. 573 (1980), held that a warrantless nonconsensual
entry into a home to make a felony arrest is unconstitutional
absent exigent circumstances. The privacy of the home deserves at least as much protection under the Fourth Amendment in the case of a warrantless entry to arrest for a civil
traffic offense. In my view the Supreme Court of Wisconsin
erred in finding that the entry was justified by exigent circumstances. I agree with the finding of the Wisconsin Court
of Appeals that in this case there was neither "hot pursuit"
nor other circumstances that required this night-time entry
into respondent's home. Preservation of evidence, for example, does not in every case create an exigency sufficient to
justify warrantless entry into the home. In this case, the
State's interest in the evidence was relatively slight. Under
Wisconsin law, only a traffic offense had been committed.
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Nor had there been a showing that a warrant could not have
been obtained promptly. 2
In sum, I agree with the dissent that the judgment of the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin should be vacated and the case
remanded for further proceedings.

2
I do not join JuSTICE BRENNAN's dissenting opinion, particularly its
approval of a "bright line" principle. See, Part II, A, ante, at 8. It is
settled that exigent circumstances may justify a warrantless entry where a
felony reasonably is believed to have been committed. I see no reason in
this case to foreclose the possibility that some circumstances may justify a
warrantless entry where the offense is less serious than a felony.

